Europe can take over role of US in Ukraine

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 10–16 November 2024

Five publications (The Atlantic, Foreign Policy, The Washington Post, Globe and Mail, and Foreign Affairs) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

Supporting Ukraine is Europe’s task. Phillips Payson O’Brien (Atlantic) argues that Europe should develop its own plans to support Ukraine and strengthen its own security, as the US global role will diminish. European leaders need to consider a future “world where NATO no longer exists—or where the United States is no longer the leading force in the alliance.” Europe has enough economic and technological resources to defend itself: “It has a large and educated enough population to staff modern armed forces. It also has some strong and growing military capabilities. For instance, European states either have received or will receive in the coming years as many as 600 F-35 fighters—the most advanced and capable aircraft in the world. Such a force could dominate the skies against a clearly inferior Russian opponent.” However, Europe also has many weaknesses: “It has developed a shockingly large number of military hardware systems but then only builds a small number of each. This boutique way of addressing military capability has been exacerbated by a weakness in investing in logistics and a limited ability to produce supplies and equipment quickly and reliably enough to sustain a war effort.” According to the author, rapid expansion of defense systems would be difficult but not impossible. The priority for European capitals should be to provide Ukraine with everything it needs, in case Washington withdraws its support. Europe has the capacity to provide Kyiv with more ammunition and ground-based air defense systems, including German-made Taurus cruise missiles; allow Ukraine to strike deep into Russia; jointly modernize and expand the capabilities of Ukrainian drones, and so on. It is also possible that Europe could deploy military units—at least in western Ukraine—or “could take over air-defense responsibilities—shooting down Russian missiles and drones without directly killing Russian soldiers.” Such steps would reassure the Ukrainian people that they will not be alone if the US leaves, and that their future lies in Europe. According to O’Brien, the biggest obstacle to the implementation of these steps is psychological: “After decades of expecting the United States to act wisely and forcefully in defense of the broader democratic world, Europe needs to start thinking and acting on its own and in its own interests. Trump’s return means that things previously inconceivable must be faced. And in Ukraine, a new Europe can be born.”

Kremlin is not fighting for land in Ukraine. Anne Applebaum (Atlantic) argues that the team of the newly elected US president will face a “land for peace” dilemma in resolving the Russo-Ukrainian war. However, this approach is false, as Moscow is not seeking to conquer territory but to destroy Ukraine as a nation: “He wants to show his own people that Ukraine’s democratic aspirations are hopeless. He wants to prove that a whole host of international laws and norms, including the United Nations Charter and the Geneva conventions, no longer matter. His goal is not to have peace but to build concentration camps, torture civilians, kidnap 20,000 Ukrainian children, and get away with it—which, so far, he has.” In addition, through its aggression against Ukraine, Russia seeks to demonstrate the weakness of the United States, NATO, and the West as a whole. In the author’s opinion, Moscow may be interested in suspending the war, but the motive for such a step is the desire to build up strength before a new offensive. Moscow will stop fighting only when it either loses the war or loses power and control over its economy. For his part, in the last two months of his presidency Joe Biden will have the opportunity to take a number of steps to support Ukraine and stabilize the front: (1) allow Kyiv to strike deep into Russia; (2) provide financial support to Ukraine: “Biden must press upon the Europeans, as a matter of urgency, the need to transfer frozen Russian assets to Kyiv—not just the interest but the capital.” According to Applebaum, Russia’s victory would not make Europe safer or the US stronger. Instead, costs would increase: “A massive refugee crisis, an arms race, and possibly a new round of nuclear proliferation could follow as European and Asian democracies assess the new level of danger from the autocratic world. An invasion of Taiwan becomes more likely. An invasion of a NATO state becomes thinkable.”

Europe can take over role of US in Ukraine. Paul Hockenos (Foreign Policy) underlines that Europe should take responsibility for Ukraine, especially given that the US may soon stop military and financial assistance to Ukraine. This will be a challenge for European countries, but also an opportunity for a united Europe: “The fear of a Russian rout of Ukraine…could motivate Europe to try assuming responsibility for supporting Ukraine on its own—beginning with a recognition that ramping up its support is not beyond its ability.” Europe has done a lot to support Kyiv, but now it must lead a global coalition to support Ukraine. In the author’s opinion, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and her potential foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas can handle this task. Other leaders of the great European powers will be focused on their own internal problems. The EU leadership needs to convince its citizens that Russia’s war against Ukraine directly affects them, “and Ukraine’s defeat would throw into jeopardy much of what decades of integration has accomplished—and cost their countries dearly in many ways.” One of the steps that could bring Ukraine’s victory closer is an Estonian initiative announced on the eve of the US elections: “It calls for all NATO members anteing up at least 0.25 percent of their GDP for Ukraine’s defense, as the Baltic states already do. That would net $131 billion for ensuring Ukraine can still purchase weapons to check Russia. The EU could also consider pursuing raising funds in this way on its own, outside of NATO.” Regardless of how the situation in the US develops, it is unlikely that Donald Trump will be leading an alliance against Russia. Therefore, according to Hockenos, Europe’s time has come: “It can grab the initiative and set the agenda rather than allowing the Orbans, Putins, and Xis of the world to do it their way.”

Biden should help Trump stop the Russo-Ukrainian war. Edward Fishman (Washington Post) emphasizes that the administration of President Joe Biden should give President-elect Donald Trump additional leverage over Russia. Currently, Washington has significant influence over Kyiv but almost no influence over Moscow. A key instrument of pressure on the Kremlin is sanctions, which have purportedly ceased to be effective over the past 18 months, with the US failing to close all loopholes. The limited effect of sanctions is partly explained by political considerations: “Ramping up sanctions on Russian oil was seen as too risky, as it might spike oil prices, worsen inflation, and undercut Democrats’ chances in the 2024 election.” It is unlikely that Donald Trump will decide to strengthen them. According to the author, there are three key steps that should be taken. First, the presidential administration should close the massive loophole for Russian energy: “Closing the energy sanctions loophole would make it much harder for Russian leader Vladimir Putin to fund the war with Russian oil revenue.” Second, expand the use of secondary sanctions: “Since December, Biden has threatened secondary sanctions on banks and companies that aid Russia’s military-industrial complex. But he has refrained from threatening secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil.” Third, ensure that Congress has a say in any future decision to lift sanctions on Russia: “Giving Congress a say over any decision to lift sanctions would substantially enhance Trump’s negotiating position with Putin. It would reduce the possibility that Putin could use flattery to persuade Trump to accept a bad deal.” According to Fishman, “There is no greater contribution Trump could make to the cause of world peace than ending the Russia-Ukraine war. The Biden team should do everything it can to help him in the little time it has left.”

Canada’s defence gaps loom amid Russia’s war in Ukraine. The Editorial board of the Globe and Mail highlights the significance of Remembrance Day as a time to reflect on the sacrifices of Canadian military personnel and calls for meaningful action to honour their legacy. The authors underscore that Canada’s historic contributions to global peace—defeating fascism, resisting Communism, and maintaining international stability—must be protected in the face of new threats, particularly Russia’s war against Ukraine that has been going on for the past 1,000 days. The unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine is described as a direct challenge to the “hard-won principle that armed might cannot redraw borders.” This war, supported by malign actors like Iran and North Korea, and with China’s ambitions in Taiwan looming, signals a critical moment for the West to defend the international order built through decades of sacrifice. The authors argue that Canada’s response, while supportive on providing aid to Ukraine, falls short in terms of addressing broader global security challenges. The board strongly criticizes Canada’s current defence posture, particularly its inadequate military spending and lack of preparedness in the Arctic. Despite promises to meet NATO’s 2% GDP defence spending target by 2032, the editorial warns this timeline is far too slow, given the urgency of current threats: “What borders will the Russian army have rolled past by then?” Former Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie’s scathing assessment of Canada’s military readiness is cited, highlighting the near-absence of Arctic defences and insufficient investment in rebuilding air and naval power. The authors stress that protecting Canada’s sovereignty and global peace will require significant financial sacrifices, akin to the spirit of service displayed by past generations. In honouring veterans, Canada must move beyond commemoration and commit to action, in order to preserve the freedoms they fought to secure.

Debunking the myths of 2014 Euromaidan Revolution proves agency over interference. Doug Sanders (Globe and Mail) debunks three persistent myths about Ukraine’s pivotal events of the Euromaidan revolution and everything that followed in 2014, which are often propagated by figures like Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, US President-elect Donald Trump, and some Western “realists.” First, it refutes the false claims of NATO involvement, emphasizing that Ukrainian membership in NATO was not on the agenda in 2014 or the years prior, as NATO nations were generally opposed to it. Second, it counters the narrative of a “coup,” highlighting that Ukraine’s democratic transition was led by its elected legislature using constitutional powers after Viktor Yanukovych’s departure. Lastly, it challenges the idea of extensive US interference, explaining that the United States neither significantly supported Ukraine at the time nor engineered the events. As the author notes, “the fate of Ukraine was left to Ukrainians,” underscoring the grassroots nature of the Maidan protests, driven by Ukrainians’ frustration over Yanukovych’s sudden pivot away from the EU under Russian pressure as well as deteriorating human rights and civil liberties. The United States did not interfere or provide significant support to Ukraine after Russia’s invasion, either. Putin sought to suggest otherwise by releasing a wiretapped call between Victoria Nuland and the US ambassador, but their discussions focused on mediating Ukraine’s democratic transition, which was led by its elected legislature—not a coup, according to the author. Frustration in Kyiv grew as Washington withheld support; in 2016, Barack Obama called Ukraine a “core interest” of Russia’s, and Donald Trump was later impeached for delaying aid to Ukraine for personal gain. Far from NATO expansion or Western meddling, Sanders writes, the events of 2014 were a genuine reaction to domestic and regional pressures.

Ukraine faces uncertainty with Trump’s return. Nataliya Gumenyuk (Foreign Affairs) notes that Ukrainians have responded with a mixture of humour and pragmatism regarding the potential return of Donald Trump to the White House. While many jokes circulated about Trump’s claim to end the war with Russia in 24 hours, the reality of the situation leaves Ukraine wary. Trump’s past statements, including his reluctance to fully support Ukraine and his admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin, raise concerns that his administration might reduce US military aid or even negotiate terms that would favour Russia. As the author notes, “Ukraine has many reasons to be concerned about a second Trump presidency,” but despite these concerns, the country remains focused on adapting to whatever challenges may arise. Ukrainians know that survival often means working with the hand they are dealt, including engaging with a president whose stance on the war remains unclear or unfavourable. Despite these uncertainties, Ukraine’s leadership, particularly President Volodymyr Zelensky, is preparing to engage with Trump, recalling the more pragmatic aspects of his first term. During Trump’s initial presidency, US support for Ukraine grew over time, particularly in terms of weapons like the Javelins, which were instrumental in the fight against Russia. While Trump’s statements have often been unpredictable, Ukraine’s strategy has been one of adaptability and cautious optimism. “Ukrainians have something else to go on: how Trump dealt with Russia and Ukraine during his previous term in the Oval Office.” This experience allows Ukraine to anticipate a possible shift in US policy based on evolving realities on the ground, where Ukraine may gain more military aid and leverage through increased understanding of the war’s impact. Ukraine’s strategic approach, according to Gumenyuk, involves working across party lines in the US, recognizing the importance of bipartisan support for continued assistance. Throughout the war, Ukraine has ensured that both Republicans and Democrats in Washington are involved in the dialogue, which has been critical to securing aid packages. The author highlights how Zelensky and his team have “long recognized the need to retain the support of both major parties in the United States.” As Trump assumes office, Ukraine will continue to emphasize that a Russian victory would destabilize not only Europe but also embolden autocracies globally, particularly China, Iran, and North Korea. Gumenyuk underscores that “a Russian victory would be extremely dangerous for the United States,” strengthening Ukraine’s argument that ongoing US support is not just vital for their survival but also critical to maintaining global security.