The West should buy into a plan for Ukraine’s victory

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 20–26 October 2024

Six publications (The National Interest, Foreign Affairs, The Washington Post, Foreign Policy, The Globe and Mail, CBC) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

Ukraine must turn the tide before negotiating. Jack Watling (Foreign Affairs) argues that before Kyiv starts negotiations with Moscow, it must stabilize the front line in Donbas and receive security guarantees from the West. Russia will only negotiate when it realizes that it is losing militarily. Only then will Ukraine be able to negotiate on its own terms. To achieve this goal, Kyiv must synchronize its actions with its allied Western capitals. The problem is that Ukraine is now facing both a deteriorating situation on the battlefield and stagnation of diplomatic efforts between its partners on the eve of the US election, where the candidates have radically different approaches to the war. In the author’s opinion, in order to reverse this dynamic, Kyiv and its allies will need to do several things simultaneously. First, it should limit Russia’s surveillance capabilities on the battlefield: “Ukraine has developed effective interceptor drones that can knock down Russian Orlan and Zala surveillance drones. But it needs assistance scaling up the production of these interceptors and fielding a sufficient density of radar and other sensor systems to make them effective.” Second, Ukraine should prepare new lines of defence along its current positions, in accordance with best practices. Third, Kyiv needs to fix its dysfunctional recruitment and training system: “Training for new troops has been inadequate throughout the war. This is something the Ukrainian military has been slow to acknowledge and slower still in addressing. It is also an area where Ukraine’s partners can do little.” And fourth, Ukraine’s international partners should do everything they can to reduce Russia’s firepower: “To mount a capable defense against Russian artillery and glide bomb attacks, Ukraine needs to be able to strike stockpiles and airfields. Funding for and support of Ukraine’s own long-range strike programs and aggressive targeting of Russia’s supply chains of raw materials, machine tooling, and critical components of weapons production can have a significant effect.” According to Watling, “If such measures are delayed, the situation at the front risks deteriorating to a point where the Russians can begin to advance with impunity, and where the Ukrainians simply lack the personnel and equipment to block all the axes along which the Russians might push. Preventing that outcome is a prerequisite for Ukraine to be able to embark on successful negotiations.”

Russia will threaten NATO after the Russo-Ukrainian war. Mikhail Troitskiy (National Interest) declares that after Russia’s war against Ukraine, Moscow will threaten NATO member states. Russia’s ability and willingness to threaten NATO after the war depends largely on the conditions under which it ends. The Russian army, like the Ukrainian one, has learned from the war and has become stronger. Its military experience goes beyond the battlefield: “Western resolve has been tested, and upcoming elections or political crises in Western countries may impact their willingness to support Ukraine.” In the author’s opinion, the best safeguard against further Russian expansion would be a strong Ukraine capable of deterring Moscow. However, the idea of deploying NATO troops or powerful long-range strike systems in Ukraine has not found support in the capitals of NATO member states. An alternative step to deter Russia would be Ukraine’s accelerated accession to NATO. In such circumstances, Western countries will be torn between two key fears: “The possibility of nuclear escalation by Russia and Russia’s westward advance toward NATO borders. Essentially, they would be choosing between potentially disastrous scenarios in the near or long term.” However, Russia’s resources are not unlimited: sanctions, rampant inflation, falling incomes without continuous investment in the military-industrial complex, and economic stagnation are factors that have the potential to accelerate the onset of peace. According to Troitskiy, “The proverbial can has been kicked too far down the road and now risks being crushed, unleashing several malign forces. Achieving a lasting settlement that can withstand Russia’s ongoing destructive revisionism will require containing these forces once again.”

76-day window after the US election to get Ukraine right. Lee Hockstader (Washington Post) argues that President Joe Biden has 76 days after the election to make Ukraine stronger. He can use the interregnum “as an opportunity to turn the tables on Russian dictator Vladimir Putin in a war tilting in Russia’s direction.” First, President Biden should allow “Kyiv to unleash long-range strikes using U.S.-supplied Army Tactical Missile Systems, known as ATACMS, deep inside Russian territory.” Second, “Washington can and should do more to help Ukraine defend itself from widely expected, fresh Russian attacks on energy infrastructure that would leave Ukrainians shivering this winter.” Third, “Biden could also point to Putin’s intensifying hybrid offensive on NATO territory — a concerted strategy featuring sabotage, drone incursions, assassination plots and electronic jamming of civilian aviation in Europe.” Even a slight change in the dynamics of the war in Ukraine’s favour could increase support for Kyiv in Washington after the election: “Some congressional Republicans might be reluctant to undercut Zelensky, and by implication Washington’s NATO partners, at the very moment Ukraine is gaining momentum.” In addition, Biden’s decisive actions may prompt German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to send Ukraine his own long-range Taurus missiles. The green light for missiles is not a panacea: “The Kremlin has moved some potential targets deeper inside Russian territory, beyond the range of Western missiles. But if the world has learned anything in this war, it’s that Kyiv has found ways to leverage its available assets to maximize the price Putin pays.” Decisive steps in support of Ukraine could also strengthen US ties with NATO partners who are in favour of extending an official invitation to Kyiv to join the alliance. According to Hockstader, “Whatever Biden’s achievements in rallying the Western alliance, Congress and the American people to Ukraine’s cause, the result — a war of attrition lasting nearly three years so far — is a poor facsimile of success. After the election, he will have a final shot to put Ukraine in the best possible position. He should use it.”

The West should offer a plan for Ukraine’s victory. Robin Niblett (Foreign Policy) points out that the pompous rhetoric of Western states fails to hide their lack of understanding of what Ukraine’s victory should entail. President Zelensky’s victory plan is simple: “Ukraine’s allies should formally invite it to join NATO and provide more weapons to push back the Russian assault. Only then will Russian President Vladimir Putin come to the negotiating table.” President Putin’s plan is no less obvious: “With his forces suffering their highest casualty rates of the war in September, he recently ordered the conscription of 133,000 new servicemembers in the autumn draft starting Oct. 1 and announced a 25 percent increase in defense spending, which will account for a staggering total of 32 percent of the Russia’s 2025 federal budget.” Since Washington has not yet authorized the use of US long-range weapons deep in Russia, Ukraine is forced to fight “with one hand tied behind its back.” In the author’s opinion, “it is perverse” to expect a viable plan from Kyiv in such circumstances. Western governments must define what a Ukrainian victory means to them and what actions they will take to achieve it. The Western definition of victory should be simple and close to Kyiv’s: “Ukraine must remain a sustainably sovereign democracy with the right to the European future its citizens are fighting for—and which Putin is determined to deny them. A successful Ukraine must also have credible defenses against a long-term Russian threat. This outcome can be achieved without Ukraine recovering 100 percent of its sovereign territory militarily now.” The first step in implementing this plan is to stop Russia’s offensive.

Putin champions ‘new world order’ at BRICS summit. Mark MacKinnon (Globe and Mail) reports on the 16th BRICS summit, hosted by Russian President Vladimir Putin, which underscored his strategic pivot away from Western alliances toward countries opposing the “rules-based” international order. The summit brought together founding BRICS members Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa with new joiners Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE—alongside representatives from 26 additional countries. Reinforcing Putin’s vision of a so-called “new world order,” his closing remarks articulated desire for an international system that priotitizes the “sovereign choice of nations” over Western norms that “ostensibly promote democracy, human rights and the climate change agenda.” The gathering, according to MacKinnon, showed that Russia’s economy is supported by BRICS despite international sanctions, with Chinese and Indian oil imports helping to sustain it. United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ attendance at the summit, despite criticism from Ukraine, highlighted BRICS’ collective clout as it now represents nearly half of the global population. Guterres urged ceasefires in Ukraine and the Middle East, yet the call “didn’t seem to move his Russian host”, the author concludes.

North Korea bolsters Kremlin’s war effort. Chris Brown (CBC) notes that Vladimir Putin hinted at a closer military alliance with North Korea during the BRICS summit in Kazan, implying that troops from the insular nation might join Russian forces (or have already) in the war against Ukraine. Putin avoided explicitly confirming North Korean troop deployment but hinted at a confirmation: “Images are a serious thing. If there are images [of North Korean troops], then they reflect something.” Reports indicate that up to 12,000 North Korean soldiers could be involved, with 3,000 already near the Kursk region, which is partially controlled by Ukrainian troops. Ukraine’s intelligence services confirmed sightings of North Korean soldiers receiving Russian military gear, further solidifying concerns about Pyongyang’s direct support of Moscow’s campaign. The implications of North Korea’s involvement go beyond the immediate battlefield, Brown suggests. Analysts interviewed by Brown speculate that the presence of North Korean soldiers in Russia could provide strategic advantages for Moscow: (1) ot addresses Russia’s significant manpower shortages, allowing it to continue the “meat grinder” tactics of relentless infantry assaults in Ukraine without exhausting its own troops further; and (2) the alliance could represent a deeper, mutually beneficial relationship. Rachel Minyoung Lee from the Stimson Center suggests that Kim Jong Un’s decision to send troops “is not just based on immediate economic and military-technology considerations,” implying that Kim may expect a reciprocal commitment from Russia in the future, especially if North Korea faces escalations on the Korean peninsula. While President Zelensky expressed frustration with the muted response from Western allies, writing, “If North Korea can intervene in a war in Europe, it’s obvious that there hasn’t been enough pressure on this regime,” the international community remains cautious. With South Korea contemplating direct arms support to Ukraine, the North Korean–Russian alliance could shift dynamics in both Europe and Asia, intensifying the global impact of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Markets shift focus from the Russo-Ukrainian war. Eric Reguli (Globe and Mail) argues that financial markets view the Russo-Ukrainian war as a “frozen” conflict with limited influence on global commodities and investment opportunities, despite its ongoing impact on the ground. Initially, investors feared the war would disrupt supply chains and exacerbate shortages, particularly in oil and grain, and drive up prices sharply. However, “the war in Ukraine ended—as far as the market is concerned—some time in late 2022,” according to Montreal’s BCA Research report, as supply chains adapted. Now, Ukraine’s resilience in grain exports and Russia’s evasion of oil sanctions have stabilized these markets, reducing the war’s immediate financial impact. Escalating Israel-Iran tensions in the Middle East, however, have captured investors’ attention, reflecting a greater perceived threat to oil prices and economic stability. A potential conflict could significantly disrupt Iran’s oil output, which, while unlikely to reach the levels of early 2022’s spike to $120 a barrel, could still drive up prices. Yet, with weakening Chinese demand and growing non-OPEC production, current energy markets remain resilient. “The Ukraine war, which is still bigger than the Middle East wars, is no longer of much relevance to investors. May it stay that way,” Reguli concludes. “If Israel and Iran ratchet up their missile volleys, economic risk will certainly rise. But those risks could dissipate fairly quickly if the Ukraine-Russia war is any indication.”