US elections decisive factor affecting the outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian war

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 27 October–2 November 2024

Five publications (The National Interest, Foreign Policy, The Globe and Mail, Washington Post, New York Times) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

Ukrainians feel trapped in a dead end. Michael Bociurkiw (Globe and Mail) emphasizes that Ukrainians feel trapped by the results of this month’s elections in Georgia and Moldova, as well as by the uncertainty of the coming US election results. Kyiv fears that because of the US elections, “the war will be settled not on their own terms but by Donald Trump, a man who admires Mr. Putin among other distasteful leaders, both past and present. A worst-case scenario involves a deal outlined by Mr. Trump’s running mate, J.D. Vance, that comes straight from Russian talking points: Moscow retaining territories it has already seized, the establishment of a demilitarized zone, and Ukraine giving up its NATO bid.” Russia has suffered enormous losses at the hands of Ukrainian troops: “The combined number of deaths and injuries on the Russian side was estimated at around 300,000 a year ago; about one-third of its vaunted Black Sea fleet has been destroyed; the volume of Russian oil refining has been reduced to 17 per cent owing to Ukrainian drone strikes.” However, Moscow is increasing pressure on Ukraine with the support of Iran, North Korea, and China. Meanwhile, Western capitals are still afraid to give Ukraine permission to strike deep in Russian territory. According to Bociurkiw, “Ukraine is just one front in a multipronged Russian assault against the west, but it is the most important one. If Mr. Putin loses here, it will weaken him substantially. But the slow-drip approach to military aid for Ukraine and the weak sanctions against Russia have proven ineffective. Give Ukraine what it needs now to finish the job—starting with long-range strike capability inside Russia.”

Russia is low on money. Agathe Demarais (Foreign Policy) argues that Russia is spending its rainy-day savings to cover the fiscal deficit caused by war and maintain social stability. Contrary to the Kremlin’s claims, the costs of the war against Ukraine and Western sanctions are causing serious damage to the Russian economy. Moscow is trying to project economic normalcy, using its huge financial buffers. However, without cash flow this solution cannot last long: “Russia could soon struggle to preserve costly social stability at home while waging its expensive war against Ukraine.” In the author’s opinion, inflation is the most accurate indicator of the above problem. First, “The ruble has lost one-third of its value against the U.S. dollar since early 2022, inflating the price of imports and therefore fueling inflation.” Second, Russian companies are experiencing labour shortages due to population decline, high mortality rates from the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war against Ukraine, “which has killed or seriously wounded 2 percent of Russian men between the ages of 20 and 50, and is causing an exodus of highly skilled workers.” To attract qualified staff, employers have to raise salaries, which fuels inflation. Third, the Kremlin is spending a lot of money to support social programs to stabilize the mood in society. The high level of inflation is also evidenced by the central bank’s interest rate hikes: “Since mid-2023, it has gradually increased its key rate to a whopping 21 percent.” The cost of Russian aggression is only growing: “Military expenses will make up 40 percent of Russia’s public spending in 2025, for an eye-popping $142 billion.” State companies that generate revenues for the Kremlin are suffering losses: “After losing access to the European market, Gazprom recorded a $6.8 billion loss in 2023, making it impossible for the company to transfer money to state coffers. (Gazprom sent $40 billion to the Russian Ministry of Finance in 2022.)” To cover the budget deficit, Russia is forced to use savings rather than borrow money through the sale of government bonds: “The liquid part of the [reserves] has shrunk by more than half since the start of the war in Ukraine, to just $54 billion in September. Last year, the government stopped saving money in its [National Wealth Fund]. Moscow is now resorting to selling the portion of its NWF reserves that it holds in gold; the fund’s gold reserves have shrunk by around half, or about 262 tons of gold, since early 2022.” According to Demarais’ forecast, “The NWF’s liquid reserves cover just around a year and a half of budget deficit.”

Russia must lose. Steven Pifer (National Interest) argues that Moscow’s threat to Europe will largely depend on the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine. It is too early to talk about the outcome of the war. Russian troops are being dynamics on the battlefield, but “the Russian army occupies only a bit more Ukrainian territory than it did in January of this year, and far less than it did in mid-2022. That is not to say that Ukraine is winning, but the Ukrainians remain determined in what they regard as an existential fight.” According to the author, “A Ukrainian victory would strengthen European security and potentially lead Ukraine toward NATO and EU integration, deterring future Russian aggression.” In this case, Russia is unlikely to risk starting a new war with a successful EU and NATO member state. According to another, more optimistic alternative, Moscow’s defeat in the war could lead to systemic changes in Russia itself: “Earlier defeats in Russian history have sparked attempts at reform and renewal, some more successful than others, and sometimes upheaval. Perhaps Russia’s leadership, especially a new leadership in the wake of defeat in Ukraine, could come to terms with the loss of its empire…” Russia’s victory, on the other hand, would strengthen the Kremlin’s malignant ambitions to regain its so-called “historic Russian lands” and restore its influence in the post-Soviet space, creating a new risk for Europe: “In the late 18th century, the Russian empire included Finland, the Baltic states, and a large part of Poland, all now members of NATO.” According to Pifer, “That is the kind of threat that a Russia victorious over Ukraine could pose to Europe. For the sake of a stable and secure Europe, it is better to stop Russia in Ukraine.”

US elections will determine the outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Ben Hodges and Peter Zwack (National Interest) emphasize that Ukraine’s victory depends on the US elections as much as on any frontline battle with the Russian army. Ukraine’s victory is vital to the security of the US and the future of the international order: “Allowing Russia to succeed in its brutal invasion of Ukraine would not only reward atrocities but embolden Russia to threaten other European states, potentially triggering direct military conflict with NATO.” It is extremely important that Americans elect a president “who will provide steady and strong leadership in standing up to Russia and with allied support help Ukraine win.” In the opinion of the authors, Kamala Harris, not Donald Trump, is the right candidate because she understands “the danger ahead for America and our allies in Europe and Asia if we let Putin win.” According to Hodges and Zwack, “The ballots Americans cast on November 5 will determine if Ukrainians have bullets to fire tomorrow. So let’s cast those ballots for someone who believes in their cause and will continue to have their backs.”

NATO must support Ukraine to defeat Moscow’s expansionist ambitions. Aurel Braun (National Interest) examines Russia’s enduring threat to NATO, despite its struggling economy and limited global economic influence. Russia’s power projection, especially under Putin’s “personalist regime,” stems not from economic prowess but from its nuclear arsenal, ruthless foreign policy, and Putin’s use of international conflict to bolster domestic support. While Russia’s GDP is small compared to the US, China, or India, its ability to destabilize neighbours and challenge Western stability is disproportionately high. Putin’s aggression has paradoxically united NATO, prompting Sweden and Finland to join the alliance. Yet, Braun notes that a weakened Russia remains provocative and dangerous: “Putin‘s massive domestic failures make Russia a continuing threat, great power or not. External diversion is critical to his staying in power.” The author stresses that NATO’s response must counter Putin’s ambitions without appeasing his aggression. He argues that any settlement allowing Russia to retain conquered Ukrainian territories would embolden Putin and validate his expansionist policies. To secure NATO’s future, the West should aim for a resolution where Russia “should ultimately fail and be seen to fail” —a strategy suggested by Boris Johnson. While Ukraine has made strides in defence, Braun believes NATO’s support has been overly cautious. Concessions might be necessary, yet they should be conditional on Ukraine’s NATO membership to safeguard its sovereignty. “For NATO to manage a future Russian threat, it must ensure that Russia is perceived to have lost overall in its aggression in Ukraine.” This would draw a “bright red line,” containing Russia’s threat while setting the stage for Putinism’s eventual collapse, Braun concludes.

North Korean troops bolster Russia’s war effort, test US resolve. The editorial board of the Washington Post highlights the strategic and potentially destabilizing implications of North Korea’s deployment of combat troops to support Russia, as this move represents a critical escalation in the conflict. North Korea’s military contributions (around 10,000–19,000 North Korean troops deployed) could potentially broaden the war’s scope beyond Europe into the Asia-Pacific. The deployment extends beyond military aid, as it also aids Putin’s political goals. Partnering with North Korea strengthens Russia’s image of resilience against Western sanctions and isolation, especially following Putin’s engagement with the BRICS nations and their allies. This recent summit allowed Russia to display its connections with influential global powers, raising a united front against Western economic dominance. Amid these developments, the authors suggest that Western nations should avoid “complacency,” as North Korea’s involvement might further stretch Ukraine’s defence capabilities and test European commitment, particularly if U.S. support wavers. “Steadfast diplomacy, strong alliances and firm deterrence will be needed to meet this growing threat. This is the main challenge facing the next president, who will take office Jan. 20,” the authors conclude.

Russian advances challenge Ukraine’s resilience. Julian E. Barnes, Eric Schmitt, Helene Cooper and Kim Barker (New York Times) outline escalating concerns over Ukraine’s waning position against Russian forces and the uncertainty surrounding future US support. While the Ukrainian military once held strategic advantages in regions like Kursk, Russia has recently made significant advances in the east. Russia has captured 1,146 square kilometers (442 square miles) in Ukraine since early August (when Ukraine began its Kursk region offensive), about a quarter more than in the first seven months of the year, Bloomberg reported on Nov. 1. “What matters is the way that Ukraine fights back. And what matters is staying focused on what works,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stressed, emphasizing the critical need for Ukraine to rebuild and stabilize its military capacity. The mounting toll, with around 57,000 Ukrainian soldiers lost, highlights the strain on Ukraine’s comparatively smaller population and challenges Kyiv’s ability to hold the line without continued Western assistance. Moreover, the authors note that the stakes are compounded by the upcoming US presidential election, with potential changes to American policy depending on the outcome. Vice President Kamala Harris has pledged to maintain support for Ukraine, while former President Donald Trump advocates ending aid, potentially leading to a forced “peace” that could mean territorial concessions. This uncertainty adds pressure on Ukrainian leaders, including President Zelensky, who has faced setbacks on the battlefield and fears a dip in morale if Western aid falters. Meanwhile, Russia’s manpower surge—fueled by recent North Korean troop deployments and robust recruiting efforts—allows it to push further into Ukrainian territories, potentially offsetting its own logistical strains and soldier losses, which now exceed 600,000.