CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 9–15 June 2024

Six publications (The New York Times, The National Interest, Foreign Affairs, The Globe and Mail, Toronto Star, and CBC) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

Featured topics

• The world and Ukraine: a new way to make Russian assets work for Ukraine’s victory; alliances mean victory.
• Russia at war: how to convince Russia that it will lose; Russia is running out of recruits for its war against Ukraine; Putin demands Ukraine cede territories on the eve of peace summit. 

MMS summaries

A new way to make Russian assets work for Ukraine’s victory. US Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen (New York Times) emphasizes that the time has come for the US and other allies of Ukraine to unlock the value of immobilized Russian assets and use them to support Ukraine. This step will convince the Kremlin that it cannot overcome the Western coalition and win against Ukraine. The US and its partners have already done a lot: imposed broad multilateral sanctions, provided Ukraine with weapons, equipment, and financial support, and “immobilized approximately $280 billion of Russia’s sovereign assets held in our financial institutions so that they cannot be used to fuel Putin’s war of choice.” The EU has already agreed to use the excess profits that it receives from frozen Russian assets in order to support Ukraine. But this is not enough. Ukraine should be offered a loan that would provide a decisive amount of funding: “The loan would be paid off by the earnings over time. The funds this loan would provide would equip Ukraine with the resources it needs to defend itself and to rebuild—paid for by the proceeds earned from Mr. Putin’s assets.” According to Yellen, such a “proposal would send a clear message to Mr. Putin that we are in it for the long haul: He cannot outlast Ukraine and our coalition. It is consistent with domestic and international law. And it would not foreclose taking additional actions on these assets together with our partners in the future.” 

Alliances are essential for Ukraine’s victory. Richard Levine (National Interest) emphasizes that alliances are the way to victory, while isolationism is the way to defeat. History shows that the victory of the US and the USSR over Nazi Germany in World War II was the result of their alliance, regardless of their ideological considerations: “It was the Red Army that broke the back of the Wehrmacht. Crucial to the Soviet Union’s victory was America’s Lend-Lease Act of 1941, which was originally titled An Act to Promote The Defense for the United States.” According to the author, the benefits of alliances stem from the advantages they bring to the US: “The Tizard mission is a testament to why alliances are necessary for America’s defense. Had this mission and other allied agreements never occurred, it may be conjectured that hundreds of thousands more Americans would have died in World War II.” Today, the US and Ukraine have similar arrangements that work to the benefit of both states:  “It is impossible to overstate the value yielded to America’s armed forces and the Department of Defense’s future procurement strategies from the battlefield information and insight provided by Ukrainian forces. In particular, this includes data on the employment and destruction of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) or drones on land and at sea.” Given that almost all of Washington’s aid to Kyiv is spent in the US, this symbiosis is in fact extremely beneficial for the United States. According to Levine, “In aiding Ukraine in obtaining victory, we must not forget that the lessons of this conflict constitute nothing less than a blueprint for how we may contest and ultimately defeat Russia, China, and Iran. Part of this knowledge will permit us to reform our defense industrial base so that it remains unequaled during a time of immense technological change.”

How to convince Russia that it will lose. Dan Altman (Foreign Affairs) argues that the key to Ukraine’s victory over Russia is to convince Moscow that its war is futile. Two key ideas dominate the debate on how to end Russia’s war against Ukraine: (1) the West should put pressure on Ukraine to make concessions to Russia; (2) the West should support Ukraine’s efforts to win on the battlefield. Both approaches recognize that war will end in peace negotiations. But neither approach is inherently conducive to the negotiation process. Putting pressure on Ukraine can only increase Russia’s appetite, and Ukraine’s tactical successes on the battlefield are unlikely to force Russia to end the war. According to the author, to end the war on terms acceptable to Kyiv, it is necessary to convince the Kremlin that it will not win: “The key to ending the war is changing Moscow’s expectations about how its war effort will fare three, five, and even eight years from now. Influencing the perceptions that exist in the minds of Russian leaders should be a primary goal of Western strategy.” There are three basic approaches to sending such signals. First, “Western leaders can shore up their commitment to Ukraine by increasing the costs they would incur from a Ukrainian defeat, thus strengthening their motivation to avoid that outcome.” Second, Western leaders should demonstrate their willingness to provide Ukraine with modern weapons for as long as it takes. Third, the West must make it clear that it is ready to invest more in weapons and munitions manufacturing today. According to Altman, “Reshaping Moscow’s long-term calculus is as important as winning today’s battles. Changing that calculus requires making investments to expand weapons and munitions manufacturing that are large enough to convince Moscow that the West will outproduce Russia in the years to come. The objective is to make Russian leaders fear a long war. That fear is vital to avoiding one.”

Russia is running out of recruits for the war against Ukraine. Stavros Atlamazoglou (National Interest) argues that Russia is forced to look for new sources of recruits because of heavy losses in its war against Ukraine. Moscow is compensating for its losses by “recruiting mercenaries from central African countries like Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, and Uganda.” Moscow promises a reward for their participation in its war against Ukraine: “Russia is reportedly offering a sign-up bonus of $2,000, monthly pay of $2,200, and the promise of a Russian passport.” For men from poor African countries, this is a lot of money—which, however, they are unlikely to use: “The life expectancy for the average Russian soldier in Ukraine is rather short.” A key factor in this decision was Russia’s heavy losses during the war, especially this spring: “Moscow has suffered over 500,000 casualties in 23 months of war and continues to lose more than 1,000 men killed, wounded, or captured every day. In May alone, the Kremlin lost approximately 40,000 men, or the equivalent of almost three divisions.” Another reason is that there are no more prisoners to recruit: “The infamous Wagner Group private military company recruited convicts to fight in Ukraine in exchange for promises of freedom once their contracts were over. The move proved useful, and the Ukrainian military had to expend many resources and significant manpower to deal with Russian human-wave tactics.” And the last reason, in the author’s opinion, is related to the Moscow’s fear of starting a new wave of mobilization inside the state: “The Kremlin knows that it can tap Russia’s vast manpower capabilities, [but] Russian President Vladimir Putin has been trying to shield Russian society from the war and pretend that all is well. At one point, he was forced to declare a partial mobilization, which sparked a mass exodus of military-aged men from the country.”

On the eve of the peace summit, Putin demands Ukraine’s capitulation. Mark MacKinnon (Globe and Mail) reminds readers on the eve of a critical summit in Switzerland aimed at advancing a peace plan for Ukraine that Russian leader Vladimir Putin has reiterated that peace will only come with Ukraine’s full military withdrawal from currently Russian-occupied southeastern regions and an official renouncement of NATO ambitions. This position, expressed just before the summit at the Bürgenstock Resort near Lucerne, underscores Putin’s continued push for Ukraine’s capitulation rather than a negotiated peace deal. In response, Ukrainian adviser Mykhailo Podolyak dismissed Putin’s statements as lacking genuine peace proposals, signaling that the summit’s focus will be on supporting parts of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s 10-point peace plan, which demands a full Russian withdrawal to pre-2014 borders—before Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea—and addressing key issues such as nuclear security, food security, and the return of prisoners of war. The summit, which sees attendance from major Western leaders but excludes Russia, faces challenges due to fluctuating participation from invited countries, influenced by alleged pressure from Russia and its ally China. Despite the anticipated endorsement of only portions of Zelensky’s plan, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba affirmed Ukraine’s commitment to its full Peace Formula. Concurrently, the arrival of Russian warships near Cuba, seen as a strategic show of force, underscores the geopolitical tensions surrounding the summit. Cold War historian Historian Sergey Radchenko noted: “This time, Moscow is eager to parade its presence,” highlighting the Kremlin’s overt display of military power amidst rising global stakes.

No peace deal in sight for Ukraine-Russia, Israel-Hamas wars. Allan Woods (Toronto Star) stresses that while peace efforts struggle on multiple fronts, Ukraine’s bid for a resolution to the Russia-instigated war remains at the forefront of international diplomacy. This weekend’s Ukraine-led summit in Switzerland, which Russia has dismissed as “absolutely futile” due to being excluded, aims to bolster support for President Volodymyr Zelensky’s 10-point peace plan. The plan demands the release of prisoners, complete Russian withdrawal from occupied territories, and establishment of a tribunal for war crimes. Despite these efforts, Vladimir Putin remains steadfast, reportedly open only to freezing the war along current front lines — a stance unacceptable to Ukraine. “The political bickering in Washington, as well as in Europe, about whether and how to support Ukraine has been a disincentive for Putin to seek peace and given him every reason to believe that holding out could allow him to cement Russia’s gains in Ukraine,” Woods noted. Meanwhile, global diplomatic maneuvers reflect the broader struggle for peace, with contrasting dynamics in other conflicts such as the Israel-Hamas war. The Swiss summit, overshadowed by these tensions, underscores the enduring challenge of negotiating peace while hostilities continue. Despite significant international pressure and sanctions, Putin’s determination to shore up Russia’s strategic position in Ukraine persists, buoyed by the belief that Western support for Ukraine could waver. The recent relaxation of restrictions on Ukrainian use of Western weaponry, coupled with renewed military aid, suggests a potential shift in the front-line dynamics. As Ukraine mobilizes fresh troops and Western allies contemplate using frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s war efforts, the prospect of a shifting front line could redefine the parameters of any future peace deal.

Ukraine recruits prison inmates to bolster military ranks. Briar Stewart (CBC) writes that Ukraine has recently initiated a program allowing inmates from medium-security prison “colonies” to enlist in the armed forces in an effort to bolster their military ranks. Nearly 100 inmates were released early from a prison on the outskirts of Kyiv to join the military, swapping their prison uniforms for combat gear. This initiative aims to address the military’s depleted ranks and dwindling volunteer numbers by potentially recruiting up to 20,000 soldiers from the country’s prisons. Inmates like Renat Temirgaliev, serving a ten-year sentence for murder, see this as a chance to redeem themselves and protect their country. “I want to be a hero of Ukraine. I want to protect my country,” Temirgaliev said, highlighting the mix of personal redemption and patriotism driving many inmates to volunteer. The recruitment process, which began after a law was passed in May, involves a court-approved application, military interviews, medical checks, and brief court hearings. Despite concerns about coercion, Ukrainian officials emphasize that the process is fair and free of pressure, unlike Russia’s use of convicts as Wagner mercenaries. More than 4,500 inmates have applied, with nearly 2,000 approved so far. Judge Dmytro Tkachenko, who oversees many of these applications, noted that most inmates are motivated by a sense of responsibility and patriotism. “Some of them told me that they feel some responsibility for the country, for the Ukrainian people,” Tkachenko said. “I think some prisoners may be [quite] effective in the war,” he concluded. 

Tentative peace might be good for Ukraine. Walter Dorn (New York Times) writes that after more than two years of Russia’s all-out war against Ukraine, a decisive victory for either side in the Ukraine war remains elusive, necessitating a future cease-fire and peace agreement. Such an accord would not only reduce the death toll and immense costs of the war but also fortify Ukraine’s defence capabilities and democracy, the author notes. The peace conference in Switzerland offers a crucial platform to explore the feasibility of an agreement. Dorn believes that “to secure a lasting cease-fire, [Ukraine] may need to recognize that Russia has control, though not sovereignty, over portions of four Ukrainian regions and Crimea — and halt its quest to seize back occupied areas by force.” A path to peace might also include Ukraine to pause its NATO application. These steps could stabilize the region and enhance Ukraine’s long-term security, according to Dorn, who is a professor of defence studies at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario, and the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. Many in the West fear that conceding to Russia would be tantamount to appeasement, yet the author believes that ending the war would enable Ukraine to rearm and deepen its integration with Europe and the West, thereby increasing deterrence against future aggression. A peace deal would involve robust measures to prevent further conflict, including a demilitarized zone and international inspections. This agreement could also facilitate Ukraine’s reconstruction, allowing millions of refugees to return home and fostering Ukraine’s European integration: “A tentative peace, even if interrupted by violations, would finally give the people of Ukraine time to rebuild their lives and their country.”