Restraint in relations with Russia will not work

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 1–7 December 2024

Six publications (Foreign Policy, The National Interest, Foreign Affairs, The Wall Street Journal, The Globe and Mail, and Policy Options) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

Ukraine’s security now depends on Europe. Elie Tenenbaum and Leo Litra (Foreign Affairs) believe that the willingness of the newly elected US president and his team to start negotiations soon is a cause for concern for Ukraine and its European partners. Kyiv is currently in a weak negotiating position due to the Russian offensive and massive shelling of the Ukrainian power grid. The general proposals of Donald Trump’s team include “a military freeze along current frontlines and terms for Ukraine’s postwar status that range from formal neutrality to full disarmament. Such terms entirely contradict the promise NATO leaders made to Kyiv in July, at the alliance’s summit in Washington, of a ‘well-lit bridge’ to membership. To agree to this kind of settlement would amount to shutting off the lights.” According to the author, European countries must now come together to form a coalition, claim a seat at the table, and make their conditions heard loud and clear. First, the European coalition should insist on providing effective security guarantees for Ukraine as a precondition for negotiations. Without them, any truce is meaningless: “Between 2015 and 2022, Russia and Ukraine held almost 200 rounds of negotiations and agreed to 20 cease-fires. Throughout that period, Russia tested the agreements daily through artillery fire, sniper shots, infiltration, cyberattacks and electronic warfare, and intense disinformation campaigns.” European states should be prepared to provide guarantees that include: (1) inviting Ukraine to join NATO before the end of the war; (2) increasing financial support for Ukraine and lifting most restrictions on the use of force; and (3) deploying military forces to Ukraine to enforce the ceasefire agreement with Russia. According to Tenenbaum and Litra, “Without an ironclad assurance that Ukraine will remain protected, the cure of a cease-fire may prove much worse than the disease of war—and an inadequate settlement may well doom not just Ukraine but the continent as a whole.”

How the US can end the Russo-Ukrainian war for good. Marc A. Thiessen (Wall Street Journal) argues that the Munich, Yalta, or Budapest agreements should not be repeated. The Munich Agreement of 1938 led to the encouragement of Adolf Hitler’s expansionist sentiments and the beginning of the bloodiest war of the twentieth century. The Yalta Agreement brought the world to the brink of nuclear Armageddon during the Cold War. The Budapest Agreement led to the Russian war against Ukraine: “On Dec. 5, the world will mark the 30th anniversary of the Budapest Memorandum of Security Assurances, the disastrous agreement that paved the way to today’s bloody war in Ukraine.” In 1991, Ukraine was “the world’s third-largest nuclear power.” According to the Budapest Treaty, Ukraine renounced these weapons: “In exchange, Russia pledged to ‘respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine’ and to ‘refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.’ Moscow also agreed to refrain from the ‘threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.’ And the United States and Britain gave Ukraine security guarantees, promising ‘to provide assistance to Ukraine…if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression.’” These guarantees turned out to be empty: “In 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea, in direct violation of the pledges Russia made in Budapest.” In the author’s opinion, it would be important for newly elected US President Donald Trump to consider the bitter lessons of Budapest and not repeat them if he wants to achieve peace in Europe. First, it is important to realise that “Putin does not want peace; he wants Ukraine.” The only way to stop him is to make his objective impossible to achieve. Second, Western security guarantees are worthless if they are not backed by Western military force: “Putin must understand that this agreement is final, and that if he ever tries to resume his invasion, he will not be fighting just Ukraine.” Third, Ukraine must be militarily strong enough to deter Russia: “Ukraine will need to create a conventional deterrent so powerful that Russia will never take it on.” According to Thiesssen, “If Trump wants to avoid presiding over a historic failure like Budapest, he needs to avoid the trap of trying to appease Putin with promises of Ukrainian neutrality and disarmament. He does not want to join Neville Chamberlain in the pantheon of leaders who promised peace in our time but delivered the opposite. Trump says he wants to prevent World War III. If that is the case, he should do what he did in his first term and secure peace through strength.”

Western restraint has only provoked Moscow to intensify its aggression. Lucan Ahmad Way (National Interest) emphasizes that the West can only hope to prevent further escalation by demanding that Russia pay a real price for its crimes. In the light of Moscow’s recent threats to use nuclear weapons, voices in favour of limiting military aid to Ukraine have grown stronger. However, according to the author, “Calls for caution blind us to the very real danger that limiting Ukraine’s ability to respond to Russian aggression will make a broader European or global war more likely by reducing the perceived costs of Russian escalation.” The belief that Russia will reward Western prudence is misplaced: “Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 was provoked in part by Western weakness and restraint rather than belligerence. Great Britain did little to punish Russia after it murdered a British citizen on British territory in 2006. Then, Western powers responded with extraordinary restraint after the Russian government blatantly violated core international norms by invading sovereign Ukrainian territory and seizing Crimea in 2014.” Western restraint has only provoked Moscow to intensify its aggression. According to Way, “If we want to stop Russia from invading sovereign countries and sowing instability in Europe and the United States, we must make such behaviour costly. That is ultimately the best way of preventing escalation.”

Donald Trump must make the Kremlin shudder before negotiations begin. Mark Montgomery and John Hardie (Foreign Policy) argue that increased Western pressure on Russia will increase the likelihood of a just and lasting peace for Ukraine. Today, Moscow is feeling like a winner and is therefore making maximalist demands for a peace agreement: “Ukraine must cede additional territories to Russia, abandon all hope of joining NATO, demilitarize, and ‘denazify’—Kremlin code for replacing the current government. These demands, which are unacceptable to Kyiv, suggest that Putin is confident that the war is trending in his favor.” If President-elect Donald Trump wants to achieve peace, he must change the Kremlin’s perception of its advantages. In the short period of time before the talks, he must increase the influence of the US and Ukraine. According to the author, Washington’s diplomatic efforts should consider key issues in the Russo-Ukrainian war. First, Putin’s ambitions go far beyond the seizure of several Ukrainian regions and their populations: “For decades, he has fought to keep Ukraine within Russia’s sphere of influence and rewrite the broader security order in Europe.” Second, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are retreating under pressure from the Russian army due to a lack of men and weapons. Third, as long as Kyiv is unable to adequately defend itself or deter attacks on its critical infrastructure, Moscow can continue to put pressure on the Ukrainian economy and discourage Western investment in recovery. Fourth, the Kremlin seems to perceive the West’s growing interest in peace talks as a sign of its weakness. Concessions to Russia at the expense of Ukraine will only make Kyiv vulnerable to another Russian aggression in the future: “For Washington, attempting to coerce Kyiv into accepting such a deal would be foolish—not least because China will be watching. If Putin is permitted to dictate terms to Kyiv, Beijing might feel more inclined to use military force against Taiwan or other neighbors.” Ukraine and its Western partners need to change the situation so that they can negotiate from a position of strength. To do this, the allies need to stabilize the front line, provide equipment and a continuous supply of ammunition, and lift restrictions on Ukraine’s strikes deep into Russia. The administration of the newly elected president should also put strong pressure on the Russian economy: “The harder it is for Moscow to keep its economy afloat and fund its war effort, the more likely the Kremlin will be to accept a fair deal.” The main targets of Washington’s attack should be Russian energy resources and the introduction of secondary sanctions. According to Montgomery and Hardie, “As the co-author of ‘The Art of the Deal,’ Trump knows that one negotiates best from a position of strength. If Trump wants a good deal to end the war in Ukraine, he should seize the opportunity to maximize pressure on Russia.”

Ukraine’s struggles demand stronger US support. Michael Bociurkiw (Globe and Mail) underscores the mounting challenges Ukraine faces more than 1,000 days into Russia’s full-scale invasion, highlighting the toll on morale, infrastructure, and the economy. Power outages caused by relentless Russian missile and drone strikes are sapping the resilience of Ukrainians, while bitter winter conditions compound their hardships. Bociurkiw critiques the Biden administration’s “drip-feed approach” to provide military support for Ukraine, arguing that previous delays in providing advanced weaponry like ATACMS allowed Russia to adapt. Despite these setbacks, the Ukrainian people remain resolute, understanding that “life under Russian occupation is worse than death—it would be hell on Earth.” The author also notes rising fears over new Russian missile technology, such as the experimental Oreshnik ballistic missile, which Putin claims can cause catastrophic damage. Bociurkiw calls for decisive action from President Biden before his exit, emphasizing the need for robust air defence systems and long-range strike capabilities to counter Russia’s escalatory tactics. Such measures would allow Ukraine to target critical Russian military infrastructure, including launch pads for missiles and the Kerch Bridge, “a vital conduit for military supplies into occupied Crimea.” “While Mr. Biden’s exit hasn’t gone the way he would have liked, he can polish up his legacy by firmly backing Ukraine in its time of need,” the author concludes.

Partitioning Ukraine could ignite a guerrilla war. Nina Khrushcheva (Globe and Mail) examines the potential consequences of US president-elect Donald Trump’s proposal to end the Ukraine war through a settlement likely involving Ukraine’s territorial partition. Drawing historical parallels, it highlights the enduring violence and enmity caused by past partitions, including Poland, Ireland, India, and Palestine. Khrushcheva emphasizes that partitions rarely achieve peace and often incite long-term unrest and guerrilla warfare, as seen in Poland’s uprisings against its eighteenth-century partitions or the sectarian violence following India’s division in 1947. Similarly, Ukrainians, who have demonstrated extraordinary resilience, are unlikely to accept a dismembered nation quietly, particularly given Vladimir Putin’s claims that “modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia” and should exist only under the Russian umbrella. The author warns that “any partition of Ukraine would risk repeating the devastating cycles of violence seen in past historical examples” and questions whether such a path could ever lead to stability. The author argues that any future peace negotiations must include robust security guarantees for Ukraine to deter further Russian aggression, suggesting that NATO membership or equivalent commitments are essential. Trump’s apparent aversion to such guarantees risks emboldening Russia and escalating the conflict. Moreover, Khrushcheva warns of a heightened risk of terrorism, noting that Ukrainians have already vowed to launch a guerrilla war if necessary. “Mr. Trump should seek to persuade the Kremlin of the need for fair negotiations; otherwise, post-partition terrorism may come to Russia, possibly on a greater scale than the Chechens ever imagined,” she notes, emphasizing that a forced partition could backfire on the Kremlin.

Russian opposition infighting undermines efforts to challenge Putin. Mark MacKinnon (Globe and Mail) argues that deep divisions and tensions within Russia’s pro-democracy movement have undermined its effectiveness in opposing Vladimir Putin’s regime. These challenges, long characterized by disputes over leadership and strategy, have intensified since the death of Alexey Navalny, who had briefly unified opposition factions. Accusations of corruption, such as claims against Navalny’s team for alleged ties to exiled bankers, and the revelation that Leonid Volkov’s attacker was allegedly funded by opposition figure Leonid Nevzlin, have further fractured the movement. This internal discord, exacerbated by the Kremlin’s possible manipulation, is described by strategist Marat Guelman as a “very successful FSB campaign.” The infighting has disappointed Western governments that had hoped for a united front capable of presenting a viable alternative to Putin’s rule. Despite recent efforts, including a November anti-war march in Berlin, the opposition remains divided along personal and ideological lines. Figures like Yulia Navalnaya, Vladimir Kara-Murza, and Ilya Yashin advocate for unity, yet avoid direct association with the central players in the ongoing disputes. Political expert Ekaterina Schulmann attributes the discord to the immense pressure the movement faces, calling it a “normal defence mechanism” but cautioning against the expectation of a singular opposition leader emerging anytime soon. Instead, Yashin emphasizes the need to engage the Russian public: “We need to consolidate the people. If we can unite the people, then politicians will also begin to unite.” MacKinnon concludes that without addressing these internal conflicts, the Russian opposition risks irrelevance in its quest to challenge Kremlin leadership.

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Canada needs to step up its game in combating Russian disinformation. Stan Kutcher, Maria Popova, and Ian Garner (Policy Options, digital magazine of the Institute for Research on Public Policy) highlight the pervasive and dangerous impact of Russian disinformation tactics on Canadian democracy, emphasizing the need for urgent action. It critiques the mistaken belief among some Canadians that their country is immune to such propaganda, noting how this complacency enables Kremlin-backed narratives to spread. “A key issue we are facing in Canada is the difficulty distinguishing between Russian propaganda and well-informed, constructive debate. As propaganda gets absorbed into everyday discourse, our democratic debates are reframed and made increasingly inflammatory,” the authors note. By manipulating freedom of speech, Russian propaganda infiltrates online networks, reframing democratic debates and deepening societal polarization. The goal is not to bolster Russia’s image but to “to tear Ukraine down,” weakening trust in Kyiv, undermining Western unity, and eroding democratic values. To counter these threats, the authors recommend a multi-pronged approach. These include diplomatic expulsions, strengthening fact-checking campaigns, and legislative actions to curb disinformation. Public awareness campaigns are also critical to help Canadians recognize and resist propaganda narratives. As one remedy, the authors suggest empowering independent organizations to conduct “pre-bunking interventions,” which involve proactive efforts to expose falsehoods before they spread. Moreover, public broadcasters and cultural institutions must avoid inadvertently legitimizing disinformation, as seen in controversies like Anastasia Trofimova’s film “Russians at War,” which the Ukrainian Canadian Congress criticized for “whitewashing well-documented atrocities.” The authors underscore that Canada cannot afford complacency, given its position as a strategic target for Russian disinformation, and needs to address these challenges with concrete steps: “Simply turning a blind eye to Russian propaganda will neither neutralize it nor make it go away.”