Ukraine can rightfully seize initiative in this war

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 4–10 August 2024

Seven publications (The Economist, Politico, The National Interest, Foreign Affairs, Globe and Mail, National Post, and Foreign Policy) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

How F-16s will affect the Russo-Ukrainian war. The editorial board of the Economist emphasizes that the F-16s handed over to Kyiv are not enough to defeat Russia’s air force, but it is a strong symbolic start. In late July, the first 10 (out of 79 possible) F-16s arrived in Ukraine. By the end of 2024, “Ukraine should be flying 20 of the American-made fighter jets. The rest, promised by the so-called F-16 coalition led by Denmark and the Netherlands, will arrive in batches during 2025.” According to the Economist, the reasons for the delay in providing the aircraft were a lack of political will, the language barrier in operating such complex equipment, and the need to create proper infrastructure for the aircraft. F-16s will help to eliminate the impunity with which Russian Su-34s strike Ukrainian infrastructure. However, for Ukraine to dominate the skies, it will need many more aircraft: “Of the 79 committed, at least ten are two-seat trainers. Some of the others may be in such poor condition as to serve mainly as a source of spare parts. Ukraine may have enough for just three to four squadrons.” That is why the main value of the F-16s’ arrival in Ukraine is to boost morale. According to the editorial board, “The F-16s’ arrival marks the start of building a NATO-standard air force. … NATO weapons systems such as Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles will be far more effective when carried by a plane they were designed for, rather than lashed on to elderly MiGs and Sukhois… Too few and too late though they may be, the F-16s’ importance should not be underestimated.”

The US presidential election could bring relief to Ukraine. Matthew Kaminski (Politico) is convinced that the US presidential election, regardless of its outcome, can be beneficial for Ukraine. It will reset the format of Washington’s support for Kyiv, which has proven ineffective. In the author’s opinion, the expectations that exist in the expert community regarding the policies of Donald Trump and Kamala Harris towards Ukraine are unlikely to correspond to their actual policies. Discussions in the camps of both candidates show that the position on Ukraine is not yet fully formed and continues to change. It is unlikely that Harris would continue the course of President Biden: all the key members of the 47th president’s team responsible for supporting Kyiv will not join the new administration. Instead, the Harris team may be more determined to support Kyiv. Donald Trump is also reassessing his position on Russia’s war against Ukraine: “After choosing Vance and claiming the nomination, the first foreign leader that Trump called was Zelenskyy. People who are familiar with the details insist it went even better than the warm readouts from their conversation. According to them, Trump told Zelenskyy it was ‘fake news’ that he’d help Putin and promised to push for a just peace.” Regardless of who wins the election, the next president will have to be much more explicit about defining any US intervention in Ukraine in terms of American interests: “A world with spheres of influence—the kind sought by China and Russia—would hurt America in multiple ways, not least economically, by shrinking the space available to U.S. goods, including for defense hardware and investment. That is an interest-based argument for arming the Ukrainians to win the war that they, not U.S. soldiers, are fighting.” According to Kaminski, “Trump and Harris can do what Biden hasn’t done and define it: Ensure a sovereign Ukraine emerges, with its security guaranteed, ultimately, by the U.S.”

Russia, China, and Iran’s interests collide in Central Asia. Arman Mahmoudian and Valentina Pegolo (National Interest) argue that the cooperation between Russia, China, and Iran in Central Asia is more a strategic convenience than a deep-seated alliance. Central Asia is a critical region, due to its rich natural resources and geographical location: “Rich in oil, gas, and rare minerals, the region also serves as a crucial transit corridor linking the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe.” Today, Central Asia is becoming increasingly important. For Moscow, this region is crucial in terms of avoiding sanctions and exporting energy resources. For Beijing, it is vital in terms of implementing the Belt and Road Initiative and importing cheap raw materials. Tehran needs Central Asia to develop strategic transport corridors to bypass competitors. According to the authors, “The three states’ competing visions for a regional order in Central Asia are giving rise to diverging interests in the security, energy, and trade spheres, which the West could leverage to deepen its engagement with the region.” Despite their common interest in countering the US in the region, Russia, China, and Iran have conflicting security goals in Central Asia: “Russia has the most significant military presence, with major bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and it leads the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). To counterbalance Russia’s dominance without challenging it directly, China has expanded its security engagement through the SCO and established a rapid-response military outpost in Tajikistan. At the same time, Iran seeks to make up for its lack of military presence in the region through security and economic partnerships.” In addition, the three states do not share a common vision of how to combat extremist groups. The loss of the European gas market because of Russia’s war against Ukraine has led to a convergence of interests between Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia. However, their interests are in direct conflict with the states of the region, which are seeking to reduce their dependence on the former: “Russia’s new role as an energy exporter in Eurasia has altered the status quo in the region, creating urgent dilemmas for the ex-Soviet Republics. Turkmenistan has the most to lose from Russia’s eastward pivot and has frantically looked for new export markets. The outpour of cheaper Russian gas into the Eurasian energy market threatens around 80 percent of Turkmenistan’s state revenues.” The trade interests of the three countries have not changed significantly. However, Russia’s war against Ukraine has exacerbated their differences: “If China and Russia have more to gain from cooperating to exclude Iran from the energy market, Iran and China stand to gain from trade cooperation through BRI at the expense of Russia.” According to Mahmoudian and Pegolo, “With the United States’ relative disengagement from Central Asia and growing competition for its resources, the underlying conflicts of interest among these countries become more apparent. Russia, China, and Iran each aim to secure their energy needs and economic interests, leading to rivalries often masked by their cooperative façade against common threats.”

Ukraine can rightfully seize initiative in this war. Mick Ryan (Foreign Affairs) is convinced that Kyiv can benefit from the weakening of Russia’s offensive impulse. At the end of 2023, Moscow had the opportunity to change the quality of the war against Ukraine in its favour, given the failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive in 2023, the delay in approving US aid, and the delayed adoption of the law on mobilization in Ukraine. However, Russia failed to use this opportunity to seize new territories: “All in all, the amount of territory seized by Russia since January 2024 adds up to around 360 square miles, an area roughly two-thirds the size of New York City. It is hard to describe these gains as a success when they came at the cost of more than 180,000 Russian casualties, according to Western intelligence estimates.” In the author’s opinion, no state can wage such an intensive offensive over a long period of time, not even Russia with its resources. Moscow’s momentum is likely to run out in a couple of months. Ukraine should start planning how best to take advantage of this. It will not be easy, but Kyiv has everything it needs to succeed. According to Ryan, “Ukraine can closely study the battlefield for signs of Russian weakness. It can work with NATO to train and prepare for new offensives. It can manage outside expectations. And it can devise a new theory of victory—one that makes Russia’s military position truly untenable. It is then, and only then, that Ukraine will be able to negotiate on favorable terms and secure a durable win.”

Canadian companies struggle to fully exit Russia—over 900 days after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began. David Milstead (Globe and Mail) reminds readers that over two years after Russia’s all-out war against Ukraine, some Canadian companies continue to maintain operations in Russia, despite their pledges to exit the country and show solidarity with Ukraine. While many companies—like Kinross Gold and PHX Energy—withdrew swiftly, often at a considerable financial loss, others—like CCL Industries (Toronto branch of the global label maker that is in the S&P/TSX 60 Index of large companies) and Calfrac Well Services—have either retained their Russian interests or struggled to divest. CCL, for example, still owns a 50% stake in a Russian joint venture, CCL-Kontur, which operates four plants in the country. Despite its public stance on supporting Ukraine, the company recorded record sales in 2023 from its Russian operations. Similarly, Calfrac, a Calgary-based oil services company, is still operating in Russia, generating higher revenue and profits than before the full-scale invasion, according to the author, though it claims to be actively seeking a buyer for its Russian subsidiary. Milstead also writes that Restaurant Brands International (franchiser of several chains, including Tim Hortons) has ceased collecting royalties from its 800 Burger King franchises in Russia, but those outlets continue to operate under the Burger King brand. The author emphasizes that Canada’s sanctions on Russia do not impose a blanket ban on business but rather focus on specific individuals, companies, and certain export categories, e.g., technology. While the issue is substantially moral as well,the international push to stop business in Russia aims to avoid supporting its war economy.

Africa becomes a new battleground in the Russo-Ukrainian war. Geoffrey York (Globe and Mail) writes on Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba’s recent visit to three African nations, where he offered grain shipments to drought-affected Zambia and Malawi but faced significant diplomatic setbacks in West Africa. Strong Moscow allies Mali and Niger announced a complete severance of ties with Ukraine after reports suggested Ukrainian involvement in a rebel attack that killed Russian Wagner Group soldiers in Mali. The reports were unproven; however, York cites a Ukrainian official who apparently hinted that Kyiv provided assistance to separatist rebels responsible for killing dozens of Russian military contractors in a battle in northern Mali last month. In response, Russia has accused Ukraine of opening a “second front in Africa” after its struggles on the Ukrainian battlefield. The conflict between Russian and Ukrainian influence in Africa has intensified since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in early 2022, with both countries vying for diplomatic and military support from African nations. Russia has expanded its military presence across the continent, including in Mali, Niger, Central African Republic, and Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, Ukraine has ramped up its diplomatic efforts in Africa—which Kuleba has acknowledged that his country had previously neglected—including opening new embassies and making multiple visits to the continent.

Trump could face a geopolitical dilemma in balancing strategy, support for Ukraine. Matthew Bondy (National Post) argues that even though a potential second Donald Trump presidency would bring renewed focus on key US foreign policy issues—including a tough stance on Iran and China and support for Israel—his anticipated approach to Ukraine remains a significant concern. While the Trump administration might emphasize “peace through strength” and challenge US allies to increase their defence spending, his handling of Ukraine could diverge from this approach. Trump has suggested a possible “settlement” of the war with Russia that might involve land concessions and Ukrainian neutrality, which contradicts the strategic benefits the US gains from supporting Ukraine. Bondy notes that this approach by Trump would be inconsistent with his otherwise strong foreign policy stance, as the war in Ukraine offers a chance for the US to weaken a major adversary at minimal cost to itself. Despite Trump’s past achievements in foreign policy, such as advancing the Abraham Accords and confronting China’s economic practices, his apparent reluctance to fully support Ukraine is concerning. “Trump’s carelessness on Ukraine probably boils down to personal animosity between himself and Zelenskyy,” the author writes. But inaction—allowing Russia to invade and dismember a neighbouring democratic state with no repercussions—would send a troubling message to Communist China, authoritarian Russia, radical Islamic Iran, and other rogue states, undermining US credibility and influence. Bondy concludes that Trump must rise above personal rivalries and take principled action on Ukraine support.

Ukraine’s Kursk operation may accelerate war’s end. Andreas Umland (Foreign Policy) describes the dramatic turn of events—Ukrainian forces have made significant territorial gains in Russia’s Kursk region, marking the largest advance by either side since Ukraine’s counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson in late 2022. This incursion is notable for demonstrating Ukraine’s capacity for surprise and rapid breakthroughs—in stark contrast, Umland notes, to Russia’s persistent failures in these areas. The operation is a historic event, as it marks the first time since World War II that foreign troops have invaded Russian soil. Ukraine’s Western allies, including the White House and the European Union, have expressed support for Kyiv’s move, signalling a shift in the strategic landscape. This development challenges the previously held belief that crossing Russian red lines would lead to uncontrollable escalation, as the Biden administration had previously limited the range and types of Western weapons supplied to Ukraine. As the Ukrainian offensive continues, the strategic implications remain uncertain, but it highlights Kyiv’s potential to alter the war’s dynamics and leverage its position in future negotiations—particularly as growing war-weariness among Ukrainians and international criticism of Kyiv’s refusal to engage in talks with Moscow intensify. The offensive could be a strategy to strengthen Ukraine’s bargaining position, potentially leading to a land-for-land deal rather than a land-for-peace arrangement, according to Umland. However, past experiences with Russian agreements, which have often been disregarded, still cast doubt on the likelihood of a lasting resolution.