What the US election means for Ukraine

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 22–28 September 2024

Five publications (The National Interest, Foreign Affairs, The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, and Politico) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

What does Ukraine’s victory mean? Thomas E. Graham (National Interest) argues that the time has come for Washington to offer a compelling vision of its strategy for success in the Russo-Ukrainian war. For Ukrainians, the answer is obvious: the liberation of all Ukrainian territories. Unlike Ukraine, however, Western allies do not share a common vision of what a Kyiv victory would mean. Neither has the White House clearly articulated how it sees victory, instead issuing abstractions: “It has declared its goal to be the preservation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence without specifying clearly within what borders, even though the United States officially recognizes the 1991 borders.” Under Congressional pressure, President Biden’s administration “sent a classified strategy for Ukraine in mid-September,” but details are not publicly available. In the author’s opinion, this indicates either a lack of agreement on this issue within the administration itself or uncertainty that the strategy would withstand the rigors of public debate; they “may also be concerned that, if made public, its vision of success would risk rupturing Western unity and alignment with Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression.” This approach is a losing proposition, as it risks losing popular support, wasting resources, weakening US strength, and reinforcing the Kremlin’s belief that “it can outlast the West to achieve its goals in this conflict.” According to Graham, now is the time for the US to offer its strategy for success, which “should be grounded in objective reality, with a clear assessment of Russian, Ukrainian, European, and U.S. interests and capabilities, and identifying the resources that will be needed to achieve its goals. It must embed its goals for Ukraine in a broader vision for Europe’s future security architecture in the face of continuing Russian hostility and obstructionism. It must chart a course to co-existence with Russia that, no matter what the outcome of the Ukraine war, will not cease to be a major rival while remaining a necessary partner in managing strategic stability and dealing with urgent transnational threats, with climate change at the top of the list.”

Putin’s silence on the Kursk offensive indicates a crisis of leadership in Russia. Ryan Bauer (National Interest) argues that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s silence on Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk shows cracks in the regime’s monolithic structure. Vladimir Putin’s inability to publicly and openly communicate the crisis is nothing new. The siege of the Beslan school by Chechen rebels in 2004, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the June 2023 mutiny of Yevgeny Prigozhin underscore this failure. This time, however, Putin’s lack of response has drawn criticism from his supporters, indicating cracks in his approach: “In late August on a state television show, Andrei Fedorov, a former deputy foreign minister of Russia, openly criticized Russia’s handling of Ukraine’s incursion as shameful and suggested that promoting lies about the incursion and Ukraine’s capability is to Russia’s detriment.” Tensions are rising due to the dissatisfaction of residents in the Kursk region with the lack of response and downplaying of the problem on state channels. According to Bauer, “While it seems unlikely the offensive will lead to a collapse of Putin’s regime, the mounting public criticism highlights the increasing challenges for Putin in his war against Ukraine and his leadership approach.”

What the US election means for Ukraine. Alexander Vindman (Foreign Affairs) argues that the results of the US presidential election could cause a crisis for Kyiv but would not spell defeat in combating Russia’s aggression. “Tactics are not strategy, and defensive warfare is, at best, a punishingly slow path to winning. To end the war soon and on terms favorable to Kyiv, Ukraine will need to go on the offensive once again in 2025.” A successful Ukrainian counteroffensive can “convince reluctant Western backers to increase their material support by showing them a realistic military strategy—one that includes clear objectives, actions in support of those objectives, and an understanding of the resources required.” An effective combination of defensive operations and a successful offensive in at least one direction “could compel Moscow to negotiate.” But to launch this scenario, Ukraine will need the support of the West—and this support will largely depend on the outcome of the US elections. Kamala Harris’s victory is likely to continue “the Biden administration’s support for Ukraine, given the United States’ critical national security interest in seeing Russia defeated and deterred from further aggression toward Europe.” But Donald Trump’s victory would be extremely dangerous for Kyiv: “Former President Donald Trump and his running mate, Ohio Senator J. D. Vance, would helm an isolationist administration that would cease all U.S. support for Ukraine, disengage from European security, and make friendly overtures to Russia and other authoritarian countries while projecting hostility to NATO and other traditional allies.” According to Vindman, Kyiv and its European allies should already be preparing for such a scenario: “Although Ukraine’s prospects for a decisive military success would diminish in any Trump contingency, steps that Brussels and Kyiv take today could cushion the blow.”

Ukraine and its allies must change course. The editorial board of the Economist emphasizes that Kyiv and its allies must recognize that they are losing the Russo-Ukrainian war. A war of attrition does not bode well for either Ukraine or its allies. War fatigue in Western countries, elections in the US, the rise of right-wing populists in France and Germany, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure in Ukraine diminish Kyiv’s ability to recapture all of its territory in the near term. Russia, on the other hand, is slowly making headway, despite suffering enormous losses. Kyiv must stop ignoring reality “by insisting that Ukraine’s army can take back all the land Russia has stolen since 2014… Whether or not Mr. Trump wins in November, the only hope of keeping American and European support and uniting Ukrainians is for a new approach that starts with leaders stating honestly what victory means.” According to the editorial, “Mr. Putin attacked Ukraine not for its territory but to stop it becoming a prosperous, Western-leaning democracy.” Western leaders should bring this goal closer by providing Ukraine with the military capabilities and security guarantees it needs: “If Ukraine can convincingly deny Russia any prospect of advancing further on the battlefield, it will be able to demonstrate the futility of further big offensives. Whether or not a formal peace deal is signed, that is the only way to wind down the fighting and ensure the security on which Ukraine’s prosperity and democracy will ultimately rest.” Realizing this goal will require a significant increase in arms supplies to Ukraine and an increase in domestic arms production. The West should also invite Ukraine to join NATO now. According to The Economist, Kyiv cannot define victory without knowing the level of Western support. In contrast, the plan outlined above is self-reinforcing: “A firmer promise of NATO membership would help Mr. Zelensky redefine victory; a credible war aim would deter Russia; NATO would benefit from Ukraine’s revamped arms industry. Forging a new victory plan asks a lot of Zelensky and Western leaders. But if they demur, they will usher in Ukraine’s defeat. And that would be much worse.”

Zelensky’s US visit risks undermining bipartisan support. The editorial board of the Wall Street Journal critiques President Volodymyr Zelensky’s recent engagements in U.S. politics, suggesting that his actions may harm Ukraine’s prospects for continued bipartisan support in Washington. Zelensky’s visit to the US, which included speaking at the United Nations and promoting a “victory plan” to President Joe Biden, drew attention when he toured an ammunition factory in Pennsylvania with several Democrats but no Republicans. This led House Speaker Mike Johnson to accuse the event of being “designed to help Democrats” and even call for Ukraine to replace its ambassador in Washington. The editors argue that Zelensky’s criticism of J.D. Vance, Donald Trump’s running mate, for his stance on the Ukraine war was ill-timed, as it appeared to show preference for Democrats during an election season. “Ukraine depends on American weapons, and [Zelensky] is going to need bipartisan support in Washington to keep getting them.” The authors also note that while Donald Trump mocked Zelensky, accusing him of being unwilling to compromise with Russia, Putin is not open to any settlement unless it involves reducing Ukraine to a puppet state under Russian control. Despite Biden and Harris speaking favourably about Ukraine, their delays in providing military aid have weakened Ukraine’s defence. The editorial board stresses that no matter who wins the US election, negotiations between Ukraine and Russia are inevitable, and Ukraine’s success in regaining territory will strengthen its position in those talks. The WSJ editors conclude that Zelensky’s actions this week were counterproductive: “Mr. Zelensky’s trip this week won’t help him on that crucial score.”

Ukraine is caught in US election’s “silly season.” Holman W. Jenkins, Jr. (Wall Street Journal) highlights how the US political landscape, particularly in the context of the upcoming presidential election, has led to exaggerated and unrealistic claims regarding Ukraine, heralding its “silly season.” The author notes that while the incumbent president Joe Biden continues to call for Ukrainian victory, he avoids defining what that victory entails, presidential candidate Donald Trump speaks of potential settlements rather than outright success for Ukraine. Jenkins suggests that despite differences in rhetoric, their positions on Ukraine might be more aligned than they appear: “The president’s and ex-president’s stances might actually be compatible, if not identical.” Kamala Harris is also criticized for her strong opposition to any territorial concessions for Ukraine, which the author believes will eventually be walked back if she assumes leadership. Ukraine’s President Zelensky is spared from this critique but is noted for his own “radical” expectations, such as demanding that Russia return to its 1991 borders and pay reparations. The author argues that the Biden administration has been consistent in its cautious approach, never intending to disrupt the status quo in Crimea or Donbas, and he views Putin’s 2022 invasion as a strategic error that has benefited the US. Now, as Biden’s reluctance to fully rearm becomes apparent, some former supporters accuse him of betraying Ukraine. Despite the chaos, Jenkins suggests that this could be a step toward real progress, potentially leading to a ceasefire that would require convincing Putin he can gain no more Ukrainian territory.

West should set firm red lines with Russia. Jamie Dettmer (Politico) quotes veteran German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger, who argues that the West should establish its own red lines with Russia, rather than worry constantly about Moscow’s threats. Speaking at the Yalta European Strategy conference, Ischinger noted that “Russia keeps saying, if you do this, if you cross this or that red line, we might escalate. Why don’t we turn this thing around and say to them: ‘We have lines and if you bomb one more civilian building, then you shouldn’t be surprised if we deliver Taurus cruise missiles or America allows Ukraine to strike military targets inside Russia’?” He emphasized the importance of standing firm on these red lines to deter further aggression from Russia. Ischinger, known for his role in peace negotiations during the Balkans wars, also stressed the need for strength in dealing with Russia, saying that “Russians do respect strength.” He envisions peace negotiations beginning only after the US election and believes that Washington and Moscow will set the framework for talks. While he sees leaders like India’s Narendra Modi playing a key role as intermediaries, he stresses that discussions should start with more straightforward issues, like securing the Zaporizhia NPP or facilitating POW exchanges, and gradually move toward more complex topics such as borders and NATO membership for Ukraine.