Putinist ideology is spreading across the world

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 9–15 March 2025

Six publications (Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The Atlantic, The National Interest, The Washington Post, and The New York Times) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

Russia is only winning in President Trump’s head. Alexey Kovalev (Foreign Policy) argues that the only war that Moscow is winning is in the minds of members of President Donald Trump’s administration. This is the result of the Kremlin’s targeted and systematic propaganda: “For Putin, the narrative of an inevitable Russian victory makes it appear invincible in Western eyes and, more importantly, spreads the idea that any assistance to Ukraine is futile and merely prolongs the war.” The reality of Russia’s war against Ukraine on the ground is quite different: “[The Russian army’s] most capable and elite units are long gone, ground down by fierce Ukrainian resistance in the first few weeks of the war. Stocks of tanks, armored vehicles, and even trucks are perilously low; Russian soldiers at the front have increasingly resorted to donkeys and horses to move supplies.” According to the author, “Some of the most passionate pro-war Russians are grappling with the grim realization that the war is not the grand historical struggle they envisioned, but a slow, grinding catastrophe.” Moscow has paid a high price for the success it has achieved: “At the time of writing, open-source data confirms close to 96,000 regular Russian troops have been killed in action, with the likely real number to be at least 160,000. Adding the seriously wounded brings Russia’s irrecoverable combat losses to an estimated 550,000, according to a recent report.” According to Kovalev, “If Russia has a chance of winning this war, it will not be because of its military achievements on the battlefield. It will be because Putin has convinced Trump, Vance, and their MAGA acolytes that Russia holds all the imaginary cards.”

Putinist ideology is spreading across the world. Michael McFaul (Atlantic) argues that the West has underestimated Vladamir Putin’s global ideological vision as “an animating force for his foreign-policy agenda.” As a result, “Putinism” is now rapidly spreading across Europe and the US. The ideology of Putinism was born in 2011 as the Kremlin reacted to protests against its regime on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. After gaining a foothold and destroying the opposition at home, Russia launched a campaign against the West: “If the Cold War’s central ideological struggle of communism versus capitalism was between states, this new ideological struggle of illiberal nationalism versus liberal internationalism is being fought primarily within states.” Moscow has allocated significant budgets to promote its narratives in Western countries: “Russia’s ideological efforts in this domain were so effective in Romania’s 2024 presidential election, for instance, that an obscure far-right presidential candidate, Cǎlin Georgescu, came out of nowhere and won the first round. The violation of Romanian sovereignty was assessed by intelligence services to be so acute that the country’s supreme court felt compelled to cancel the second round of the election.” Not only Europe but also the US have become vulnerable to Putinism. In less than a month, the administration of President Donald Trump has made significant concessions to Russia, according to the author: “(1) intelligence sharing with Ukraine has been discontinued; (2) USAID assistance for Ukraine, including funding to repair its energy grid and for anti-corruption programs, has been discontinued; (3) US funding for Russian civil society and independent media operating in exile has been stopped; (4) diplomatic relations with Moscow have been restored, beginning with a meeting between US Secretary of State Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in Saudi Arabia a few weeks ago; and (5) in a radical reversal of past policy, the United States voted with Russia, Belarus, North Korea, and a handful of other rogue autocracies against a UN resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In addition, Trump has insisted that (6) Ukraine cannot join NATO; (7) Zelensky must give up territory to Russia; (8) no new military aid for Ukraine will be made available, even previously appropriated funding; (9) US forces deployed in Europe might be reduced and will not participate in any peacekeeping mission in Ukraine; and (10) sanctions on Russia could be lifted, although Trump suddenly reversed himself last week when he said he was ‘strongly considering’ new sanctions and tariffs.” These concessions are aimed at restoring the personal relationship between President Trump and President Putin, based on a common ideology. McFaul concludes, “The challenge of fighting for democracy, liberalism, and the rule of law just got a lot harder because the president of the United States—a title that used to be synonymous with the leader of the free world—just switched sides. That puts the onus on those within the United States, Europe, and the rest of the world who still support these ideals to get organized if they are to prevail over Putin’s ideology of illiberal nationalism.”

Peace agreement in Ukraine must be long-lasting. G. John Ikenberry and Harold James (Foreign Affairs) describe two main approaches to achieving lasting peace after the Russo-Ukrainian war—a general solution and a partial solution. The first option could even lead to a reformatting of the world order: “A sweeping settlement could provide a framework for resolving conflicts in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East as well, by establishing a brand-new security mechanism to address the destabilizing effects of weaponized finance, trade wars, and fractured diplomacy. The model would be the negotiations to end World War I and World War II.” However, according to the authors, the general option is unlikely to resolve Russia’s war against Ukraine, as “Kyiv’s and Moscow’s positions are too starkly opposed, and the rest of the world is too fractured.” If there is no general solution, the next best option is the partial one: “Since 1945, partial solutions have been the most successful means of keeping peace, including by preventing the renewed outbreak of war in conflicts that have reached stalemates. When these provisional settlements have been reached, the parties have not known how long they would last. But in many cases they worked and proved remarkably durable—particularly when the great powers of the day played a decisive role in pushing combatants to de-escalate.” To be effective, the partial solution must meet two conditions: (1) it must not undermine the credibility of either the Russian or Ukrainian governments; (2) it must provide Ukraine with security guarantees backed by real power, not weak promises. According to Ikenberry and James, “The result will not be a perfect deal. But if these conditions are all met, an agreement in Ukraine today can maintain peace until the circumstances are more favorable for a durable solution—and it can even provide a template for effective multilateral cooperation in this turbulent new world.”

Donald Trump deals a blow to Russian-Chinese relations. Christian Whiton (National Interest) argues that President Donald Trump’s desire to bring about “peace” in Russia’s war against Ukraine provides the means of radically revising the world order. And a peaceful settlement of the Russo-Ukrainian war will lay the foundation for destruction of the Sino-Russian alliance. According to the author, this dramatic change would entail five developments. First, abandonment of President Joe Biden’s policy could increase Moscow’s readiness for peace talks. Second, Russia is unhappy with its growing dependence on China for industrial goods, especially cars and electronics: “It wants trade with other Asian economies that can only come with peace and sanctions relief. US détente with Russia could allow Moscow to diversify its economy and, importantly for Washington, become more independent from Beijing.” Third, “Europe could be an obstacle to peace if its leaders continue to cling to illusions of defeating a nuclear-armed state and admitting Ukraine to NATO.” Fourthly, Moscow’s willingness to go beyond armed confrontation “creates more room for diplomacy than most experts thought would be available before Trump.” Fifth, the US should not trust “Russia or pretend to be allies, but a window exists this year to create lasting peace in Ukraine, end European mooching off of the United States, reduce energy costs globally, and refocus US resources and attention on graver challenges.” According to Whiton, “This is a lucky break for the United States. In less than two months in office, Trump may have created the conditions to derail a China-Russia power bloc against the United States—an extreme hazard. Finalizing a peace agreement that satisfies Russia and the current or future political authority in Ukraine will take skill, persistence, and well-organized diplomacy. Success is far from assured. However, the potential windfall for the United States and the loss of opportunity for its chief adversary in Beijing call for maximum effort.”

Amid ongoing peace efforts, Zelensky needs to win Trump’s friendship. Marc A. Thiessen (Washington Post) opines that Volodymyr Zelensky’s approach to dealing with Donald Trump has been misguided, especially during their heated Oval Office meeting, where the Ukrainian President’s comments led Trump to believe Kyiv is not genuinely interested in peace. The author emphasizes that Trump’s primary objective—motivated by pure self-interest—is to end the war quickly: “Trump’s most pressing objective is to stop the fighting.” The US President’s frustration stems from Zelensky’s refusal to consider an immediate unconditional ceasefire, which the author claims would have shifted the pressure onto Putin to prove his willingness for peace: “If the Russian leader rejected it or violated it, he would be the object of Trump’s ire and coercion, not Zelensky.” Additionally, Thiessen highlights what he presents as Trump’s commitment “to helping Ukraine survive as a sovereign and independent nation,” pointing out that he has worked on agreements to support Ukraine’s survival, such as the minerals deal. According to the author, Trump is open to negotiations that would help Ukraine regain its territory, but insists that security measures should be dealt with last in peace talks, which conflicts with Zelensky’s stance on securing guarantees upfront. The author also highlights Trump’s rhetoric toward Putin, revealing that while Trump maintains a neutral public stance, his actions suggest otherwise; as he has said in the past, “nobody has been tougher on Russia than I have.” Trump’s strategic positioning aims to facilitate peace talks rather than escalate the front-line situation, but his critics are mistaken in interpreting his comments about Putin as signs of support. Thiessen also notes that “if Putin ends up stringing Trump along, he’ll find out how quickly Trump will turn on him.” The author suggests that Zelensky must understand Trump’s negotiating tactics and focus on rebuilding their rapport to ensure continued support from the US. The author believes that Trump, despite his controversial approach, remains Ukraine’s ally, and that Zelensky needs to work with him to avoid jeopardizing the country’s future. “The fact is, Zelensky had Trump’s friendship and lost it. He needs to win it back, because—like it or not—his country’s fate depends on it.”

Zelensky’s leadership balances war, reform, and democracy. Michael Bociurkiw (New York Times) highlights President Volodymyr Zelensky’s achievements and weaknesses in the context of geopolitical tensions, stressing that while he showed great resolve as a wartime leader who remained in Ukraine during Russia’s full-scale invasion, his presidency remains a mix of resilience and strategic miscalculations. His recent diplomatic recovery—securing restored US military aid and intelligence sharing after a tense period with the Trump administration—has led to a surge in his approval ratings, with a poll showing 72% support. However, the author warns that Ukraine must continue demonstrating commitment to democratic principles to sustain international backing. As European leaders consider long-term security strategies for Ukraine, “EU member states will demand assurances that their money won’t be wasted and that Ukraine can survive as a stable democracy.” Bociurkiw states that institutional reforms are needed, particularly anti-corruption efforts and governance transparency, to reinforce Ukraine’s credibility. While Zelensky initially promised to root out corruption, his administration has faced allegations of tolerating it, especially in defence procurement and the judiciary. The author notes, “Polls suggest that a majority of Ukrainians consider corruption the second-biggest problem in Ukraine, after Russian aggression.” Additionally, elections remain contentious, with the author acknowledging that holding national elections under martial law is nearly impossible but suggesting local elections as a potential first step to demonstrate Ukraine’s democratic stability. Proposing a phased easing of wartime restrictions, such as lifting curfews in western regions and reopening some airports, could signal progress to both domestic and international audiences. As Ukraine navigates its war effort and global alliances, Zelensky must take decisive action to solidify Ukraine’s future as a democratic and accountable state.

Putin seeks to dictate terms of Ukraine’s surrender. Max Boot (Washington Post) argues that Russia, not Ukraine, remains the primary obstacle to peace, as evidenced by the Kremlin’s outright rejection of a 30-day ceasefire proposal brokered by the Trump administration. While Ukraine “unconditionally agreed” to a ceasefire during talks in Saudi Arabia, Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed the offer, citing “issues that we need to discuss.” Boot highlights that Putin’s objection is rooted in his refusal to allow Ukraine time to “use those 30 days to continue forced mobilization, get weapons supplies, and prepare its mobilized units,” while making no commitment to pause Russia’s own military operations. Putin is not interested in genuine peace but rather in imposing a settlement on his own terms, which include territorial concessions, Ukraine’s demilitarization, and regime change. The author warns that “Putin does not want an armistice agreement similar to the one that froze the front lines in the Korean War in 1953”—rather, a dictated peace akin to the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which humiliated a defeated Germany. Boot also criticizes US President Donald Trump’s failure to recognize Putin’s expansionist ambitions and his misguided stance on the war. Trump has wrongly blamed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the all-out war and even praised Putin for supposedly wanting to end it. The author argues that such statements only embolden the Kremlin, as do the Trump administration’s temporary halt in US military aid, intelligence sharing, and cyberoperations targeting Russia. Citing a Russian think tank document aligned with the Federal Security Service (FSB), the author outlines the Kremlin’s unrealistic demands, which include international recognition of Russia’s annexed territories (none of which Moscow fully controls), creation of neutral “buffer zones” within Ukraine, and drastic reduction of Ukraine’s armed forces to just 50,000 soldiers. The document also dismisses any Western peacekeeping role as “absolutely unnecessary” and insists on the dismantling of Zelensky’s government, declaring that “the current Kyiv regime cannot be changed from inside the country.” Putin will only abandon his war if he realizes that he cannot win by force, the author argues, adding that increased Western support for Ukraine is the only viable path to ending the war.