Bad peace is more expensive

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 24–30 November 2024

Five publications (Foreign Policy, The National Interest, Politico, Globe and Mail, and The Economist) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

What the Kremlin wants from the war against Ukraine. Arkady Moshes (National Interest) argues that “If the West wants to change Putin’s calculus, it must demonstrate that it is not going to purchase another period of comfort for itself at Ukraine’s expense.” Allies must make it clear to Russia that they will not give up. In recent months, discussions about the need for a peaceful resolution of Russia’s war against Ukraine have become more frequent. Much attention is paid to compromises and proposals that could be imposed on Ukraine. However, little has been said about compromises that can be demanded from Russia. According to the author, the time when Moscow was ready to compromise is over: “At this point, Vladimir Putin looks confident that time is on his side.” This looks plausible because, first, Russia has maintained and sometimes even increased its ability to wage war, including a war of attrition; and second, Moscow wants to win an undisputed victory not only over Ukraine but also over the West as a whole—otherwise, “when Russia’s national consolidation weakens after the war ends and the economy slows down without the war stimulus, it will be a challenge to keep the Russian citizens convinced that the endeavor was worth the effort.” There are four goals that Moscow seeks to achieve: “(1) Western recognition of Russia’s territorial expansion, including Crimea; (2) Economic sanctions against Russia should be lifted; (3) Frozen assets should be returned; (4) A de facto Russian veto on major issues of European security, such as NATO enlargement.” Achieving any of these goals would encourage Moscow to push for further expansion. According to Moshes, the West “should make Moscow understand that the name of the game is anything but Western surrender.”

Five conditions that have changed globally. Michael Hirsh (Politico) is convinced that President-elect Donald Trump will have a hard time achieving “world peace,” because the modern world is less receptive to his style of dealmaking. Trump’s diplomatic approach during his previous presidential term did not show significant results in negotiations with China, Iran, or North Korea. According to the author, there are five ways conditions have changed globally that all but ensure Trump is going to find it harder to get his way this time around. First, Russia escalated its war against Ukraine: “Trump already faces the prospect of breaking one of his biggest campaign promises, having repeatedly pledged to end that war ‘before I even become president.’” Following the phone call between President Trump and President Putin, Russia has only intensified its attacks on Ukrainian civilians: “[Putin] is still massing forces in Ukraine’s southeast in apparent preparation for a new offensive, and over the past week Putin has launched some of his biggest missile attacks on Ukraine in months.” Second, Israel’s threats of annexation could prolong hostilities. Third, Iran is much closer to going nuclear. Trump is also facing new obstacles in fulfilling another campaign promise: to force Iran to abandon its nuclear programme. Fourth, North Korea entered into an alliance with Russia: “The mutual defense agreement between Russia and North Korea, announced in June, means Kim is getting food aid, money and oil—and likely military technology—that previously only a deal with Washington could provide.” Fifth, China has become more hard-line: “Trump will find it far more difficult to push China to play fair on trade and stand down on its threats to Taiwan, because Chinese President Xi Jinping is more of a hard-liner on all these issues than he was four years ago.” According to Hirsh, “The very real question is whether Trump, in his pronounced eagerness to make deals, will have the leverage […] he needs. Without it, he may well find himself engaged in a series of one-sided negotiations in his second presidency in which he walks away, once again, empty-handed.”

Bad peace is more expensive. Anastasia Edel (Foreign Policy) argues that the West no longer has the political will to help Ukraine win militarily, and instead is looking for ways to negotiate with the aggressor. These sentiments are reinforced by the US election results. The USA’s shift to isolationism may accelerate the inevitable: “Ukraine and the West will soon find themselves negotiating with Russia to define the terms of a settlement—and, by extension, shaping a new world order.” According to the author, “The problem is that any deal will amount to Ukraine’s—and the West’s—capitulation to Russia.” Western states are guided by the principle that “a bad peace is better than a good quarrel.” If Ukraine’s allies are determined to secure this “bad peace,” they must have a negotiating strategy based on four critical parameters: territory, security guarantees for Ukraine, reparations and sanctions. But it will be extremely difficult to reconcile the positions of all parties on these four points. Meanwhile, Russia is not interested in a lasting peaceful settlement: “Even if Putin wanted to end the war, it would entail serious risk for his regime. Drones, shells, and missile production would have to be scaled down, ending the economic boom. The sudden drop in government spending would create real prospects of an economic collapse. Around 1.5 million veterans would have to be pulled out of Ukraine to find new roles in a corrupt Russian society. The manufactured sense of national unity would give way to envy that beyond the border, on Russia’s ‘ancestral lands,’ Ukrainians are thriving under European Union and NATO banners.” However, one should not overestimate Moscow’s strength and invincibility: “The BRICS countries are not rushing to replace SWIFT with the Russian alternative. By putting all his economic eggs into the military basket, Putin has siphoned off resources from everywhere else, an unsustainable move. Inflation is real, and the ruble is weakening. Even the overheated military sector can’t keep up with demands. Moreover, as a student of Russian history, Putin knows that the support and adoration of the Russian masses can turn on its head overnight.” To preserve his regime, President Putin will negotiate from a position of strength: “After a call during which Trump told the Russian leader not to escalate in Ukraine, Russian state television released a special on Melania Trump’s modeling career, including nude photos of the once and future first lady.” The West, meanwhile, will be negotiating from a position of inherent weakness. According to Edel, “The issue of European security cannot be solved by a settlement with Moscow, because appeasement only increases the aggressor’s appetite. Only the containment of Putin’s expansionism by military means will remove the existential threat to his neighbors. So long as there is an aggressive, revanchist Russia in the picture, lasting peace is an illusion.”

Trump’s peace deal between Russia and Ukraine is not viable. Fredrik Wesslau (Foreign Policy) emphasizes that the real risk of a peace deal is not so much that it will be bad, but that the Kremlin could use President-elect Donald Trump as a way to undermine Western unity and support for Ukraine. This would allow Russia to move closer to its goals of conquering Ukraine and changing the global security order. In the author’s opinion, the “Trump-Putin deal could include dropping US support for Ukraine’s NATO membership, committing to Ukraine’s neutrality, recognizing Russia’s annexations in Ukraine, ending sanctions, and limiting (or ending) military and other assistance to Ukraine. In exchange, Russia could commit to a cease-fire and to stopping missile and drone attacks on Ukraine. A demilitarized zone along the current line would separate the forces.” However, Moscow does not need peace, only a ceasefire to rearm its troops. Ukraine and Europe may not agree to such a deal, no matter how much pressure the US puts on them: “Most Ukrainians see this war as existential and have no illusions about a cease-fire that would give Russia a chance to regroup to attack Ukraine again.” At the same time, “Europe—with a few exceptions, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban—would balk at recognizing Russia’s territorial conquests, which would upend the European security order and set a precedent of legitimizing conquest. Many allies, especially Europe’s eastern front-line countries, would also object to forcing neutral status on Ukraine.” According to Wesslau, Europe should be ready to support Ukraine in its confrontation with Russian aggression on its own. First, Europe should immediately increase defence spending, including an immediate commitment to a new minimum of 3 percent of GDP. In addition, each state should allocate 0.5 per cent of its GDP to Ukraine for military assistance, including investments in Ukraine’s defence sector. Second, Europe needs to have “skin in the game”: “This means sending European troops to Ukraine as trainers and advisors, as well as deploying air defense assets to front-line countries, from where they can intercept Russian missiles and drones over Ukraine.” Third, NATO’s European allies should reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine’s membership. Fourth, Europe should link any threats by the Trump administration to weaken US commitments to NATO and Article 5 to Europe’s willingness to cooperate with Donald Trump on China: “Washington needs Europe to counter Beijing, but if Trump is not ready to help with security for Europe, then Europe should make clear that it is not interested in joining forces on China. For Europe to defend its interests, it must be ready to engage in tough transactional bargaining—just like Trump.”

Historical models offer lessons for Ukraine’s path to peace. Tony Keller (Globe and Mail) explores potential resolutions for the war in Ukraine, emphasizing that a decisive victory akin to V-E Day in 1945 is unlikely. Instead, the author compares two historical models for ending conflicts that a Trump administration might consider: the enduring success of the 1953 Korean War armistice and the failure of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords. The Korean armistice stopped North Korea’s conquest of the South, establishing a de facto border where the fighting ceased. This peace has lasted due to US military support and a clear commitment to South Korea’s defence, demonstrating that “a lasting peace was achieved through both strength and compromise.” In contrast, the Paris Peace Accords provided a brief pause in Vietnam, allowing the US to disengage and paving the way for North Vietnam to conquer the South when US support was withdrawn. Keller highlights Ukraine’s fear of a Vietnam-style scenario, “that Mr. Trump’s model will be 1973, and that he will lean on and threaten Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into accepting a bad deal that leaves Russia free to finish the job later. It could happen – but there are reasons to believe it won’t,” he notes, adding that Trump often promises that he’ll avoid what he calls “forever wars.” The author concludes that “delivering something that recalls the final humiliation in Vietnam, or the similarly chaotic fall of Kabul in 2021, would make [Trump] look like something else: a loser.”

With Trump returning to office, what’s next for Kyiv, Moscow, and Europe? The editorial board of the Economist highlights Donald Trump’s imminent return to the White House, focusing on the challenges of resolving the war in Ukraine and expressing concerns that his strategy may prioritize appearances over meaningful outcomes. While Trump has vowed to end the war swiftly, critics warn he could cut aid to Ukraine and compel it to accept Russian demands, potentially leaving Kyiv vulnerable to future aggression. President Putin, emboldened by his belief in Russia’s upper hand, has set non-negotiable terms, including Ukraine ceding territories and abandoning its NATO aspirations. The authors warn of potential isolationism within Trump’s administration, emphasizing that “if Ukraine collapses, Mr. Trump will simply blame Mr. Biden.” Some advisers suggest a more balanced approach, leveraging military and economic tools to pressure Putin and uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty. European dynamics add another layer of complexity, according to the authors. While France’s President Macron and other leaders aim to secure a meaningful peace, they worry that diplomacy could devolve into an American-Russian affair, sidelining both Europe and Ukraine. Trump’s demand for Europe to bear a larger share of the costs might exacerbate existing tensions. Nonetheless, there is discussion about forming a European coalition to deploy forces in Ukraine, though logistical, financial, and public support hurdles remain significant. Northern and Eastern European countries appear the most willing to lead such efforts, but skepticism lingers in Western and Southern Europe. The authors note that the stakes of any deal struck by Trump are likely to set the tone for Ukraine’s future security and NATO’s credibility. Ukrainian officials have attempted to align Trump’s transactional style with their interests, offering access to rare minerals as an incentive. Allies are expressing cautious optimism, with NATO’s Admiral Rob Bauer saying: “I cannot imagine it’s in the interest of the United States that Putin comes out of any possible peace negotiations as the winner.” A European foreign minister, quoted by the authors, dismissed the notion of Ukraine being abandoned, adding that such a scenario would be so shocking that “it’s not going to happen.”

Robust security guarantees key to successful peace talks with Putin. The editorial board of the Economist analyzes US President Trump’s potential approach to the war in Ukraine and the broader implications for global stability. The primary concern is that Trump might impose a hasty peace deal, prioritizing optics over Ukraine’s sovereignty. While Russia’s President Putin appears open to freezing front lines, his demands include Ukraine renouncing NATO membership, demilitarizing, and replacing its leaders, effectively achieving Russia’s war goals. “Should Mr Trump back this, Mr Putin would have achieved most of his war aims and Ukraine would have suffered a catastrophic defeat,” the authors warn. Such an outcome would embolden Russia and destabilize Ukraine further, threatening to turn the country into a failed state vulnerable to Russian influence or renewed aggression. To secure a sustainable peace, the authors emphasize the necessity of credible security guarantees for Ukraine, highlighting NATO membership as the optimal solution. Membership would integrate Ukraine’s battle-hardened forces into the alliance and deter Russian aggression. However, since NATO consensus is unlikely due to opposition from members like Hungary and Turkey, the Economist explores alternatives, such as bilateral security arrangements with front-line states and major European powers. These could include stationing foreign troops in Ukraine as a tripwire force, deterring Russia by signaling that aggression would draw these nations into the war. Yet “countries should not offer such a promise to Ukraine unless they are ready to honour it,” as failing to respond to Russian aggression would undermine NATO’s credibility. The authors conclude that the success of any ceasefire depends on Ukraine’s ability to rebuild and strengthen its economy, politics, and defences with Western support. Europe must step up with massive aid for reconstruction, accelerated EU accession talks, and increased defence spending to counter Russian ambitions. “To signal to Mr Putin that (European countries) would fight back if he attacked, they would need to dramatically increase their own defence spending and overhaul their arms industries. Mr Trump, who has long urged bigger European defence budgets, ought to welcome such an outcome.”