Russo-Ukrainian war is a proxy war for Asian powers

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 17–23 November 2024

Five publications (Foreign Policy, The National Interest, The Wall Street Journal, The Economist, and The Globe and Mail) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

Moscow will exploit the US presidential transition to its own ends. Raffaele Marchetti (National Interest) declares that the next few weeks of fighting will be crucial in determining the geographical settlement between Russia and Ukraine. The intensification of Russia’s offensive is the result of Moscow’s belief that a Donald Trump presidency will end Russia’s war against Ukraine in a way that best serves its interests. Therefore, Moscow seeks to liberate the territory of Kursk and capture as much Ukrainian territory as possible in the short period of time before the rotation of the US president. Russia’s involvement of North Korean troops should be viewed in the same light. Moscow raised the stakes by asking Pyongyang not only for ammunition, missiles, and other military equipment but also for its soldiers. In turn, for Pyongyang “Russia is expected to reciprocate now and in the future with upgraded military technology for both conventional and nuclear capabilities that North Korea strives for.” This step is beneficial to Russia, as it helps to resolve its political issues: “From the Russian side, having an additional source of military personnel is decisive not only to increase the impact on the ground but also to reduce the pressure on national conscription, which has been painful since the beginning of the war. Moreover, in case of casualties, of course, the loss of a foreign Korean soldier is less politically costly for the Kremlin.” For North Korea there are also political and economic benefits: “From the DPRK side, sending troops is a relatively small cost compared with the significant benefits that the country can accrue in terms of enhanced military capabilities and political alliance with Russia. In case of casualties, the political cost will be minor, given the tight media censorship and social control in the country.” In sum, according to Marchetti, “These next few weeks of transition, while Trump awaits his seat in the White House, will be crucial in determining the exact delineation of the future Ukrainian-Russian border.”

US sends a message to North Korea. The editorial board of The Economist argues that the decision to allow Ukraine to strike deep into Russia will not fundamentally change the situation on the battlefield, but it may deter Pyongyang from providing additional military support to Moscow. The Biden administration has imposed restrictions on the use of US long-range weapons for three reasons. Firstly, there is a limited number of ATACMS and a need for them in different parts of the world. Second, the use of ATACMS will possibly not have a significant impact on the situation on the battlefield, as the main targets are beyond reach. Third, the risk of escalation of the military conflict becomes greater. Ukraine and its supporters have refuted these arguments: “There are more than enough ATACMS—more than 1,000 on some estimates—in America’s inventory, they argue, and they are being gradually replaced with newer and longer-ranged missiles. Russian jets may be out of range, but other targets—depots, command posts, logistics hubs and the like—abound. The main targets would be Russian helicopters and attack aircraft providing close-air-support to troops, notes Tatarigami, a pseudonymous former Ukrainian officer who tracks the war. Escalation concerns are also overdone, they argue. After all, Mr Putin considers Crimea to be an inalienable part of Russia and yet did nothing in response to ATACMS strikes there. Likewise, he failed to take any dramatic retaliatory steps in response to the West’s steady intensification of arms supply from small arms to missiles to tanks to fighter jets.” The Economist argues that the White House’s decision to strike deep into Russia raises questions: (1) Why did President Biden authorise these strikes now? (2) Will the UK, France, and Germany, like the US, give permission to use their weapons? and (3) How will Moscow react to this decision? According to the editorial board, “Mr. Biden may be hoping that Mr. Putin will not respond aggressively, in order to keep open the prospect of cutting a deal with Mr. Trump next year. The president-elect reportedly told Mr. Putin on a phone call that he should not escalate the war. If that is true—the Kremlin denies that the phone call took place—then both Mr. Biden and Mr. Trump will have had their answer in the skies above Ukraine in the early hours of November 17th: the largest air attacks since last year, crippling Ukraine’s power grid and killing a reported 18 people.”

Russia’s war against Ukraine is a proxy war for Asian powers. Jeffrey W. Hornung (Foreign Policy) emphasizes that Russia’s war against Ukraine has all the hallmarks of a proxy war. Moscow has clearly articulated its position that “Ukraine has no agency as an independent state and that the target of its invasion is the West—specifically, the United States.” For its part, NATO members and a number of other allies have been supporting Ukraine by providing financial and military assistance. The West’s intention may be to protect Ukraine, but its efforts are necessarily directed at Russia. Now, more and more states in the Indo-Pacific region are joining the war. Moscow is indisputably being actively supported by Beijing and Pyongyang. China has become Russia’s key partner, keeping its economy and military industry afloat: “Russia now imports most of its battlefield goods and critical components from China; according to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, China now supplies Russia with about 90 percent of its microelectronics imports and 70 percent of machine tool imports. According to customs data, Beijing ships more than $300 million worth of dual-use goods to Russia every month.” North Korea has adopted a more direct strategy of supporting Russia: “It was one of only five countries that voted against the UN General Assembly resolution opposing Russia’s aggression, and last week Pyongyang ratified a military alliance that pledges either country to aid the other in case of attack. North Korea has provided Russia with artillery shells and ballistic missiles to support dwindling munition stockpiles. But the most escalatory step occurred last month, when North Korea sent about 10,000 troops to Russia, some of whom are now reported to be fighting the Ukrainians in Russia’s Kursk region.” Notably, Kyiv is supported by two other East Asian states: Japan and South Korea. Tokyo has joined the West’s sanctions against Moscow and “also provides direct and indirect assistance to Ukraine, including nonkinetic military equipment—including vehicles, flak jackets, and reconnaissance drones—as well as some $12 billion in other aid, making Tokyo one of Kyiv’s top bilateral donors. Japan also revised its restrictions on weapons exports, enabling the transfer of Japanese-manufactured Patriot missiles to the United States, thereby helping to ensure US stockpiles remain stable even as some of this equipment is sent to help Ukraine. And diplomatically, Japan has used its connections to act as a convening power to help Ukraine.” Seoul has focused its support on humanitarian aid and “other nonlethal support, such as mine-clearing equipment, body armor, and helmets.” The motivation of these four East Asian actors has all the hallmarks of a proxy war: “Both Beijing and Pyongyang have an overarching strategic interest in seeing Moscow prevail. Both share Russia’s vision of a post-Western world order, in which the United States and its allies are weakened.” Seoul and Tokyo have opposite goals: “As a status quo power, Tokyo has a strategic interest in ensuring that the existing order does not falter.” According to Hornung, “Beijing, Pyongyang, Seoul, and Tokyo are supporting their respective partners on European soil in order to wage a much broader struggle over the future of the international order. This, in turn, indicates the extent to which the war has become global—and has set a new precedent for how Asian nations compete for their interests in other parts of the world.”

Donald Trump should implement Churchill’s option for peace. Margus Tsahkna (Wall Street Journal) argues that Ukraine’s victory over Russia is in the interests of the US. A weak peace agreement between Kyiv and Moscow, despite a certain attractiveness of such a step, will only weaken the position of Western states in the world. Newly elected US President Donald Trump should not repeat the past mistakes of democratic forces during war: “In 1938, [Neville] Chamberlain was convinced that by making concessions to Adolf Hitler he would bring peace to Europe. But as Churchill argued at the time, forcing Czechoslovakia to concede territories inhabited by Sudeten Germans to Germany emboldened Hitler. To a dictator spurred by imperialist ideas, this kind of acquiescence demonstrated weakness and encouraged him to demand even more.” The incoming POTUS should emulate Winston Churchill’s approach to securing a genuine and just peace. Washington should not publicly hint at any territorial concessions to Ukraine, as this would only encourage Russia to engage in new aggression. Moscow shall use peace as an opportunity to prepare for a new, bloodier war. Such prospects are contrary to US interests, as Europe under the shadow of a military threat will also mean losses stateside: “The US economy is deeply integrated with Europe’s—each is [by some measures] the other’s most important market. Any European country preoccupied with fending off an invader is also out of the business of buying American civilian goods or services. Fighting leads to logistical knots for international trade, which means shortages and increased prices for Americans.” The fate of Ukraine will also affect US security interests around the world: “Iran and North Korea have enabled Russia’s war. A victory for Mr. Putin is a win for all these regimes. It would also upend the existing Western-led international order and inspire further acts of aggression.” In turn, Ukraine’s clear victory and Russia’s defeat will prove that the US and its allies are strong enough to withstand military and diplomatic challenges around the world. According to Tsahkna, “The only path to peace is for Russia to withdraw from Ukraine and remain within its borders, with Moscow’s defeat made bluntly clear. Mr. Trump has a chance to be the one who brings a just peace to Europe. I hope he takes it.”

At 1,000 days of all-out war, Ukraine’s future hinges on geopolitical shifts, Western resolve. Andrew Hammond (Globe and Mail) reminds readers that Ukraine just recently marked 1,000 days since Russia’s full-scale invasion, a grim milestone underscored by significant developments that signal a potential turning point. The election of Donald Trump to a second US presidential term introduces a pivotal shift in the geopolitical landscape. While his promise to end the war in a single day seems unrealistic, his likely pressure for a negotiated settlement has been felt by both President Putin and President Zelensky. Escalating offensives from Russia, including devastating airstrikes, and Ukraine’s use of newly authorized long-range Western missiles into Russian territory reflect both sides’ efforts to maximize battlefield gains before a potential peace process. North Korea’s entry into the war on Russia’s side, particularly in the fight in Kursk oblast, has further complicated the dynamics. As one expert notes, the war may be heading toward a “Korea-style scenario,” where Ukraine could cede a fifth of its prewar territory while the remainder integrates with the West. The author also notes that Europe must step up its support, particularly given concerns that Trump might reduce critical US funding for Ukraine. While leaders like Germany’s Olaf Scholz and Britain’s Keir Starmer support the Biden administration’s decision to provide Ukraine with long-range missiles, dissent from Italy’s Giorgia Meloni reveals fractures in Western unity. A coordinated European approach could solidify Kyiv’s negotiating position and strengthen Ukraine’s potential integration into NATO and the EU. “The war is now entering a new phase. Given huge uncertainty ahead for Ukraine, now is the moment for Europe to double down on its commitment to Mr. Zelensky given the huge incentives they have to bolster his negotiating position ahead of 2025,” Hammond writes.

Canada could pursue BRICS observer status to diversify its role amid US shift. Emerson Csorba (Globe and Mail) suggests that Canada should diversify its economic and geopolitical relations, particularly in light of a potential second Trump administration, which is expected to adopt a protectionist approach that could significantly harm Canada’s economy. With projections showing a potential 2% drop in Canada’s GDP due to this policy, the author stresses the urgency for Canada to broaden its international engagement. One key recommendation is for Canada to pursue observer status in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), a growing multilateral bloc that also includes emerging economies such as Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. This strategy would allow Canada to foster stronger ties with countries that occupy a middle ground between the West and the Global East, allowing it to maintain its traditional role as a mediator in global affairs. Csorba emphasizes that “engagement with these BRICS members is paramount as the world becomes resolutely multipolar and dangerous,” and warns that Canada risks increased dependence on the US and marginalization in geopolitics if it continues to avoid these crucial relationships. In the author’s opinion, the potential benefits of BRICS observer status for Canada include greater economic diversification, access to investment opportunities, and strategic balancing of relationships with both Western and Eastern powers. This would help Canada protect its interests and enhance its global role, similar to its historical role during the Cold War as an intermediary between the US and countries like the USSR and China. However, Csorba also acknowledges the risks, particularly given the challenging dynamics within BRICS, such as the rivalry between China and India, and the bloc’s growing inclination to circumvent global economic systems.

Putin escalates nuclear threats, challenges the West. Mark MacKinnon (Globe and Mail) notes that Vladimir Putin has escalated Russia’s stance in the ongoing war in Ukraine, challenging the United States and its allies by revising Russia’s nuclear doctrine and increasing military threats. Putin’s new doctrine lowers the threshold for using nuclear weapons, now allowing for a nuclear response if Russia faces a “critical threat” to its sovereignty or territorial integrity, particularly in scenarios where non-nuclear states like Ukraine are backed by nuclear powers. With Ukraine’s use of Western-made long-range missiles, including US-made ATACMS and British Storm Shadows, Putin aims to provoke a response from the West. His revised policy signals a higher risk of nuclear escalation, with Moscow presenting the West with an ultimatum: either accept nuclear conflict or end the war on Russia’s terms. “Putin’s bet is that the US and its allies will not escalate to nuclear war over Ukraine,” which is why he continues to push the boundaries of Western tolerance, MacKinnon argues. The situation could grow more dangerous in the coming months, particularly with the approaching second-term transition of US President Trump, who has expressed intentions to push for an end to the war. Western diplomats fear that Putin could leverage this transition period to further escalate tensions, framing it as a choice between peace on Russia’s terms or nuclear conflict. The next few months will be crucial as Russia seeks to shape the battlefield ahead of any negotiations, while the West must carefully calibrate its response to avoid a nuclear standoff.

US approval of ATACMS offers Ukraine new strategic edge, but critics say delay erodes impact. Jane Lytvynenko (Wall Street Journal) argues that the Biden administration’s decision to authorize Ukraine’s use of the US-supplied ATACMS missiles marks a significant shift in military strategy, allowing Ukraine to potentially disrupt Russia’s logistical supply chains. With the missiles able to hit targets up to 190 miles away, they offer Ukraine an opportunity to target critical assets—including ammunition depots, airports, and military staging areas—in regions like Kursk, where Russian forces have concentrated troops and equipment. This new capability could hinder Russia’s ability to resupply its forces, particularly in vital areas like Kursk, where Russian troops and newly arrived North Korean recruits are stationed. The missiles could force Russia to reposition its high-value assets, such as aircraft and troops, farther from the front lines, making it harder for Moscow to respond swiftly to Ukrainian offensives. As one analyst notes: “The ATACMS could give Ukraine more time to maneuver and strategize, forcing Russia to expend valuable resources to maintain its supply lines.” Despite the strategic advantages of ATACMS, critics argue that the delay in authorizing the missiles has diminished their potential impact. Russia has had months to prepare for the missile strikes, moving high-priority targets such as planes and helicopters beyond the range of the ATACMS, Lytvynenko stresses. This delayed response has allowed Russia to mitigate some of the missiles’ effectiveness. “While Ukraine fights for months to secure new weapons, Russia obtains what it needs to kill Ukrainians and seize their land,” said former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. The US permission, though significant, may be too late to turn the tide on the battlefield in the short term. However, the authorization signals continued Western support for Ukraine and gives the country new tools to slow its advances in the occupied regions.