For Russia, the price of peace is higher than the price of war

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 13–19 April 2025

Seven publications (Foreign Policy, The National Interest, Foreign Affairs, Politico, The Globe and Mail, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

Ukraine’s democracy holding despite hiatus on elections. Paul Hockenos (Foreign Policy) argues that Ukraine has developed a unique wartime political culture that is based on the principles of civic activism. Democracy in wartime Ukraine functions differently than in peaceful countries, and “such activity has deepened since 2022, despite war-related stress, exhaustion, and the war’s financial burdens.” According to Hockenos, Ukraine’s democratic impetus stems primarily from Ukraine’s historically rooted popular solidarity, which erupted during the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 and fuelled the resistance to the Russian invasion in 2022: “Over a decade, civil society engagement, social solidarity, and public participation have defined the new Ukraine. It is a country in which citizens have bolstered or taken over fields traditionally covered by the state, including the tackling of corruption, environmental protection, caring for refugees and wounded soldiers, and even providing weaponry for front-line brigades. Moreover, Ukrainian volunteers build drones, train paramedics, cook for the front, counter Russian disinformation, and track Russian war crimes.”

Russia could play the US card against China. Thomas Graham (National Interest) opines that President Donald Trump’s attempt to play the Russia card against China is absolute fantasy. Implementing a “reverse Kissinger” strategy would be extremely difficult, as Moscow has strong strategic reasons for sustaining close working relations with Beijing: “Fifteen years ago, China became Russia’s leading trading partner; since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, it has become the largest importer of Russian oil and natural gas. Geopolitically, Moscow benefits from maintaining tranquility along the 4,000 km-long border with China, which has been a source of tension throughout history.” According to the author, it is Moscow that is interested in using Henry Kissinger’s approach to rebalance its relations with China: “In the short term, that would ensure that the deals it cuts with China are not tilted so heavily in the latter’s favor as they are today. In the long term, a hedge is necessary to protect against China’s abandoning partnership in favor of strategic competition with Russia.” Thus, the Kremlin is “manipulating Trump’s avowed desire for an early settlement of the Russia-Ukraine war to gain U.S. support for Russian goals vis-a-vis Ukraine.” According to Graham, “It is an intricate game, especially for a country that is the weakest of the three parties, but perhaps Putin learned something from all those conversations he had with Kissinger after he rose to power.”

The price of peace is higher than the price of war. Leon Aron (Politico) notes that President Donald Trump is wrong to believe that President Vladimir Putin wants peace. Russia’s huge human and economic losses are insignificant compared to what it could lose if the Russo-Ukrainian war ends. That is why Washington’s concessions to Moscow can only lead to an escalation of the conflict, not its resolution. In the author’s opinion, this misconception is explained by three blind spots that have plagued almost all US presidents in their attitude to Russia: “an ignorance of the country; an unbound confidence in their personal gift of persuasion; and an inability to appreciate the ideological and political imperatives that drive authoritarian regimes.” Aron lists seven reasons why Putin avoids negotiations. First, the war is a justification for his dictatorship. Second, President Putin likes the attributes of militarism: “The war’s end would deprive him of such symbolic props for the defender of the motherland image he cherishes.” Third, Russia’s economy is dependent on the war. Fourth, ending wartime bonuses and other perks could cause social unrest. Fifth, change destabilizes authoritarian regimes. Sixth, Putin is an opportunist and a risk taker: “Every new concession prompts more, and more brazen, ultimatums from Putin.” Seventh, he needs victory, not peace. According to the author, “Trump and his negotiators must understand that at the moment, Putin intends to go to any so-called peace talks only to codify a Ukrainian surrender. He will procrastinate until he is confident of meeting this objective. There are no shortcuts to persuading him otherwise—except for making the cost of his dithering increasingly painful.”

Russia that Putin made. Alexander Gabuev (Foreign Affairs) suggests that Russia’s war against Ukraine has changed the destiny of Russians. No truce can change the degree to which the Kremlin has turned confrontation with the West into an organizing principle of Russian life, nor can it reduce the degree to which Moscow’s relations with Beijing are deepening. Russia has become more repressive and anti-Western: “Since 2022, the Kremlin has conducted a sweeping campaign to quash political dissent, spread pro-war and anti-Western propaganda domestically, and create broad classes of Russians that benefit materially from the war. Tens of millions of Russians, including senior officials and many of the country’s wealthiest people, now view the West as a mortal enemy.” Even if Russian-American relations are restored, the Kremlin’s distrust of the West will not allow for genuine reconciliation. On the other side, deterrence should remain the cornerstone of Western policy, and especially of European strategy, at least in the short term. After President Vladimir Putin steps down, Western countries should take advantage of the window of opportunity to build relations with Russia: “They must come up with a vision of a new kind of relationship with Russia, one shorn of the illusion that to become a solid economic and strategic partner for the West, the country must transform as completely as West Germany did after World War II. They must propose specific terms for a peaceful coexistence, such as arms control strategies and forms of economic interdependence that preclude weaponization by either side. And European leaders (as well as US politicians who do not share Trump’s pro-Putin inclination) should begin communicating that vision by making all their Russia-related communications clearer—even, for instance, their announcements about increasing their countries’ military budgets. According to Gabuev, “Some in the West may feel that the past three years have taught them that they have very little ability to shape Russia’s trajectory. But they have tools they have not yet fully used—ones they would be unwise to surrender.”

Trump wants Ukraine peace, but Russia and allies aren’t ready. Nina Khrushcheva (Globe and Mail) argues that amid recent US–Russia talks in Istanbul focused on restoring diplomatic missions, a deeper objective is President Donald Trump’s push to broker a peace deal in Ukraine. This goal, however, is not currently shared by other key stakeholders. According to the author, “no party with a stake in the war—not Russia, not Ukraine, and not the European Union—wants to end the conflict now.” Ukraine remains unable to secure its core demands of full territorial restoration and NATO membership, and under Trump, even those ambitions face further erosion. Trump has been pressuring President Volodymyr Zelensky to offer the US access to Ukraine’s rare-earth minerals “as compensation for America’s support during the war,” without offering security guarantees in return. For Zelensky, the options are grim: make concessions to both Russia and the US, or continue a war with increasingly limited prospects. At the same time, Russia appears better positioned to benefit from a future peace deal but is in no hurry to sign one. While the country has suffered under sanctions, it has “defied expectations” and maintained political stability, while also consolidating some territorial gains unlikely to be fully reversed. Khrushcheva suggests that “Mr. Putin is still trying to work out where that limit is”—how far Trump is willing to go to fulfill his peacemaking ambitions. Putin’s recent move to send investment envoy Kirill Dmitriev to America underscores a strategy to offer Trump economic incentives, including access to Russian resources and joint space missions, to sway negotiations. Khrushcheva warns that “whatever unfolds in these rapid-succession meetings will probably mean less than what follows,” as both Trump and Putin continue to test the boundaries of potential compromise.

Trump’s trade chaos threatens Ukraine strategy, US global standing. Holman Jenkins, Jr. (Wall Street Journal) writes that the Trump administration’s chaotic trade policies and inconsistent strategic efforts risk undermining critical US interests, particularly its delicate handling of Ukraine. Trump’s tariffs and unpredictable tactics, described as a “trade-policy gong show,” threaten to destabilize not only economic progress but also diplomatic initiatives, notably his recent push for a Ukraine settlement. While Americans are sympathetic to Ukraine, Jenkins notes that the implied stance under both Biden and Trump is that “the US is ready to let Ukraine lose” if direct involvement in war becomes necessary. Trump’s insistence on negotiation—despite criticisms about his methods—actually aligns with American interests because a partial settlement would still bolster NATO and signify a strategic setback for Russia. However, the author warns that Trump’s administration, characterized by erratic personnel moves and ineffective execution, could jeopardize significant economic and geopolitical gains. Such policies risk triggering retaliatory trade measures, derailing recent industrial investments, and weakening the public backing Trump requires to advance any broader strategic goals—including a potential resolution to the war in Ukraine. In this light, the administration’s lack of discipline and inability to apply a coherent long-term strategy threatens not just economic progress but also America’s global credibility.

Trump’s Ukraine gambit alarms allies. David Ignatius (Washington Post) argues that Donald Trump’s growing impatience with stalled Ukraine peace talks has raised alarms among US allies, as his willingness to “take a pass” on the negotiations signals a potential retreat from American leadership at a critical moment. Trump, who once vowed an easy settlement, now warns that if either Russia or Ukraine remains uncooperative, “we’re just going to say: ‘You’re foolish, you are fools, you’re horrible people, and we’re going to just take a pass.’” Secretary of State Marco Rubio echoed this warning, adding that Trump may “move on” if a deal can’t be reached soon. Yet the talks remain deadlocked, with sources confirming that Vladimir Putin “didn’t budge from his hard-line demands,” including territorial gains and Ukrainian neutrality. The framework presented by Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff reportedly offered major concessions to Moscow and lacked the US-backed security guarantees—prompting Ukrainian and European leaders to reject it. Trump’s erratic approach to Ukraine peace negotiations and his growing disinterest in a sustained diplomatic effort have deepened European doubts about the reliability of American security commitments. His rejection of a proposed Patriot missile sale and dismissive remark—“You don’t start a war against someone 20 times your size and then hope that people give you some missiles”—underscore a posture increasingly detached from Ukraine’s security needs. Meanwhile, European officials are warning that without American intelligence and defence support, their militaries cannot protect Ukraine after a deal. Kyiv recently survived a six-day cutoff in US intelligence, but officials say “if it had gone on another week… the consequences would have been disastrous.” As Trump turns his focus toward prospective US-Russia commercial ventures—driven by the vision of “trillions” in investment pushed by Kremlin-linked intermediary Kirill Dmitriev—America’s allies are left questioning whether Washington remains a reliable bulwark against a newly emboldened Russia.