USA lacks strategy of maximum pressure on Russia

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 29 December 2024–4 January 2025

Five publications (Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, NBC News, The Hill, and The New York Times) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

Russia’s war against Ukraine has changed Ukrainians. Anton Grushetskyi and Volodymyr Paniotto (Foreign Affairs) argue that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered a long-term social transformation in Ukraine. Since 2022, public opinion in Ukraine has changed on several key issues: “How Ukrainians perceive their national identity, how they imagine their orientation to the wider world, and how ready they are to resist foreign aggression.” With the outbreak of full-scale war, Ukrainians began to value their state, sovereignty, and democratic rights more: “Nearly three years of fighting have also flattened differences in attitudes between regions and encouraged greater uniformity across ethnic and linguistic lines. This increased cohesion and greater support for the state among Ukrainians helps bolster efforts to resist Russia.” At the same time, the Russo-Ukrainian war has caused additional challenges: “Between military personnel and those who have not served, and between internally displaced people and those who remained in the occupied territories—that can cause friction and social tensions.” According to the authors, despite Moscow’s attempts to destroy Ukraine, Ukrainians remain optimistic about their future: “Only 19 percent of Ukrainians believe that ten years from now their economy will be destroyed and many more of their compatriots will have fled. Most Ukrainians still believe that in ten years Ukraine will be a prosperous country within the EU.”

USA needs strategy of maximum pressure on Russia. Alina Polyakova (Foreign Affairs) argues that the USA should gain more leverage to force Russia to the negotiating table. US President-elect Donald Trump’s desire to end Russia’s war against Ukraine is laudable. However, the problem is that Moscow does not want peace, as evidenced by the demands that the Kremlin is making on Kyiv and its partners: “Permanent neutrality for Ukraine with no future option for NATO or EU membership, Western recognition of the Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine, the removal of all Western sanctions, and broader agreement from the West to recognize Russia’s self-defined ‘sphere of influence.’” To negotiate with Moscow from a position of strength, Washington should launch a “maximum pressure campaign” that would force the Russians to the negotiating table—“something they currently have little incentive to do—while allowing the Trump administration to set the agenda.” Washington should use all available levers of influence to increase pressure on Moscow. First, the USA should strengthen sanctions against Russia in the financial and energy sectors. Second, the new presidential administration should use the remaining funds from the latest congressional supplemental legislation for Ukraine to provide Kyiv with air defence and long-range missile systems such as Patriot interceptors, ATACMS, and HIMARS. Third, the US should put political pressure on European allies to increase their support for Ukraine’s security and economic needs: “Europe holds the majority of the frozen Russian assets that were immobilized in 2022 ($260 billion out of approximately $300 billion).” Fourth, together with its allies, Washington should take steps to suppress the Russian defence industry: “Russia alone cannot produce all the components it needs to build and transport its military equipment and has deep dependencies on third-party providers in key sectors.” According to Polyakova, “By taking advantage of Russia’s economic, political, and military vulnerabilities, the United States would be able to impose costs on U.S. adversaries such as China and Iran, which supply many of Russia’s war needs. Only through maximum pressure can the new administration turn today’s grinding war of attrition into a stable peace.”

Europe is still dependent on Russian energy. Paul Hockenos (Foreign Policy) argues that despite Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and the efforts of European states to reduce their dependence on Russian fossil fuels, the continent still remains dependent on them. Regardless of the loud rhetoric, Russian energy resources are in demand in Europe: “Several European countries have failed to completely sever their energy ties to Russia, and the notoriously pro-Russian governments of Hungary and Slovakia are among them—but they are not alone. In 2024, only Slovakia deposited more into Russian accounts for fossil fuels than France, followed by Hungary, Austria, and Spain.” Moreover, Europe has regressed in terms of reducing its dependence on Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG): “EU countries’ imports from Russia—led by France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium—reached an all-time high in 2024. Russian gas imports are Europe’s most glaring failure, with Russia still making up 18 percent of all EU natural gas imports as of late 2024… By 2024, the share of Russia’s pipeline gas in EU imports dropped to about 8% of its 2021 total as Germany and other countries found new markets. But Russian gas continued to flow into the EU—through Ukrainian pipelines—with some of the best customers being Slovakia, Hungary, Austria, Greece, and Italy.” In 2024, the EU imported a record 16.5 million metric tonnes of LNG from Russia,” up from 15.2 million in 2023. According to Hockenos, “Given the humanitarian tragedy in Ukraine and the war’s geopolitical ramifications, Europe should expedite the formulation of clear guidelines and earlier deadlines for phasing out all types of Russian energy imports.”

Peace in Ukraine hinges on security, justice, and strategic boundaries. Matthew Bondy (The Hill) highlights the potential for peace in Ukraine, particularly in light of President-elect Trump’s vow to end the war “within a day” of assuming office. He notes that President Volodymyr Zelensky has, for the first time, signaled conditional openness to territorial concessions if NATO guarantees protection for areas under Kyiv’s control. A peace framework appears to be emerging, but Bondy emphasizes that any deal must address three critical non-negotiables: the boundaries of any territorial concessions, NATO security guarantees for Ukraine, and funding for reconstruction. The author warns against drawing new borders that leave Kyiv vulnerable or ceding excessive land, particularly territory east of the Dnipro River, which would bring Russia alarmingly close to the capital. “In drawing new boundaries, Trump and Zelensky need to be strong and strategic, resisting the temptation to end the war at too high a price,” Bondy writes, adding that Ukraine’s immediate NATO membership is essential to prevent future Russian aggression, as demonstrated by Russia’s repeated invasions of non-NATO neighbours. Finally, justice requires that Russia’s frozen financial assets abroad be seized to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction, a process estimated to cost nearly half a trillion dollars. The author argues this approach would strengthen Ukraine’s economy and the broader democratic world while addressing the injustices caused by Russia’s war. Any peace deal that sacrifices these principles risks creating instability and emboldening expansionist autocrats like Vladimir Putin.

Effectiveness of Russian sanctions faces renewed scrutiny under Trump. Patricia Cohen (New York Times) examines the impact of sanctions on Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and their potential role as leverage in future negotiations under President-elect Trump. While initial predictions that sanctions would quickly destabilize Russia or cripple its economy were overly optimistic, Cohen argues they have significantly hindered Moscow’s ability to wage war effectively. Key measures include freezing over $300 billion in Russian assets, restricting access to the global financial system, and cutting off many avenues for international trade. Sergei Guriev, dean of the London Business School, explains: “Imagine a world where sanctions were not introduced… It’s very clear that sanctions did cause problems for Putin, did reduce the amount of resources in his pocket and, therefore, saved lives in Ukraine.” However, the author notes that Russia has adapted by forging stronger economic ties with countries like China and India, which have provided oil revenue and critical supplies to sustain the war effort. Despite their achievements, the sanctions’ overall effectiveness is debated. Western nations have struggled with enforcement, and loopholes have allowed Russia to circumvent many restrictions, such as transporting oil through a shadow fleet of vessels. Critics like Jeffrey Schott of the Peterson Institute argue that the sanctions were implemented too cautiously, particularly regarding energy exports, where Russia continues to profit. While sanctions remain a valuable bargaining chip for Trump as he plans negotiations with Vladimir Putin, their ultimate success depends on the Kremlin. “Even the most valuable bargaining chips that may derive from sanctions may not be enough to persuade Mr. Putin to agree to a settlement that is also acceptable to Ukraine and its neighboring European allies,” Cohen concludes.

Ukraine braces for a challenging 2025 amid Putin’s advances, Trump’s presidency. Astha Rajvanshi (NBC News) argues that 2025 will be a decisive year for Ukraine, with the incoming presidency of Donald Trump expected to play a key role in determining the course of the war. Trump has pledged to end the war in “24 hours,” while voicing skepticism about extensive US military aid and criticizing Ukraine’s tactics, such as launching missiles into Russian territory. His aides have floated a truce plan involving a 20-year delay in Ukraine’s NATO membership in exchange for continued Western arms and European peacekeepers—a proposal analysts fear could embolden Russia. Justyna Gotkowska of the Center for Eastern Studies warns that “Trump, with his unpredictable policy on military support for Kyiv and on how to end the war, will be the biggest challenge.” Meanwhile, Ukraine contends with intensified Russian attacks and manpower shortages, as Moscow makes gains in Donetsk oblast and solidifies its military position. Ukraine’s President Zelensky must secure ongoing Western support while grappling with the possibility of concessions in peace talks. Analysts like Kristi Raik of the International Centre for Defence and Security express concern that Trump’s eagerness to fulfill his promise to end the war could pressure Ukraine into a “bad deal” with Russia. Russia, viewing itself as negotiating from strength, has rejected Trump’s suggested terms. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that “ensuring Ukraine’s nonaligned status remains among the goals of the special military operation that must be achieved.” Rajvanshi concludes that Zelensky has advocated for NATO membership as essential to protecting Ukraine from future invasions; however, Kyiv’s chances appear slim, as leaders in both the US and Europe remain divided on the security guarantees they can extend.