Fear spreads to Moscow

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 4–10 May 2025

Six publications (The Wall Street Journal, Foreign Policy, The National Interest, The Economist, The Atlantic, and The Globe and Mail) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

Featured topics

• The world and Ukraine: Europe needs a new way of cooperating; any Trump-brokered Ukraine peace deal needs UN backing.
• Russia at war: fear spreads to Moscow; Washington fails to understand Russia; Europeans do not understand the full threat posed by Russia; Putin’s ‘parade ceasefire’ seen as propaganda, not peace effort. 

MMS summaries

Europe needs a new way of cooperating. Sophia Besch and Richard Youngs (Foreign Policy) argue that Europe must fill the political and security gaps which have emerged because of the shortcomings of the EU and NATO. These two key alliances of European states are responding ineffectively to Russia’s war against Ukraine and to the shift in foreign policy priorities of President Donald Trump’s administration, which threatens the unity and stability of the continent. In response, European capitals must not only implement tactical solutions but also propose a strategic approach to solving the problem: “Europe is considering quick fixes, such as gathering more money for defense—through spending by individual countries and loans from the European Union—and forming smaller coalitions of states to bring together like-minded governments.” Tactical decisions can help to weather the current turmoil, but they will not solve the fundamental political and security challenges facing the continent. According to Besch and Youngs, European governments should develop a new regional order that will enable them to achieve greater security in Europe: “Instituting a new system parallel to the EU in which different clusters of European states can cooperate on select areas of policy would cut through many of the bloc’s current bureaucratic and ideological roadblocks and allow Europeans to form a new, more self-sufficient, more democratically accountable alliance that better protects Europe’s liberal order.”

Fear spreads to Moscow. David Kirichenko (National Interest) claims that the elimination of high-ranking Russian military officers by Ukrainian special services on Russian territory is instilling fear in the Kremlin. The wave of killings of high-ranking military personnel indicates an enhancement of Ukraine’s intelligence capabilities and signals its readiness to fight with all available means in this existential war. Kyiv is expanding the geography of the war: “What once seemed unthinkable, Ukrainian operatives striking at the heart of Moscow, is now becoming routine. The threat that the Kremlin elite so often warns about is no longer a distant force beyond Russia’s borders, it is now circling the Kremlin itself.” According to Kirichenko, “The war may still rage across Ukrainian battlefields, but the fear is moving to Moscow. Mr. Trump may soon find himself increasingly surprised that Ukraine still has plenty of cards to play.”

Washington fails to understand Russia. Barton Swaim (Wall Street Journal) suggests that the White House is finally beginning to realize that Moscow is not interested in peace. However, it persists in the mistaken belief that phrases about “too many people are dying” will force Moscow to the negotiating table. In the author’s opinion, such statements are insincere: “They would sound credible if Mr. Trump were a typical Western liberal who believes killing and bloodshed happen mainly when people fail to appreciate the benefits of stability and prosperity. But Mr. Trump doesn’t think that way and never has, which is why he also doesn’t offer similar laments over the bloodshed happening in Haiti, Myanmar, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan and other places.” At the same time, such statements play into the Kremlin’s hands: “Mr. Putin fully embraces the centuries-old myth of Russia as the victim of betrayal and exploitation. The Mongols in the 13th century, the Turks in the 18th, the British and the French in the 19th, Germany in the 20th—always, in minds like Mr. Putin’s, steeped in the myth, Russia must fight foes bent on stealing its wealth and destroying its people.” For Russians, war is a kind of civic sacrament: “Newlyweds frequently place flowers on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Moscow, and criticizing the military is often considered blasphemous.” Therefore, President Trump’s condemnation of all killings and destruction in Ukraine is likely to fall on deaf ears in Russia. If Washington stops helping Ukraine, it risks repeating the negative experience of the Munich Agreement of 1939. According to Swaim, “America need only send weapons, not men, to Ukraine. If we can’t manage that, we will deserve the scorn of our grandchildren.”

Europeans do not understand the full threat posed by Russia. Analysis by the Economist finds that many Europeans are not taking the threat from Russia seriously. At the same time, Russia’s war against Ukraine has become an ideology for Russians: “In the past, 60% of Russians said that the government’s priority should be to raise living standards. Today, that share has fallen to 41%; instead, 55% now say they want Russia to be respected as a world power.” Russia is scaling up its military goals to justify its insane losses in the war: “What began as a special military operation next door has become Russia’s existential struggle against distant enemies.” Moscow will attempt to gain power by doubling the number of cyberattacks, influence operations, assassinations, and sabotage in Europe. If it senses weakness in NATO, it may try to seize a small territory and provoke the allies into responding. Thus, the defence of Europe against Russia must begin in Ukraine, because an unjust peace imposed on Ukraine could become a springboard for Moscow’s next aggression. According to the Economist, Europe must prepare for such a turn of events, and “that means supplying Ukraine with arms, as well as giving it more money to pay for those it can build cheaply itself.”

Trump copies Putin’s politics but not his economic playbook. Andrew Ryvkin (Atlantic) compares the authoritarian trajectories of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, emphasizing that Putin’s consolidation of power succeeded because it was underpinned by economic competence—a crucial component Trump appears to neglect. Putin’s early presidency was marked by economic reforms and technocratic management that helped to stabilize post-Soviet Russia. With oil prices high and reforms like tax cuts and land restructuring implemented, Russia’s GDP per capita rose from less than $1,400 to $12,500 by the end of Putin’s second term. “Economic performance was key for Putin’s popularity, just as underperformance was key for Yeltsin’s lack of support,” according to economist Sergei Guriev. By contrast, Trump’s approach in his second term has leaned heavily on cultural grievance and personal charisma while ignoring consistent economic messaging or results. Within his first 100 days, 53% of Americans said the economy had worsened under his leadership, and 41% reported a hit to their personal finances. While job growth and GDP expansion in Q4 2024 provided positive signals, the administration’s contradictory tariff rhetoric undermined the good news. Trump’s ad hoc approach, where “the president and administration officials will give multiple, often contradictory statements,” has led to volatile markets and declining approval ratings, Ryvkin writes. Trump’s failure to similarly implement technocratic management of the economy poses a significant threat not only to his own leadership but also to broader democratic stability. Russia, even in wartime, continues to uphold a transactional relationship with its citizens through financial compensation: military factory workers earn $40,000 annually, and soldier contracts offer $36,000, with death benefits reaching $150,000. As Guriev points out, “Money—not greatness—may be selling young Russians on Putin’s war.” Trump, meanwhile, offers no such material assurances, relying instead on slogans like “Only the weak will fail.” The author notes that any authoritarian system without the “illusion of economic stability” is inherently unstable—even for the authoritarian himself.

Any Trump-brokered Ukraine peace deal needs UN backing. Duncan B. Hollis (Foreign Policy) argues that any Ukraine-Russia peace deal brokered under US pressure may be legally invalid under international law unless it receives UN Security Council endorsement. Referencing Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the author explains that “a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.” Since Russia’s aggression began in 2014 without legitimate grounds for self-defence or UN authorization, any territorial concessions extracted from Ukraine would fall under this category of coercion. Hollis warns that even if Ukraine agrees to a deal under pressure, “that cannot salvage things,” legally speaking, and could lead to long-term instability. To legitimize any agreement, the author argues, the only viable route is involving the UN Security Council. Past precedents such as the Kosovo war in 1999 and the fighting between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000 illustrate the council’s role in certifying peace agreements under international law. The author calls on US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to recognize this legal barrier and shift Washington’s strategy: “He should aim to convince the White House that cooperation from the Security Council—now—is the best path forward.” Without the backing of this multilateral institution, any future treaty risks being seen as invalid, unenforceable, and vulnerable to rejection or violation by either party, or by third countries.

Trump’s Putin ties alarm Europe. Edward Lucas (Foreign Policy) writes about the alarming possibility of a US-Russia rapprochement under Donald Trump, outlining how such a shift could destabilize European security and fragment transatlantic alliances. Trump’s personal admiration for Vladimir Putin, whom he has called “a genius,” along with his disdain for NATO’s collective defence structure suggest that his second term could mark a strategic pivot away from the USA’s traditional allies. Lucas argues that Trump doesn’t need to formally withdraw from NATO—he can simply “let it wither” by halting aid to Ukraine, withdrawing troops from Eastern Europe, and placing caveats on advanced weapons systems already sold to allies. These moves would “leave European countries wide open to Russian subversion, sabotage, and mischief.” The author also warns that Trump and Putin could cooperate in weakening the EU’s regulatory power, reflecting their common dislike of Brussels. Lucas presents US Energy Secretary Chris Wright’s call for countries to join “Team Energy Freedom” as an example of undermining the EU’s net-zero policies. “Trump’s unfathomable personality holds the key to his future relations with Putin,” the author concludes, but the fact that such a scenario is conceivable is deeply troubling for European allies.

Putin’s ‘parade ceasefire’ seen as propaganda, not peace effort. Janice Dickson and Mark MacKinnon (Globe and Mail) write that as Russia prepared to host its Victory Day parade with foreign dignitaries in attendance, Ukraine and its citizens dismissed President Vladimir Putin’s declared 72-hour ceasefire as a propaganda maneuver rather than a genuine attempt to pause hostilities. According to the authors, the move coincided with a major symbolic event meant to project strength and unity, rather than serve any military or humanitarian purpose. Ukrainian officials and civilians immediately questioned its sincerity, due to ongoing Russian attacks across the country within the first half-day of the supposed truce. Ukrainian officials reported over 700 Russian attacks by midday, including 176 drone strikes and 16 guided bomb assaults, prompting Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha to label the truce a “farce” and “Putin’s parade ceasefire.” Russia, in turn, claimed that Ukraine violated the ceasefire nearly 500 times in its early hours. Despite Moscow’s celebration, Kyiv remained focused on resisting Russian aggression, with President Zelensky reiterating that only “tougher sanctions on Russia and more military support for Ukraine” would compel Putin to end the invasion. While Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping praised their countries’ growing ties, the Kremlin insisted that any peace deal must be negotiated with Ukraine, not the US, amid continuing talks led by President Trump.