CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 11–17 May 2025

Six publications (Foreign Policy, The National Interest, Foreign Affairs, The Washington Post, The Globe and Mail, and CBC) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

Featured topics

• The world and Ukraine: Washington must reset its failed policy towards Ukraine; post–World War II system is showing fragility; three steps must be taken to achieve peace; as Russia’s economy falters, Trump misses a key moment to pressure Putin.
• Russia at war: Moscow moves toward a closed dictatorship; Putin benefits more from avoiding Ukraine ceasefire talks than attending them.

MMS summaries

Washington must reset its failed policy on Ukraine. Philip H. Gordon and Rebecca Lissner (Foreign Policy) argue that increasing pressure on Moscow is the way to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. The Trump administration’s approach to resolving the Russo-Ukrainian war has proven ineffective because it failed to take into account Russia’s persistent neoimperial ambitions and Ukraine’s courageous determination to defend its sovereignty. The White House should consider an alternative policy that clearly defines the costs Moscow will incur if it continues its illegal aggression. According to the authors, the White House could take the following four steps to bring peace closer. First, Trump’s administration could support “a new, bipartisan Russia sanctions package, developed by supporters in the Senate such as Lindsey Graham, to intensify economic pressure on Moscow.” Second, the White House could direct the Pentagon to spend the remaining “$3.8 billion that Congress has already authorized in Presidential Drawdown Authority.” This would not only give Kyiv additional battlefield resources but also demonstrate to the Kremlin that the US is not prepared to abandon Ukraine. Third, the USA could strengthen Ukraine’s air defence, which poses no threat to Russia but helps the US defence industry and saves Ukrainian lives. Fourth, the White House could negotiate with European states to bolster long-term support for Ukraine by providing American weapons, intelligence, and training for Ukrainian military personnel. According to Gordon and Rebecca, “There is no guarantee that even these steps would get Putin to compromise or abandon his maximalist objectives. He has all along believed he could wait out the West, even at great cost, and Trump’s victory and pivot away from Ukraine seemed to confirm the wisdom of that bet. But now that Trump’s initial approach has failed, there is still time for him to try a different one—without having to cross the political red line of asking Congress for another large supplemental spending bill for Ukraine.”

Post–World War II system is showing fragility. Julian E. Zelizer (Foreign Policy) is convinced that the international system which emerged after World War II is now, more than ever before, on the brink of collapse. The system was initiated by Presidents Harry S. Truman (a Democrat) and Dwight D. Eisenhower (a Republican) with the aim of promoting liberal internationalism: “Working with Congress, they built a series of institutions and policies that have endured into 2025. This postwar order helped prevent the worst military conflict humankind has imagined and established a degree of stability in Europe that proved essential to America’s national security and economic strength.” Today, the policies of President Donald Trump toward Ukraine and other allies are undermining this order, risking permanent destruction. According to the author, Trump has significantly compromised America’s national security apparatus: “When Henry Kissinger served as national security advisor and secretary of state under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford in 1973 and 1975, it was understood that one person wielded immense influence in the halls of government. When earlier this month Marco Rubio became only the second individual to hold both roles, most observers rationally assumed his function would be to rubber-stamp whatever the president desired.” According to Zilizer, supporters of the post-WWII system must actively defend it: “Unless they can defend their vision and respond candidly to legitimate criticisms, they may soon witness the collapse of the world order they spent a lifetime defending, replaced by the abyss of America First.”

Three steps must be taken to achieve peace. Michael O’Hanlon (National Interest) believes that by balancing aid to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, Washington could bring peace closer in the Russo-Ukrainian war. The Kremlin’s belief that it can win on the battlefield is a significant obstacle to Washington’s attempts to achieve peace. The White House must do three things in the coming weeks to increase the chances of reaching a lasting peace agreement. First, President Trump must demonstrate his willingness to increase financial assistance to Ukraine: “This does not need to be the same amount as the $61 billion package that former President Biden finally persuaded Congress to provide. Still, it needs to be in roughly the same ballpark.” Second, the White House must demonstrate its readiness to impose tough sanctions against Russia if it does not come to the negotiating table. Third, Moscow must clearly understand that the longer its aggression against Ukraine continues, “the greater the chances that the United States will someday support Ukraine joining NATO.” O’Hanlon concludes that “even with these additional elements of a comprehensive U.S. strategy for ending the war over Ukraine, negotiating a stable and durable peace will be difficult.”

Moscow moves toward a closed dictatorship. Andrei Yakovlev, Vladimir Dubrovskiy, and Yuri Danilov (Foreign Affairs) argue that in the course of its war against Ukraine, Russia has gradually moved toward a fully closed dictatorship. The White House’s attempts to reset relations with the Kremlin by granting concessions to Moscow are misguided,  because they fail to take into account the main obstacle to peace—“Russia’s dramatic internal evolution since the war began.” The war against Ukraine is core to President Putin’s legitimacy, leaving him with no rational incentive to end it voluntarily: “At least since the end of 2022, the Kremlin has portrayed its war in Ukraine as a ‘war with NATO,’ and confrontation with the West has become a key element of the regime’s ideology. To truly end the conflict, therefore, will likely require little short of a change of regime in Moscow—and one driven by actors within Russia who neither benefit from the war nor align with Putin.” Russia’s protracted and complex war against Ukraine has forced the Kremlin to accelerate the restructuring of Russia’s political, economic and social systems in order to strengthen its control over the country, leading to serious tensions within the regime. According to the authors, the West must exploit these weaknesses: “This will require applying more economic and military pressure on Russia while simultaneously sending signals and offering incentives to potential elite dissenters—those most affected by the Kremlin’s rapid and forceful transformation of Russian society and who are potentially capable of stopping it.”

As Russia’s economy falters, Trump misses a key moment to pressure Putin. Christian Caryl (Foreign Policy) argues that while it briefly looked like President Donald Trump might consider tougher measures against Moscow, he quickly returned to pressuring Ukraine and backing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal for more negotiations. Trump’s April 26 post on Truth Social hinted at frustration—“maybe he doesn’t want to stop the war… has to be dealt with differently, through ‘Banking’ or ‘Secondary Sanctions?’”—but just days later, he demanded Ukraine accept Putin’s ceasefire proposal “IMMEDIATELY,” undermining a European plan tied to sanctions. As a result, “Putin is back in the driver’s seat with the White House’s support, it would seem,” Caryl notes. Yet Russia is showing economic strain that could be exploited if the West acts decisively. Inflation is surging—officially over 10 percent—and the Russian Central Bank has kept interest rates at 21 percent, “the highest in two decades.” Growth has stalled, the labour shortage is worsening, and oil prices are slipping. Sanctions experts are now targeting Russia’s shadow oil fleet, and policymakers see an opening to impose sharper pressure, such as freezing unsanctioned firms like Gazprom and Rosneft. As analyst Nicholas Fenton argues, “acute pressure over a shorter period might give us stronger results.” With Russia’s economic vulnerabilities growing, Caryl notes that this is a critical moment for the US to stop signalling weakness and join Europe in raising the cost of war for Putin. 

Trump still shocked by Putin’s brutality—four years into full-scale war. Jim Geraghty (Washington Post) criticizes Donald Trump’s continued naivety toward Vladimir Putin, perplexed that Trump could be surprised by the brutality of Russia’s war on Ukraine at this stage. According to the Wall Street Journal, Trump reportedly asked his advisers whether Putin “has changed” and said he was “surprised at some of Putin’s military moves, including bombing areas with children.” Trump being taken aback by Russia’s attacks on civilians, according to Gerathy, is a troubling indication of either ignorance or willful disregard, particularly in the context of this full-scale war, now in its fourth year. Given the extensive intelligence resources available to the POTUS and the abundance of public reporting on Russia’s brutality, “…how on Earth at this late date can Trump be surprised to hear about Russian military aggression targeting civilians, including children?” The UN estimated in late 2024 that an average of 16 Ukrainian children are killed or wounded each week. The author situates Trump’s naiveté within a broader pattern of US presidential misjudgments about Putin, from George W. Bush’s infamous remark about seeing Putin’s “soul” to Obama’s dubious “reset” policy and Biden’s initial emphasis on a “stable, predictable relationship.” Trump continues to misread the nature of his counterpart, treating negotiations with Putin as if they were business transactions rather than engagements with a regime that has shown a ruthless disregard for civilian life. Russia’s military has deliberately targeted hospitals, schools, and residential areas, and warns that Trump’s failure to grasp this reality risks emboldening a “remorseless foe.”

Seizing Russia’s frozen assets could shatter global financial stability. Eric Reguly (Globe and Mail) writes that the role of Euroclear (Belgium-based financial market infrastructure group) in safeguarding €195 billion in frozen Russian assets has become a focal point of geopolitical and financial tension, with rising pressure on Western governments to use the funds for Ukraine’s reconstruction. The European depository, which holds €41 trillion in global securities, is facing scrutiny as it manages €195 billion of Russia’s immobilized foreign reserves—nearly two-thirds of the total sanctioned assets frozen after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. While the principal assets remain untouched for now, the EU has already redirected billions in interest—€3.5 billion in 2024 alone—toward Ukraine. But seizing the underlying assets, as proposed by officials in Poland, Lithuania, and the UK, is legally murky and poses systemic risks. Euroclear CEO Valerie Urbain warned that confiscation would require a transfer of liability: “We cannot end up in a situation where assets are confiscated and then a few years later Russia comes and demands them back.” Critics argue that asset seizure could destabilize Euroclear and the wider financial system, triggering lawsuits, client withdrawals, and retaliatory actions. The Belgian Prime Minister warned that confiscating the funds would represent “an act of war” and create “systemic risk to the entire financial world system.” Already, Russian clients are suing over €70 billion in private holdings, and Russian courts—which don’t recognize international sanctions—could deliver adverse rulings. Legal scholars note that while sovereign assets are typically immune, they could potentially be seized as countermeasures to Russian violations of international law. However, any move to do so could set a precedent for future asset grabs against other controversial states, raising fears of politicized financial retaliation: “We’re in the real world, where if you take €200-billion from somebody, there will be consequences.”

Putin benefits more from avoiding ceasefire talks than attending them. Briar Stewart (CBC) argues that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to Turkey signals a bold diplomatic maneuver aimed at reviving direct talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, even as Moscow shows little sign of compromise. While Russia has agreed to send a delegation to Istanbul, “among Ukraine’s allies the expectation is that Putin will be a no-show.” The Turkish-hosted talks would be the first of their kind since 2022, with the US and Europe pressing for a 30-day ceasefire, which Moscow has refused. Instead, Putin proposed restarting negotiations that stalled in 2022, while unilaterally offering a short-lived three-day truce during Russia’s Victory Day celebrations. As one analyst noted, “the ultimate goal is to not make Trump too pissed off with the Kremlin and start fully supporting Ukraine.” The talks come amid mounting international frustration and economic strain, with the US threatening to withdraw from mediation and lawmakers preparing new sanctions if progress stalls. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and envoys Keith Kellogg and Steve Witkoff are set to attend in Trump’s stead, underscoring Washington’s uneasy balancing act. Turkey, leveraging its role as a NATO member with deep energy ties to Russia, is once again facilitating negotiations, though experts question its ability to pressure Moscow. As Istanbul becomes the latest venue for attempted diplomacy, observers warn that without meaningful Russian concessions, the process risks becoming a platform for Moscow to extract politically what it has failed to achieve militarily.