A victorious Ukraine has much to offer Europe
CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 8–14 December 2024
Four publications (Foreign Policy, The National Interest, Foreign Affairs, and The Atlantic) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.
This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.
Featured topics
- The world and Ukraine: how to achieve peace in Ukraine; a victorious Ukraine has much to offer Europe; the cost of supporting Ukraine is far less than the price of defeat.
- Russia at war: Russian economy remains Kremlin’s biggest weakness; the West must fight Russia’s global disinformation campaign.
MMS summaries
Russian economy remains Kremlin’s biggest weakness. Theodore Bunzel and Elina Ribakova (Foreign Affairs) argue that tougher sanctions could force Russia to the negotiating table with Ukraine. If President-elect Donald Trump wants to resolve the Russo-Ukrainian war quickly and effectively, he must conclude a peace agreement on terms favourable to Ukraine. Otherwise, there is a real threat that Russia would resume its aggression and the peace would be short-lived. The Russian economy is weaker than ever, thanks in large part to sanctions: “The labor supply is shrinking, as hundreds of thousands of Russian men are killed or injured on the battlefield—Russia suffered 1,500 casualties a day in October. Defense spending is eating up the budget. And if Moscow’s energy revenues—the lifeblood of the Russian economy—and its imports of Western-made dual-use goods slow significantly, it may face an economic and military crisis.” According to the authors, toughening sanctions could be the most effective tool to force Moscow to peace: “Tightening the sanctions noose would make Moscow’s colossal war effort less financially sustainable, and with the prospect of a sputtering war machine and domestic discontent over deteriorating economic conditions, Putin may feel pressure to accept terms more favorable to Ukraine.” Russian energy should be the main target of US and European sanctions policies: “Oil and gas exports account for roughly a third of government revenue, and the revenues are plugging Russia’s budget gap and propping up the economy…Today, Russia earns $60 to $70 per barrel of oil it sells. If those revenues were pushed down to $40 to $50 per barrel, that could tip the economy into crisis.” According to Bunzel and Ribakova, “Cracking down on Russia’s economy and war machine is the most cost-effective way to give Trump what he most wants: a durable deal between Russia and Ukraine for which he can justifiably claim credit. Ramping up economic leverage over Moscow is less risky than dramatically escalating military support to Kyiv, and without additional pressure Russia has no incentive to play ball in 2025. If Trump gets Moscow to accept reasonable armistice terms by squeezing its vulnerable economy, then his election won’t turn out to be the miracle that Putin was hoping for.”
The West must fight Russia’s global disinformation campaign. Thomas Kent (National Interest) argues that Western media should expand and strengthen their outreach to the Global South, in order to counter Russian disinformation. For many years, Moscow has competed with Western news media through alternative outlets such as the RT television channel (previously Russia Today) and the multimedia Sputnik news agency. Moreover, Russia is now targeting two other areas dominated by Western media: journalism training and fact-checking. In these two areas, Moscow is focusing its attention on countries of the Global South: “RT Academy, launched in February, initially focused on training journalists in South and Southeast Asia. Nearly 300 students completed an initial course, with some winning internships at RT’s regional bureaus… A course for African journalists was scheduled to begin in October. A video promo for the Africa course portrays Western media as fixated on the ‘same narrative’ of climate change, sanctions against Russia, and LGBT issues, as compared to RT’s ‘alternative perspective’ concentrating on day-to-day African news and Russia’s role in the region.” The sponsors of such initiatives are the state news agency TASS and ANO Dialogue, which are fully controlled by the Kremlin and subject to European and US sanctions. The author believes that the West should respond to this challenge in three ways. First, Western organizations should mobilize independent journalists in the Global South into new networks to create large-scale websites and social media channels with reliable daily reporting. Second, the largest international news agencies should offer their content at the lowest possible price to media outlets in states where the news services of authoritarian countries are the main sources of world news. Third, Western governments should leverage the strength and brands of their existing international broadcasting services to create innovative products that can win new popularity in regions that are desperate for high-quality information. According to Kent, “Journalism represents a critically important theater of the global war between democracy and authoritarianism. Western nations and media organizations need to recognize that fact and strengthen independent media accordingly.”
How to achieve peace in Ukraine. Niall Ferguson and Harry Halem (The Atlantic) emphasize that to protect US interests, the newly elected president must be clear-eyed and tough on Russia’s attempts to exploit negotiations. Preserving an independent Ukraine is “the best way to prevent Moscow from testing the treaty’s Article 5 mutual defense clause.” Russia will try to use the negotiation process to freeze rather than resolve a conflict, build military leverage, and split allies. If the US wants to end the Russo-Ukrainian war in its own interest, it must counter Moscow’s strategy and create military and economic leverage over Russia: “This will require not just surging aid to Ukraine and tightening the sanctions regime, but also imposing costs on Russia and its allies across Eurasia, including in Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific region.” For Russian diplomacy, unlike Western diplomacy, fighting and talking are synonymous: “From the Soviet Union’s earliest years, Moscow viewed warfare and political action, including diplomacy, as unitary. Negotiations are just another tool to improve one’s political position; the objective, as with military operations, remains the enemy’s subjugation, or at least its exhaustion.” To achieve a meaningful settlement, Washington must create much broader leverage by linking Russia’s position in Ukraine to other interests. There are four steps to take: “Increased pressure in the Middle East, disruption of Russia’s Eurasian partnerships, explicit U.S. acceptance of European-led security initiatives, and exploitation of Russia’s reliance on Chinese economic support.” Combining these four elements with continued military and economic support for Kyiv will give Washington a chance to keep Moscow at the negotiating table. According to Ferguson and Halem, “The beginning of talks should mean not the end of military and economic pressure but the reverse. The new Trump presidency will be a crucial moment for the US and its allies to lean harder—not just on Russia, but on the Eurasian Axis as a whole.”
A victorious Ukraine has much to offer Europe. Michael Hikari Cecire (Foreign Policy) argues that a victorious Ukraine could offer Europe a security umbrella, as its army has become one of the best in the world. With the new administration in the White House, the format of transatlantic cooperation and security guarantees from the US may be reformatted. Even though Europe is strategically rethinking its security policy, European capitals will need “at least a generation of dedicated European defense investment” to make it happen. Europe cannot find a quick solution on its own, but it can turn to Ukraine for help. After all, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are among the best in the world: “It will be among the few armies on the continent with real, practical experience in large-scale combined arms and maneuver warfare. Ukrainians have experience integrating varied and secondhand weapons systems from across the world and forming them into coherent and lethal operational elements. They also boast a rapidly innovating, specialized suite of advanced, battlefield-iterated domestic weapons—particularly drones and a growing array of long-range, precision-strike platforms—and real-life concepts of operations for their employment.” To realize this alternative, European states must quickly endorse and implement a plan for Ukraine’s victory and work now to ensure that Kyiv is in a strong negotiating position tomorrow. According to Cecire, “Ukraine can then offer Europe a highly militarily credible conventional deterrent, and key insights for European deterrence, defense, and resilience.
Ukraine, allies need to balance bold diplomacy, strategic defence against Russia in order to succeed. Eliot A. Cohen (Atlantic) notes that policymakers will be facing difficult choices regarding the Russo-Ukrainian war and emphasizes the urgent need for decisive action to secure Ukraine’s future. Cohen critiques the Biden administration for failing to provide Ukraine with sufficient military aid in the early days of the full-scale invasion, arguing that a more robust response could have enabled Ukraine to reclaim occupied territories. However, with Donald Trump poised to assume office, the focus shifts to his potential approach, shaped by his desire to leave a historic legacy as a “great peacemaker.” While skepticism surrounds Trump’s affinity for Vladimir Putin, the author suggests his admiration may have waned due to Russia’s prolonged failures, including over 600,000 casualties, reliance on foreign aid, and economic strain. The proposed resolution involves a modified version of the newly appointed Ukraine envoy’s plan, which includes a cease-fire, security guarantees, and reconstruction aid for Ukraine. A significant European-led force is proposed, comprising divisions from countries like France, Britain, and Poland, to ensure Ukraine’s defence and deter future aggression. The author stresses that “the strains in Russia are less visible to us than those in Ukraine and are, for now, suppressed by a near-totalitarian state, but that does not mean that they are not there,” stressing Russia’s vulnerabilities, which include rising inflation, a falling ruble, and finding “enough of its own men to serve as soldiers.” For this scenario to succeed, European nations must expand their militaries and commit to forward deployments, while Trump must assert control and pursue robust sanctions on Russia. Such sanctions, particularly targeting entities linked to Gazprom, could exacerbate internal pressures in Russia and force Moscow to negotiate. Cohen concludes that while these developments require significant effort and coordination, they are plausible and offer hope for a more secure and independent Ukraine.
The cost of supporting Ukraine is far less than the price of defeat. Elaine McCusker (Foreign Affairs) notes that the cost of losing the war in Ukraine would far exceed the US government’s expense of supporting Kyiv. The American Enterprise Institute estimates that a Russian victory would require the United States to spend $808 billion more on defence over the next five years in order to deter and achieve the capacity to defeat Moscow along NATO’s borders—over seven times more than the $112 billion Congress has allocated to aid Ukraine since 2022. This aid not only keeps Russia from threatening NATO but also strengthens US military readiness at home, as much of the funding supports domestic weapons production. “Aiding Ukraine, then, is clearly the right financial decision.” On the other hand, a Ukrainian defeat would embolden Russia, McCusker writes, enabling it to reconstitute its military strength and threaten NATO countries by 2030. Furthermore, without US support Ukraine would lose its ability to maintain air defences or produce sufficient weaponry, leaving it vulnerable to repeated Russian advances. A victorious Kremlin would station troops and military assets along NATO borders, forcing Washington to ramp up its military presence in Europe, increase recruitment, and spend billions on air, land, and maritime defences. The ripple effects of such a defeat would destabilize global security, compelling the US to redirect resources from other critical regions like the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. The author maintains that investing in Ukraine safeguards US interests by deterring larger conflicts and preserving global stability. While there are valid concerns about the cost of aiding Kyiv, abandoning Ukraine would lead to far greater expenses, both financially and strategically. “It is expensive to deter a war, yet it is more expensive to fight one. Washington is facing a multitude of global threats, and so it is understandable that officials would second-guess the cost of helping Kyiv. But given the stakes, Americans must have clarity on the long-term costs, not just the upfront expenses. Supporting Ukraine is not only morally right but financially right. It is a prudent investment in US interests.”