Ukraine can still win

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 29 June–5 July 2025

Six publications (The National Interest, Foreign Affairs, The Washington Post, The Globe and Mail, The Atlantic, and The National Post) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

Ukraine can still win. Michael Carpenter (Foreign Affairs) argues that the West’s half-hearted measures have prolonged the Russo-Ukrainian war, whereas decisive action now could bring it to an end. At present, neither side has any incentive to end the hostilities: “Ukraine refuses to surrender its sovereignty; Russia will not accept anything less than Ukrainian capitulation.” In the author’s opinion, the widespread belief that Ukraine is losing and will soon be forced to negotiate from a position of desperation is mistaken. Another view, that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire to subjugate Ukraine cannot be stopped, is also wrong. Both assumptions are based on an overly narrow interpretation of the battlefield dynamics and a limited understanding of the policy options available to Ukraine’s backers: “Despite significant constraints on the aid that Europe and the United States have offered over the past three and a half years, Ukraine has achieved impressive victories. It repelled Russia’s initial push toward Kyiv in March 2022 with little more than shoulder-fired antitank missiles and grit, defying the predictions of many military analysts. Later that year, in a stunning rout for Russian forces, Ukraine reclaimed nearly a thousand square miles in the Kharkiv region without the benefit of modern armor or air cover. And just weeks ago, Ukraine shocked the world by pulling off Operation Spiderweb, a surprise attack that used cheap, remote-controlled drones to inflict substantial damage on Russia’s long-range aviation.” The most significant obstacles to Ukraine’s military efforts have not been a lack of human resources or weak resolve on the part of Kyiv but rather insufficient provision of modern military capabilities. Solving this problem requires a radical change in Western strategy, combining a significant increase in military aid with more powerful economic measures aimed at curbing Russia’s military economy. According to Carpenter, “Victory may not come quickly, cheaply, or easily. But it is still possible and will likely cost fewer lives and resources than a perpetuation of the status quo. What remains to be seen is whether the West—especially Europe—is willing to summon the political will to secure this brighter future.”

Use of drones has changed the course of military operations. Harrison Kass (National Interest) believes that the proliferation of drone warfare has had an immense psychological and strategic impact on both Russian and Ukrainian troops. Drones have been used since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine. However, since 2002 they have rapidly evolved from reconnaissance drones to kamikaze drones and combat drones operating at long distances: “What began primarily as an improvised reconnaissance function has evolved into a high-intensity drone arms race, with both sides integrating drones into nearly every facet of the conflict, ranging from intelligence and surveillance to precision strikes, electronic jamming, and psychological pressure.” The widespread use of drones has changed the way armed forces conduct combat operations: “Now, both sides’ units hide under camouflage nets at all times, troop movement is conducted at night or in fog, and morale is far lower.” According to Kass, “Drone tactics and strategy have continued to evolve throughout the Ukraine War, in ways that will likely be studied and put to use in other conflicts. Throughout the conflict, drones have become indispensable tools for war fighting. In retrospect, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine will be the war that normalized drone warfare—an inevitability that analysts have been expecting for some time and which now seems to have fully occurred.”

Trump must be decisive in relations with Russia. Max Boot (Washington Post) declares that President Donald Trump should be as decisive toward Russia as he is toward Iran. In the case of Tehran, Trump’s actions have matched his statements. He must do the same with Moscow, which is waging an aggressive war against Ukraine. President Trump has repeatedly emphasized that if he had been president in 2022, President Putin would never have invaded Ukraine, but “since Trump returned to office this year, Putin’s attacks have surged—and Trump hasn’t done anything about it.” The White House has not taken any decisive measures to increase pressure on Moscow: it has not imposed additional sanctions, provided Ukraine with the necessary additional military equipment, or insisted on the transfer of frozen Russian assets worth $300 billion to Kyiv. According to Boot, the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine is as pure an example of good vs. evil as the modern world has seen: “That makes aid to Ukraine—leading to a peace settlement that safeguards its sovereignty—a moral and strategic imperative for the United States. Trump just doesn’t get it, and Ukraine could wind up paying a heavy price for his shortsightedness.”

Russia compares Ukraine to Azerbaijan. Taras Kuzio (National Interest) argues that recent statements by Russian officials indicate their fear that Ukraine may follow Azerbaijan’s tactics and decide to use military force to regain its occupied territories. Russia’s false narratives about the alleged “genocide” of Russian speakers by the “Nazi Kyiv regime” is nothing new. However, they began to promote another false comparison—between the Armenian-Azerbaijani and Russo-Ukrainian wars: “Describing Karabakh and southeast Ukraine as disputed regions, [Vladimir Medinsky, assistant to President Putin] raised the fear that if Russia and Ukraine sign a ceasefire agreement, as did Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s, then there will be a similar outcome of eventual loss of control.” However, this narrative is an attempt to hide the inconvenient truth that the Kremlin is afraid of losing the occupied Ukrainian territories, just as Armenia lost control over Nagorno-Karabakh. The loss of Ukraine and the occupied territories would put an end to Russia’s imperial ambitions: “Medinsky and the Kremlin are fearful that the dream of a Russian Empire will come crashing down when Ukraine liberates its occupied territories.”

Ukraine’s economic survival hinges on investment amid escalating war. Eric Reguly (Globe and Mail) notes that Ukraine faces a formidable challenge in attracting foreign investment and stimulating its economy amidst ongoing Russian aggression, regardless of an upcoming recovery conference in Rome that aims to accelerate rebuilding efforts. The country desperately needs financial support, weapons, job creation, and a robust tax base to survive and eventually rebuild, according to the author. Ukraine’s appeal as a stable investment destination is complicated by a recent surge in Russian aerial attacks, including the largest one overnight on June 29 with around 500 drones launched—“the biggest since the war began,” according to Ukraine’s air force—and a toll of “1,000 Ukrainian civilians killed since January,” as reported by the British foreign office. Still, Ukraine shows resilience, maintaining some economic growth with the help of roughly $100b a year in assistance, including weapons, and efforts to “crack down on corrupt oligarchs and launch business-friendly reforms.” The IMF forecasts GDP growth of 2–3% this year, rising to 4.5% next year—growth that could accelerate with peace. Making investments a bet on future stability, the upcoming Ukraine Recovery Conference will bring together global leaders to support Ukraine’s reconstruction, with agriculture, energy, and especially defence offering key investment opportunities. Ukraine is “essentially one big farm,” poised to benefit from EU integration, while companies like DTEK are seeking partners for “enormous wind farms.” Most notably, Ukraine has become “a world leader fast in aerial robot warfare,” drawing foreign interest, including from France and specifically Renault. Yet all these prospects exist against a backdrop of escalating Russian attacks and the “abrupt halt of some crucial U.S. weapons shipments,” which “will be hard to ignore in Rome.” Reguly writes, “If its economy shatters, so does its ability to defend itself”; and investment ultimately becomes a barometer of Western resolve to help Ukraine survive and eventually thrive.

Trump’s policy shifts are fueling Russia’s war. Anne Applebaum (Atlantic) argues that under Donald Trump’s leadership, the United States is undergoing a strategic realignment—“not merely in rhetoric but in reality”—that increasingly benefits Russia and undermines Ukraine’s survival. Despite Trump’s public gestures, such as posting “Vladimir, STOP!” on his Truth Social account or promising to end the war “in one day,” the reality is starkly different. Applebaum points out that following Trump’s direct communication with Putin, Russia launched its largest aerial attack yet, leaving parts of Kyiv in destruction and burning and causing numerous casualties. While Ukrainians continue to resist both in the air and on the ground, where 695,000 Russian troops are now stationed, the erosion of US support signals to Putin that victory is within reach. Trump’s administration has facilitated this shift through several policy reversals: First, it blocked a major weapons shipment that had already been funded by the previous administration, including the Patriot missile interceptors that are desperately needed to defend Ukrainian civilians. While Trump publicly hinted at supplying them—“We’re going to see if we can make some available”—his administration’s actions contradicted this. Second, the US is “essentially lifting sanctions on Russia” by ceasing to monitor and update them in response to evolving evasion tactics, allowing “new dummy companies to funnel funds and critical components to Russia, including computer chips and military equipment.” The result, according to Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, is a clear signal of Ukraine’s de-facto defeat: “The fewer the number of weapons that are delivered to Ukraine, the closer the end of the special military operation.” Applebaum believes the US is retreating from the information front, too. The Trump administration has dismantled the Global Engagement Center, a key tool in countering Russian disinformation, and is defunding Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty—moves that deprive America of any meaningful ability to “communicate with the Russian public or counter Russian propaganda.” The author warns that this leaves Putin unchallenged in shaping the war’s narrative, both abroad and inside Ukraine. Moreover, Trump’s own appointees are echoing Kremlin talking points. Trump’s Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, who was tasked with speaking to Putin (although there is no documented proof that Witkoff has expertise on Russia or the region’s history), for instance, reportedly agreed with Putin’s claim that “Ukraine is just a false country.” The cumulative impact is a dangerous new incentive structure—“sanctions are disappearing, weapons are diminishing, counterpropaganda is harder to hear”—that encourages Putin to escalate, not end, the war.

UofT research project under fire for echoing Kremlin narratives. Marcus Kolga (National Post) highlights a Canadian federally funded research project at the University of Toronto that has come under fire for using historically inaccurate and politically insensitive language that risks legitimizing Kremlin disinformation and distorting the traumatic legacy of Soviet colonization. The initiative of U of T’s Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), titled “Post-Soviet Canadian Diaspora Youth and Their Families,” frames formerly occupied nations such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine as part of a monolithic “post-Soviet” identity—terminology the author argues “reeks of Western academic chauvinism” and echoes Russia’s ongoing efforts to erase the distinction between occupier and occupied. Particularly problematic is the project’s use of a map depicting the Baltic states as part of the USSR—a depiction the author notes “more closely resembles those found in Soviet schoolbooks”—as well as its portrayal of the Soviet Union as a benign “multinational and multicultural country…experimenting (with) communist ideology,” with no mention of mass deportations, repression, or violent annexations. Critics, including the Baltic countries’ embassies in Canada and diaspora communities, contend that this framing ignores both lived trauma and key tenets of Canadian foreign policy, which “never recognized the Soviet Union’s occupation” of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The author warns that such positioning by academia undermines the resilience and agency of communities who resisted Soviet imperialism and inadvertently aligns with the Kremlin’s revisionist history that is used to justify present-day aggression. The project’s endorsement by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council under the banner of academic freedom is questioned as Kolga underscores that “academic freedom does not extend to legitimizing historical falsehoods… especially those that harm communities or align with authoritarian propaganda.”