Russia has started losing its war against Ukraine

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 18–24 May 2025

Six publications (Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, The Atlantic, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and RUSI) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

Russian war on NATO is only a matter of time. Fabian Hoffmann (Foreign Policy) opines that Russia’s war against NATO will be significantly different from Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moscow’s extremely low success rate on the battlefield in Ukraine calls into question Russia’s ability to defeat European NATO countries in a military confrontation, even if the US decides not to intervene. The Kremlin will try to avoid a full-scale war with NATO states and focus on undermining the bloc’s resolve: “Russia’s primary goal in a war against NATO would not be to seize large territories—at least not initially—but to destroy the alliance as a political and military entity capable of opposing Russia.” To achieve this, Moscow does not need to defeat NATO forces in open combat; it is enough to exert pressure until the alliance collapses. According to the author, “Russia will likely favor a short, high-intensity campaign designed to fracture NATO’s political cohesion. The aim would be to keep the confrontation localized, involving only one or a few NATO states at most, and to end it quickly.” This is precisely the scenario for which Europe must prepare. It must demonstrate its ability to respond effectively to Russian pressure, both nuclear and non-nuclear. One measure to counter the Russian threat is systematic and ever-increasing support for Ukraine.

Russia has started losing its war against Ukraine. Michael Kimmage (Foreign Policy) is convinced that Russia is losing on the battlefield in its war against Ukraine, and this could pose a threat to the Kremlin regime. President Vladimir Putin knows how to demonstrate victory: “He put himself forward as a decisive leader in Georgia (via the 2008 Russo-Georgian War), in Ukraine (via the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and full-scale invasion in 2022), and in Syria (via a Russian military incursion in 2015).” However, he was unable to achieve lasting success in any of these military conflicts. President Putin also tries to boast about his victories in Ukraine, but this will not last long: “For Russia, Ukraine is not Syria, and it is not Georgia. Syria was a far-away adventure where Russia’s retreat can be swept under the carpet. Georgia is stuck in a holding pattern, vacillating between Russia and the West, which is no disaster for Moscow—whereas Ukraine is a disaster for Moscow.” The military and economic losses in the war are so great that they cannot be hidden from the public. At the same time, Moscow cannot demonstrate any significant successes on the battlefield. To compensate for its failures on the battlefield, the Kremlin has resorted to war on the diplomatic front, seeking to turn allies away from Ukraine and create a rift between Europe and the US. According to Kimmage, “Real political power is concentrated in Putin’s hands. But his dictator’s prerogative makes him uniquely the man in charge, which is as much a vulnerability as it is a strength—a strength to the degree that he can win the war and a vulnerability to the degree that he is losing it. Perhaps for this reason, after years of silence on the topic, Putin has begun to speak about a successor. As he himself may be aware, he has staked his political fortunes on a foolish war, and he is not winning.”

Russia must pay for its war against Ukraine. Wally Adeyemo and David Shimer (Foreign Affairs) argue that European states should strengthen their support for Ukraine, especially given the reduction in aid from the US. They can help the Ukrainian people by confiscating frozen Russian assets located in Europe and using them to provide Ukraine with a stable source of aid. The use of these seized assets would pose fewer risks to Europe’s economic and financial stability than at any other point during the war. At the same time, it would significantly strengthen the negotiating positions of Ukraine and Europe. First, it is the only real mechanism that will force Russia to pay for its aggression. Second, it is an opportunity to shift part of the financial burden of the war from Europeans to Russians. Third, it is a diplomatic tool that will convince the Kremlin that Brussels plans and is capable of supporting Kyiv for as long as necessary. According to Adeyemo and Shimer, “European leaders must increase support to Ukraine, but their citizens do not need to shoulder the cost alone. It is time to make Russia pay for the war it chose to wage. By seizing Russia’s assets, European governments can send a clear message to the Kremlin that support for Ukraine will persist. Such a move could transform Ukraine’s negotiating position and, ultimately, the trajectory of the war.”

Ukrainians are ready for a long war. Anne Applebaum (Atlantic) asserts that Ukrainians are convinced they can continue the struggle, even with less support from the US. Unlike Washington, Kyiv is well aware that Moscow does not want peace. The Trump administration does not understand the Kremlin’s motives and confuses wishful thinking with reality: “Trump repeatedly misunderstands Putin, overrates his alleged friendship with Putin, and often attributes to Putin motives that are really his own.” The Kremlin put the entire country on a war footing, preparing for a war of attrition. However, this prospect no longer frightens Ukrainians. First, because they have no choice: “Unlike the Russians, who could withdraw from the battlefield and go home at any time, the Ukrainians cannot withdraw from the battlefield. If they do, they will lose their civilization, their language, and their freedom.” Second, because Ukrainians are now capable of defending themselves even without US support: “The Ukrainian army is not retaking territory, as it did in the autumn of 2022, nor does it have plans for a major new counteroffensive. But neither is it losing. The tanks and heavy equipment that Ukraine needed from others don’t matter as much as they did two years ago. The Ukrainians still need American intelligence and anti-missile defenses to protect civilians in their cities. They still get weapons and ammunition from Europe. But on the front line, this conflict has become a drone war, and Ukraine both produces drones—more than 2 million last year, probably twice that many this year—and builds software and systems to run them.”

Trump needs to hold line on Ukraine as Putin dodges ceasefire talks. Amy Knight (Wall Street Journal) argues that Vladimir Putin remains unwilling to pursue genuine peace talks with Ukraine, and that Donald Trump’s approach to negotiations risks legitimizing Kremlin demands while sidelining Kyiv. The author highlights that Putin deliberately avoided meeting President Volodymyr Zelensky in Istanbul, instead sending “a low-level delegation” and maintaining his narrative that Ukraine’s leadership is illegitimate. Meanwhile, Trump’s initial peace proposal, which “made major concessions to the Kremlin,” was swiftly rejected by Zelensky, prompting Trump to blame the Ukrainian president and suggest he was “the problem.” Knight suggests that Trump’s tendency to view himself as the central broker undercuts the legitimacy of Ukraine’s position, as reflected in his remark: “Nothing’s going to happen until Putin and I get together.”As the talks in Istanbul failed to produce results, due to Russia’s “usual maximalist demands,” Knight warns that Trump’s diplomatic overtures may inadvertently play into Putin’s strategy. Despite a shift in tone after Russia’s deadly April 24 missile strike on Kyiv—described by Trump as “very bad timing”—the author questions Trump’s belief that Putin is genuinely interested in ending the war. Instead, Putin “relishes being a wartime leader” and seeks to coerce Ukraine into submission while waiting for Trump to abandon the peace effort. Russian officials have reinforced this stance with increasingly aggressive rhetoric, including warnings against NATO peacekeepers and unfounded claims of Western nuclear threats. The author urges Trump to adopt a firm position, adding that he should make it clear to Putin that without agreement on a 30-day ceasefire, “the U.S. will keep providing Ukraine with the military aid necessary to defend itself.”

Putin exploits Trump’s leniency amid stalled peace efforts. Max Boot (Washington Post) criticises Donald Trump’s leniency toward Vladimir Putin amid ongoing failed negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Despite Trump’s trademark hostility toward domestic opponents, Boot highlights a stark contrast in his approach to Russia: “When it comes to dealing with Russian dictator Vladimir Putin […] the president seems to have an endless supply of patience, goodwill and understanding.” The author underscores how Trump’s promised pressure has yet to materialize: fifty days after threatening sanctions, no punitive action has been taken, even as Russia continues to reject ceasefire proposals and rain missiles on Ukrainian cities and towns. Most recently, after a two-hour call with Putin on 19 May failed to deliver progress, Trump announced vague next steps, saying only that “Russia and Ukraine will immediately start negotiations toward a Ceasefire,” despite no commitment from Moscow. Meanwhile, the Kremlin continues to push forward its maximalist conditions for ceasefire, which includes regime change in Kyiv, limitations on the size of Ukraine’s military, and full Russian control of at least four Ukrainian oblasts (none of which Russia fully controls). Boot challenges Trump’s effectiveness as a negotiator, arguing that his deference to Putin undermines both Ukraine’s position and his own credibility. It cites Trump’s own social media post following unproductive talks, where he praised the conversation’s “tone and spirit” and floated the idea of “largescale TRADE” with Russia post-war—without acknowledging Russia’s ongoing aggression. “Putin is stringing Trump along, and Trump is letting him,” the author concludes, suggesting that Trump’s inaction only emboldens Russia. Trump needs to apply strategic pressure by using sanctions, releasing frozen Russian assets, and expanding US military aid to compel Putin into serious negotiations: “Putin is playing (Donald Trump) for a fool, and Trump doesn’t even seem to realize it.”

Trump gains nothing from Putin call on Ukraine war. Tom Nichols (Atlantic) highlights Vladimir Putin’s ability to manipulate Donald Trump in the ongoing Ukraine peace efforts, asserting that Putin remains firmly in control while Trump gains nothing from their interactions. Nichols argues that Putin used a post-call media appearance to “preemptively undermine anything too positive from Trump,” portraying the Russian leader as confident and unyielding. Trump, by contrast, is described as eager to declare progress despite the lack of substance: “Trump spent more than two hours on the phone with Putin, and he got exactly nothing.” The author criticizes Trump for accepting vague promises from Putin while overlooking Russia’s continued military aggression, including a massive drone attack on Ukraine the night before their call. Trump’s approach weakens American influence in the war—now in its fourth year—and enables Putin to prolong the war with minimal consequences. “Trump has made America functionally an ally of Russia,” the author adds, warning that Trump’s deference to Putin undercuts potential sanctions and military aid for Ukraine. A US withdrawal from direct peace negotiations (which Trump threatened several times over the past weeks) might allow other international actors to take stronger action, as the American leadership fails to grasp the scale of Putin’s war aims—primarily, the dismantling of Ukrainian statehood.

Ukraine prepares for Russia’s summer offensive. Jack Watling (RUSI) asserts that Moscow will intensify its offensive operations in the coming months, aiming to increase pressure on Kyiv during negotiations. However, Russia does not have the resources or force quality to quickly manoeuvre large mechanized units. Therefore, its summer offensive will likely have a soft launch, with a steady increase in the number and scale of assaults across a broadening area around the main axis. Russia will intensify its attacks in the Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhia sectors. The aim of these attacks is to divert the attention of Ukrainian troops from the Donbas, as “the main Russian effort into the summer will once again be against the key towns of Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk. Russian forces continue to plan against orders to complete the occupation of Donetsk.” Alongside its attempts to seize new territory, Russia is taking new measures to degrade Ukraine’s multi-layered drone defences. It is also targeting Ukrainian drone pilots and striking civilian infrastructure deep inside Ukraine to demoralize the population. The Kremlin is also trying to heighten tensions between the US and its NATO allies. The next four months will be extremely difficult for Ukraine. However, in the author’s opinion, Russia cannot exert such pressure indefinitely. Additional sanctions against Russia would be extremely timely, given the obsolescence and limitations of Soviet equipment, limited human resources, and fundamental economic problems. According to Watling, “If Ukraine can deny Russia from reaching the borders of Donetsk between now and Christmas, and Kyiv’s international partners are diligent in degrading Russia’s economy, Moscow will face hard choices about the costs it is prepared to incur for continuing the war. Under such conditions the Russians may move from Potemkin negotiations to actually negotiating.”