CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 6–12 October 2024

Five publications (The National Interest, Foreign Policy, The New York Times, The Hill, and Politico) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

Featured topics

• The world and Ukraine: Ukraine’s membership in NATO would be a guarantee of peace in Europe; allowing Ukraine to strike deeper inside Russia could backfire.
• Russia at war: Europe tightens sanctions against Russia; future of Russian army is uncertain; spectre of chemical warfare appears in Europe; Kremlin has consistently betrayed Russians in pursuit of power, profit; Kyiv aims to retain Kursk territory for potential trade in any future peace negotiations; Russia’s gains in Ukraine come at a high cost. 

MMS summaries

Europe tightens sanctions against Russia. Maria Shagina (Foreign Policy) emphasizes that following the example of the US, the EU and UK are tightening their sanctions against Russia: “With primary sanctions so obviously falling short, the EU and Britain are increasingly willing to adopt measures that reach beyond their borders.” Even though European countries have not formally recognized the secondary sanctions, their actions indicate the opposite: “Its most recent sanctions package—the 14th since the start of the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—requires non-EU subsidiaries that are owned or controlled by EU companies to make ‘best efforts’ to ensure compliance with EU sanctions.” These new requirements oblige European subsidiaries outside the EU to comply with the sanctions as if they were EU legal entities. Companies can be held liable for violating sanctions even if they did not intentionally evade them but knew that their activities could have such consequences. According to Shagina, “In the never-ending cat-and-mouse game of sanctions evasion, it is an arduous task for regulators to stay one step ahead. Ever so gradually, Britain and the EU seem to be coming to the conclusion that forcing companies to be liable for the end use of their goods is a better way to play the game.”

Future of the Russian army is uncertain. Mark N. Katz (National Interest) argues that much depends on the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine. If Kyiv wins, the Russian army, like the rest of Russia, will collapse, as it did in 1917. If Moscow wins, the Russian army could become even more dangerous for European countries—and for the US, which will be forced to defend its NATO allies: “A victorious post–Ukraine war Russian army with experience of prolonged, large-scale conflict will only enhance this perception.” However, in the author’s opinion, even in this scenario there are socio-economic factors that would contribute to weakening the Russian army. First, Vladimir Putin may fear a coup by the generals, which would encourage him to reduce the army’s influence. Second, regardless of the domestic political agenda, soldiers would want to return home after the war: “In addition, the many hundreds of thousands of wounded Russian soldiers who survived the war might expect, quite understandably, that the Russian government will expend resources on caring for them. Disappointing these expectations by maintaining a large Russian army and not diverting funds to caring for wounded veterans could prove destabilizing.” Third, the economy will need a labour force, and leaving it in the army will continue to undermine the country’s economic strength. According to Katz, “While Ukrainians and Westerners rightly fear what Putin […] will do with his large, battle-tested army after the end of the Ukraine war, there could well emerge political, social, and economic pressures that encourage or even compel Putin to reduce the size and capability of the Russian army afterward.”

Spectre of chemical warfare appears in Europe. Stavros Atlamazoglou (National Interest) declares that Russia should be prosecuted for deploying chemical weapons in Ukraine. The use of chemical weapons “against Ukraine is yet another war crime by the Russian military.” Western countries have already responded to Moscow’s illegal actions: “Among the units and individuals sanctioned are the Russian military’s Radiological, Chemical, and Biological (RCB) Defence units and their leader, Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, Chief of the Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Protection Troops of the Russian Armed Forces. Kirillov is cited as ordering the deployment of chemical weapons in Ukraine, as well as acting as a ‘significant mouthpiece for Kremlin disinformation.’” In addition, the UK “sanctioned two Russian military laboratories for providing support for the development and deployment of chemical weapons in Ukraine,” and the US “has begun proceedings to sanction Russian units and individuals for their role in the deployment of chemical weapons against the Ukrainian forces.” In the author’s opinion, in practice these sanctions will have a limited effect in the short term and only a possible impact in the long term. In addition to sanctions, the Western allies must do everything in their power to bring war criminals to justice. However, without the will of Washington and other European capitals, this is unlikely to happen. According to Atlamazoglou, “Military and political officials from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were only punished after World War Two because the Allies could punish them. Without the ability to try and punish, sanctions have little practical effect.”

Ukraine’s membership in NATO would be a guarantee of peace in Europe. William B. Taylor (New York Times) opines that Ukraine should become a member of NATO. Without Kyiv’s membership in the Alliance, Ukrainians will never be safe. In 2008, the US and its allies made a mistake: “NATO’s failure to offer Ukraine and Georgia a course toward membership most likely led Mr. Putin to conclude that the West would not support those two countries if he attacked them. He invaded Georgia four months later and Ukraine for the first time six years after that. Had NATO started Ukraine and Georgia on the path to NATO membership in 2008, Russia might not have invaded the two nations and Ukraine might not be enduring today’s terrible Russian war.” According to the author, two key lessons can be drawn from the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit. First, NATO membership is a necessary step to deter Russian aggression. Second, to achieve Ukraine’s membership, the US must move forward as quickly as possible, making it a clear priority at the Alliance summit next June. According to Taylor, “Europe will not be secure—and will not be whole and free—until Ukraine is in NATO. Ukraine will not agree to end the war without it. The United States is key and must show sustained, persistent, and creative leadership. With confidence and strength, and a lot of hard work on all sides, Ukraine can become a member of NATO. For peace in Europe, it must.”

Allowing Ukraine to strike deeper inside Russia could backfire. Mark Episkopos (The Hill) argues that allowing Ukraine to strike inside Russia with Western-provided weapons carries significant risks of escalating the war, potentially pushing Moscow toward drastic retaliatory measures. While some Western policymakers believe that Russia’s “red lines” are more rhetorical than real, Episkopos contends that this interpretation dangerously underestimates Russia’s flexibility in escalation decisions. Moscow’s decision to escalate, including possible strikes against NATO or the use of nuclear weapons, is not tied to specific Western actions but rather to the evolving battlefield situation and Russia’s perception of its strategic trajectory. The author stresses that Putin’s caution is currently driven by a belief that Russia is winning at its current pace, making further escalation unnecessary. However, Episkopos warns that allowing Ukraine to strike inside Russia could inadvertently shift Russia’s perception of the war, pushing Putin to restore deterrence through more aggressive measures against NATO. He concludes that instead of escalating the conflict with more advanced weapons, the West should leverage its current military aid and sanctions to push for a negotiated solution, arguing that “the costs of inaction—both to Ukraine’s deteriorating battlefield position and in growing risks of catastrophic escalation—are much greater.” 

Kremlin has consistently betrayed Russians in pursuit of power, profit. Mark Temnycky (The Hill) reminds readers that Russia’s claim of protecting ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine and other regions is false. Instead of safeguarding these nominal groups, Russia has committed atrocities in Ukraine—targeting civilians, historical sites, and cultural landmarks—including in Russian-speaking areas, in cities like Odesa and Kharkiv. As Temnycky highlights, “Russia’s acts in Ukraine do not suggest that it is looking to protect ethnic Russians. Instead, it seeks to destroy Ukraine and its citizens, regardless of their ethnicity and language.” The author also illustrates Russia’s pattern of neglecting ethnic Russians beyond Ukraine. In countries like Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, where ethnic Russians and Russian speakers have faced pressures to abandon their cultural ties, the Kremlin has done little to protect them. Instead, Russia has prioritized political and economic gains, such as gas agreements with Turkmenistan, over supporting ethnic Russian populations. Lastly, Putin has not even shown much support for Russians and Russian speakers at home. During Ukraine’s Kursk region offensive, “Russia has hesitated to aid its citizens” despite their calls for aid as the Kremlin remained focused on its invasion of Ukraine. Temnycky concludes that the Russian government has never truly cared about the well-being of Russian speakers, sacrificing their lives for financial or territorial gains instead.

Kyiv aims to retain Kursk territory for potential trade in any future peace negotiations. Oz Katerji (Foreign Policy) analyzes Ukraine’s military incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, highlighting both its strategic importance and potential outcomes. Kyiv’s operation in Kursk, which began in early August, is seen as a bold move, giving Kyiv the political advantage of exposing Russia’s red lines and nuclear threats as empty bluffs. Strategically, holding on to Kursk offers Ukraine leverage in future peace talks. By occupying Russian territory, Kyiv could potentially negotiate land swaps with Moscow, trading Kursk for the Ukrainian territories of Kherson, Zaporizhia, or even Donetsk and Luhansk. “By occupying Russian territory—and if Ukraine successfully continues to defend that territory—Moscow cannot claim any kind of victory in this war when Ukrainian troops maintain a presence on its de jure territory.” President Zelensky aimed to disrupt Russian resources and shift focus away from the war in Donetsk, yet Russia has continued its relentless attacks on Ukraine’s eastern front, capturing towns like Vuhledar. The article argues that while the Kursk offensive bolsters Ukraine’s bargaining power, it might not deliver a decisive military victory. Still, “Kyiv has secured a substantial political victory in Kursk whether it stays or decides to withdraw from this territory,” leaving Ukraine with a stronger position in eventual peace negotiations. 

Russia’s gains in Ukraine come at a high cost. Paul Mcleary (Politico) highlights that in recent weeks Russia has achieved slow but significant territorial gains in Ukraine, particularly in Donetsk oblast; however, these advances came at an enormous human cost. US officials report that Russia’s total casualties have exceeded 600,000, marking September as the bloodiest month since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This staggering figure is “more than 40 times Russia’s losses during its decade-long invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s,” and highlights the severe toll of Russia’s strategy, which has relied on massive artillery attacks followed by large troop movements toward well-defended Ukrainian positions. As of 4 October, Russian forces were less than seven kilometers (4 miles) from the outskirts of Pokrovsk, according to local authorities. Despite the costly Russian offensives, the Ukrainian military continues to adapt, moving troops to plug gaps in their defences while engaging in operations within Russian territory. Officials suggest that Ukraine’s incursions into the Kursk region have not significantly depleted their resources elsewhere, noting, “analysts believe Ukraine can keep up the fight inside Russia for months before the Russians can fully organize a response.” Furthermore, logistical challenges on the Russian side are hampering their ability to mount a coordinated counter-offensive. As one military official observed, “there’s been nothing that would indicate (…) that they’re ready to make a major play toward taking Kursk back.”