EU is a bigger threat to Russia than NATO

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 14–20 July 2024

Six publications (The National Interest, Foreign Policy, The Economist, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, The Globe and Mail, and Washington Post) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

EU is a greater threat to Russia than NATO. Nicholas Lokker and Kate Johnston (Foreign Policy) argue that the real existential threat to Russia comes from the EU, not NATO. Moscow is afraid of the EU’s ability to stimulate profound political change in candidate countries. The recent elections to the European Parliament are the best evidence of Russia’s concern about the situation and its frantic efforts to destabilize the European community: “For Moscow, the new momentum toward widening and deepening the EU represents a unique and increasingly urgent threat to its attempts to assert its illiberal governance model, both at home and abroad.” According to the authors, Ukraine’s membership and integration into the EU could deal a fatal blow to Vladimir Putin’s regime, “turning Ukraine into what Russia most fears: a political, economic, and sociocultural alternative to Russia itself.” That is why Russia’s war against Ukraine began in 2014, when Kyiv was not yet seeking NATO membership but was preparing to sign an association agreement with the EU. EU enlargement threatens a key ideological pillar of the Kremlin’s foreign policy: “his antiquated obsession with maintaining a so-called sphere of influence along Russia’s periphery.” According to Lokker and Johnston, “To ensure the failure of Russia’s imperialist vision, the EU must follow through on its promises to integrate new members—while becoming more resilient in the process. It would be both a strategic and an ethical failure not to support other European countries wishing to develop resilient democratic political institutions, robust civil societies, and flourishing economies.”

How to build a lasting peace in Ukraine. Raphael J. Piliero, Kate Davidson and Peter Gaber (National Interest) argue that the US and other partners of Ukraine are looking for an opportunity to strengthen Kyiv ahead of negotiations with Russia. There is no alternative, as it is unlikely that Ukraine will be able to defeat Russia, and Kyiv’s defeat is unacceptable: “The destruction of Ukraine would not only be a tragedy but also a severe blow to the international norms against territorial conquest, NATO’s cohesion, and U.S. credibility.” According to the authors, “Ukraine’s most vital interest is the preservation of its sovereignty: an independent government chosen by the people of Ukraine. Any peace agreement that does not preserve a sovereign Ukraine in the long term is a failure.” An unconditional ceasefire does not guarantee a lasting and durable peace. Instead, agreements that establish material conditions that are difficult to change by military force and render both sides to invest in the settlement are more likely to establish a sustainable peace. Therefore, the main priority for Kyiv and its allies is to achieve conditions that would guarantee the preservation of Ukraine’s sovereignty: “Long-term military aid and multilateral security guarantees, Ukrainian military neutrality, and a rebuilding effort alongside economic integration with the West.” In sum, the authors emphasize, “As Ukraine and its Western allies formulate a strategy to end the war […] the key will be designing a peace that is not only resilient against future Russian aggression but also sustainable for the Ukrainian people.”

Russians expect nothing from the Russo-Ukrainian war. Kristaps Andrejsons (Foreign Policy) is convinced that the political apathy of Russians could hasten the end of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Apathy, tinged with fear, is the norm for Russians; it is their psychological survival mechanism. That is why Russians simultaneously support the war and want it to end as soon as possible: “Recent polls by the Moscow-based Levada Center show that support for war among the general population remains high, fluctuating around the 75 percent mark. At the same time, 71 percent of respondents would also approve of immediate peace talks.” The Kremlin is quite happy with this situation. After all, ideological supporters of the war could pose a threat to the current regime, unlike apathetic people. Therefore, “when Russians answer polling questions about their support for the war, they say ‘yes’—because that’s a political issue, and they have enough problems to deal with. At the same time, when they get asked about whether they would support immediate peace talks, they respond ‘yes’ again, because the killing of Ukrainians just seems odd to the vast majority of people—even if they’ve bought into Putin’s propaganda about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government supposedly being full of Satanists and neo-Nazis.” The current war is reminiscent of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but with one significant difference: “During the Afghanistan war, the Soviet Union sent regular conscripts to fight as per the mandatory service, and zinc coffins were seen in cities all over the USSR. In the Ukrainian war, Putin is careful to preserve the illusion of normalcy for the citizens of Moscow and St. Petersburg—it’s the ethnic minorities and convicts that do most of the fighting, as to not provoke the Russian people into caring too much.” According to Andrejsons, this is a chance to end the war: “If the war becomes a more personal problem, attitudes could shift fast. This is important, because people reevaluate their risks on a daily basis—when the regime is strong, they would rather lay low and stay on the safer side. But as soon as cracks start to appear, the very same people can suddenly turn fiercely.”

Russia is running out of weapons. The editorial board of the Economist emphasizes that as a result of depletion of the huge stockpiles of Soviet weapons, Russia will be forced to limit its attacks on Ukraine. This year’s failure of the Russian offensive against Kharkiv is the best proof of this. “After the first two years of the war, Russia had lost about 3,000 tanks and 5,000 other armoured vehicles.” The problem of significant losses of equipment on the battlefield is compounded by difficulties in accessing components: “Stores of components for tank production that before the war were intended for use in 2025 have already been raided, while crucial equipment, such as fuel-heaters for diesel engines, high-voltage electrical systems and infrared thermal imaging to identify targets, were all previously imported from Europe; their sale is now blocked by sanctions. The lack of high-quality ball-bearings is also a constraint.” In addition, due to sanctions Russia is dependent on “machine tools imported years ago from Germany and Sweden, many of which are now old and hard to maintain.” And the old Soviet supply chain has long been destroyed: “Ukraine, Georgia, and East Germany were all important centres of Soviet weapons and components manufacture.” According to the Economist, “Unless something changes, before the end of this year Russian forces may have to adjust their posture to one that is much more defensive…It could even become apparent before the end of summer. Mr Putin’s interest in a temporary ceasefire may soon increase.”

Canada’s defence chief warns of rising threats from Russia, China. Steven Chase (Globe and Mail) writes that General Jennie Carignan, recently appointed as Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff, is emphasizing the urgent need for Canada to enhance readiness in preparation for new long-range threats from adversaries such as Russia and China. Carignan highlights that advancements in hypersonic, cruise, and ballistic missile technologies by these nations pose significant challenges due to their unpredictability and reach. And she underscores the importance of co-operating with NORAD and NATO allies to address these emerging threats: “We have about five years to get us close enough to be ready to counter those long-range types of threats.” Carignan also notes that the melting Arctic is increasing Canada’s vulnerability, saying that “we are much more open now to both conventional threats and unconventional threats all at the same time.” Her predecessor, General Wayne Eyre, had also stressed the growing danger posed by authoritarian states, suggesting that the world could reach a “peak threat” level by the end of the decade. Eyre called for swift action to enhance military capabilities, emphasizing the importance of increased defence spending to meet NATO targets. He warned that the current period should be viewed merely as an “interwar era,” urging readiness for potential military escalation, and underscored the need for sustained support for Ukraine against Russian aggression: “That urgency is nowhere more necessary than our continued support for Ukraine, and strongly against vile and inhuman Russian aggression. The implications of the outcome of this war are momentous for our global future. Evil walks the face of the Earth, and it must be stopped.”

The world needs to push back against Russia’s neo-imperialism. Stephen Nagy (Macdonald-Laurier Institute) reports that Central and Eastern European scholars at a recent Warsaw conference stressed the seriousness of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, using terms like neo-imperialism and cultural genocide to describe Vladimir Putin’s ambitions. These analysts argue that Russia’s goal is to reconstitute the Soviet Union, potentially threatening countries like Belarus, Poland, Moldova, Georgia, and the Baltic states, and eventually others like Finland and Norway. The urgency to recognize and counter these threats needs to extend beyond Europe to North America, Western Europe, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Global South. Putin’s view that the Soviet Union’s collapse was a major geopolitical disaster underscores his expansionist agenda, aiming to restore Russia’s influence over its former imperial territories, according to Nagy. “Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the major geopolitical disaster of the century,” Putin noted in his 2005 annual address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. “As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself.” The author emphasizes the global implications of Russian neo-imperialism, highlighting the need for international solidarity against such aggression. For instance, India, which has border disputes with China, should be persuaded to reconsider its stance on the Russia-Ukraine war. Similarly, Southeast Asian countries facing China’s territorial ambitions must demand international enforcement of the rule of law. The potential annexation of Taiwan by China, which could severely disrupt regional economies, necessitates a robust international response. Nagy argues that an international order based on the rule of law benefits all nations, not just the West: “This is a value that all states have a deep-seated national interest in,” urging a collective stance against authoritarian aggression in order to maintain global stability and prevent the erasure of national identities and cultures.

How Canada can help mitigate Russia’s Baltic threat, strengthen Ukraine. Sergey Sukhankin (Macdonald-Laurier Institute) writes that after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, hopes were high that Kaliningrad, a small Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea, could transform into a prosperous, democratic bridge between Russia and the European Union. This dream was shattered as Kaliningrad reverted to its militarized Cold War stance, posing increasing threats to the West—especially after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent war in Ukraine’s Donbas. Russia’s large-scale military buildup in Kaliningrad, featuring enhanced electronic warfare, integrated anti-aircraft/missile defence systems, and precision-strike capabilities, has escalated regional tensions. Aside from Russia’s military challenges due to its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Kaliningrad remains a significant security concern, with its potential for hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns, cyber warfare, and border crises instigated by illegal migrant flows. The implications for Canada are profound, according to Sukhankin. Canada’s commitment to Operation Reassurance in Latvia, involving 2,200 military personnel by 2026, highlights the nation’s role in countering Russian aggression in the Baltic region. Kaliningrad’s military potential and hybrid threat capabilities pose direct and indirect risks to Canadian troops and regional stability. To mitigate these threats, the Canadian government should consider several steps: (1) Canada should apply political and economic pressure on Kaliningrad and Russia’s presence in the Baltic Sea region. Though limited militarily, Canada can leverage its G7 status and significant soft power, the author argues. It should introduce sanctions, ideally in collaboration with regional partners like Denmark, targeting all grain exports from Kaliningrad to Latin America and especially Mexico, as these profits fuel Russia’s war in Ukraine. Additionally, Canada should work with Baltic Sea allies to close the Danish Straits to Russian hydrocarbon carriers, which would severely downgrade Kaliningrad’s economic impact; (2) Ottawa can exert informational and psychological pressure on the Putin regime. As a leading advocate for democracy and human rights, the Canadian government should more actively support anti-Putin forums like the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum, which promotes democracy and independence for regions annexed or colonized by Moscow. These organizations are instrumental in swaying Russian public opinion against the Putin regime; (3) Canada should continue contributing to the security of the Baltic states, Sukhankin writes. For instance, Canadian troops stationed in Latvia could rotate to Ukraine as military instructors. While public support for Canadian troops in Ukraine is uncertain, the benefits extend beyond those gained from training Ukrainian soldiers. Canadian forces would receive valuable and practical insights into Russian warfare tactics. Additionally, increased engagement of Canadian (para)military personnel in Lithuania and Poland would send a strong message to Moscow about Canada’s commitment to the security of its strategic allies in the Baltic region.

Kirov residents demand victory at all costs in Russia’s war against Ukraine, the West. Francesca Ebel (Washington Post) argues that in Kirov, a small city in western Russia located about 1,000 miles from the front lines in Ukraine, while the war was initially met with ambivalence, it has increasingly garnered local support, driven by propaganda and Kremlin narratives of an existential conflict with the West. The impact of the war (which in Russia is only referred to as a “special military operation”) is also evident in local volunteer efforts, as many Kirov residents uphold the government’s justifications for the war. Local support is reinforced by state-controlled narratives, as seen in public displays like billboards, patriotic songs and medals for soldiers’ fathers at local events. The author observes that Kirov’s social media is overwhelmed with funeral notices and requests for help locating missing relatives.