Ukraine could become Trump’s Vietnam

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 16–22 February 2025
Four publications (Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The Globe and Mail, and The Wall Street Journal) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.
This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.
Featured topics
- The world and Ukraine: Ukraine could become Trump’s Vietnam; Ukraine must guarantee its own security; Donald Trump is wrong about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; Trump should leverage Russia’s economic weakness for a fair peace deal.
- Russia at war: China does not want to lead the “axis of evil.”
MMS summaries
China does not want to lead the “axis of evil.” Sergey Radchenko (Foreign Policy) argues that China is increasingly thinking about the feasibility of its alliances with Russia and North Korea. The announcement of a “no limits” partnership with “no ‘forbidden’ areas” by China and Russia in 2022 had far-reaching consequences: “The agreement implied that Beijing and Moscow were about to resurrect their long-defunct alliance that, when it briefly bound the two powers in the 1950s, projected a formidable threat that the United States could not afford to leave unchallenged.” Despite their differences, they have synchronized in order to challenge US dominance and the existing world order. The partnership between Beijing and Moscow has gone beyond rhetoric and symbolism: “China has provided material support for Russia’s brutal war of aggression in Ukraine in the form of dual-use technologies, which have both military and commercial applications, and purchases of Russian oil and gas.” Nevertheless, fearing the outbreak of a new Cold War with the West, Beijing does not support Moscow’s radical anti-Western plans: “Beijing does not want to commit to a formal Chinese-Russian alliance and bitterly resists the idea that it belongs to an ‘axis’ of some sort with Russia, North Korea, and Iran. And Kim Jong Un’s regime in Pyongyang is increasingly the main source of irritation in Beijing.” In the author’s opinion, “The main reason for Beijing’s seeming unwillingness to build a trilateral coalition with Russia and North Korea is that such an arrangement would call for strategic leadership by China, and Beijing is decidedly uninterested.” According to Radchenko, “China’s hesitancy to head an alliance of unreliable partners in a struggle against the West suggests that its leaders are aware of the high costs of confrontation and are hedging their bets. President Donald Trump’s unconventional diplomacy, which pairs militant rhetoric and threats of economic warfare with promises of great power cooperation with China and Russia, has added to the uncertainty in Beijing about the United States’ direction. As a result, Washington has a golden opportunity to test China’s intentions through renewed diplomatic efforts, even while gearing up for containment.”
Ukraine could become Trump’s Vietnam. William McGurn (Wall Street Journal) opines that Ukraine could become a personal defeat for President Donald Trump if he makes concessions to Russia. He and his administration should not repeat the mistakes made by Washington during the Vietnam War: “Then as now, security guarantees were a top concern. The fear was that after the US troops left, North Vietnam would resume the war.” President Donald Trump has fallen into the same trap as President Richard Nixon: “Mr. Trump campaigned that he was the man to negotiate a deal that would end the carnage in Ukraine. If he does and the deal ultimately goes south—meaning that Vladimir Putin resumes his aggression—it would be a huge stain on his legacy.” Certainly a just and lasting peace is Ukraine and the West’s ultimate goal, but it all comes down to the reliability of its security guarantees: “From the standpoint of his own legacy, Mr. Trump’s best friends are those who point out that the provisions Mr. Putin most objects to are those most necessary to guarantee peace. The issue isn’t getting the Russian leader to the table but getting him to honor an agreement.” According to McGurn, “Maybe Mr. Trump will negotiate a strong deal that will preserve a ‘prosperous and sovereign’ Ukraine. But there are sobering parallels between this week’s US-Russia talks in Riyadh that exclude Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the secret US-North Vietnam negotiations conducted behind Thieu’s back. Mr. Trump would do well to remember: If this deal ends in catastrophe, he will own it.”
Ukraine must guarantee its own security. Emma Ashford (Foreign Affairs) argues that the armed forces of European states could not stop the Russian war against Ukraine, nor could they prevent a new one. Based on the public statements of leaders of its member states, NATO is closed to Ukraine in the short term. President Volodymyr Zelensky is looking for alternatives: “If NATO membership is not available, then his country needs equivalent security guarantees from Europe or the United States to prevent Russia from starting a new war in coming years.” Signing a peace agreement without real security guarantees would render any negotiations futile: “Without some kind of on-the-ground tripwire presence to force their hand in the event of conflict, a simple guarantee would likely be viewed as an empty promise in Moscow, akin to the 1994 Budapest memorandum, which offered Ukraine assurances about its security as it relinquished any claim to retaining Soviet-era nuclear weapons.” In the author’s opinion, it is important to understand that the deployment of European troops alone is unlikely to guarantee Ukraine’s security: “The current front line in Ukraine is over 500 miles long; Ukraine’s borders with Russia and Belarus are over 2,000 miles long. Various military assessments suggest that between 40,000 and 200,000 troops would be necessary to enforce peace and to deter Russia from future attack. The upper end of that range is simply not feasible, given existing forces and readiness; current talks are instead focused near the low end, a proposed deployment of around 50,000 European troops.” Instead of paper promises of NATO membership or insufficient deployment of European troops, Ukraine needs more funding and weapons to focus on building its own credible defence capability. According to Ashford, policymakers should consider alternatives to direct security guarantees and identify “how to boost Ukraine’s own deterrent capabilities while addressing the conflict’s underlying causes.”
Donald Trump is wrong about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. David J. Kramer (Foreign Policy) remarks that while President Donald Trump is right to say that Russia’s war against Ukraine “never should have started,” he is wrong about who is responsible. As the US and Russia begin negotiations in Saudi Arabia to resolve the Russo-Ukrainian war, it is important for Americans to clearly understand that “it is Putin who bears responsibility for the massive loss of life among Ukrainians and Russians. Putin is guilty of war crimes and genocide against the Ukrainian people. Putin is the one who could stop this war at any moment.” Russia’s attack on Ukraine was not motivated by NATO expansion, but by the Moscow regime’s fear that Ukraine’s fundamentally democratic society—which was galvanized particularly during the Revolution of Dignity—could spill over into Russia: “To try to stem the tide, Putin sent ‘little green men’—a term used to describe his invading force—into Crimea, the peninsula part of Ukraine, and arranged for a rigged referendum to argue that Crimea wanted to become part of Russia. Putin and his pliant parliament illegally annexed Crimea in March 2014.” The truth is that the Kremlin “has never viewed Ukraine as a legitimate, independent state” and that NATO enlargement was just a pretext to attack Ukraine. That is why Washington should put pressure on Moscow, not on Kyiv. According to Kramer, “Contrary to Kremlin propaganda occasionally parroted by Westerners, there are few wars in which responsibility is as clear-cut as this one: Ukraine is the victim of Russia’s unjustified, unprovoked, and barbaric invasion. Putin, therefore, must not be rewarded for what he has done to Ukraine. Nor must Ukraine be excluded from negotiations that involve its fate. Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.”
Trump’s Putin overture poses risks to Ukraine’s sovereignty, Western security. Michael Bociurkiw (Globe and Mail) warns that US President Donald Trump’s portrayal of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin as a peacemaker opens the door for major geopolitical concessions to Russia while sidelining Ukraine from negotiations concerning the illegal war on its territory. The US-Russia talks, led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, mark the first high-level bilateral meeting since 2021, allowing Putin to push for demands that were previously unthinkable. These include freezing the current battle lines, blocking Ukraine’s NATO bid, lifting sanctions, and potentially unfreezing $300 billion in Russian assets. While the summit in Riyadh yielded no immediate results, the U.S. delegation confirmed that security guarantees and territorial discussions will continue, reinforcing concerns that Ukraine’s fate may be decided without its input. President Volodymyr Zelensky declared, “We want everything to be fair and that nobody decides anything behind our back.” However, Ukraine has little leverage if the US pursues a settlement, especially given Trump’s history of transactional diplomacy and his suggestion that Ukraine “may be Russian some day.” Bociurkiw underscores that Trump’s approach resembles that of a “slumlord,” demanding repayment for military aid without offering security guarantees. Beyond Ukraine, the author highlights the broader consequences of Western inaction and dependence on US support. With European allies failing to increase defence spending, they would be unprepared to counter Russian aggression should the US abandon Ukraine. Even the UK’s proposal to send peacekeepers faces resistance from Berlin and Warsaw, raising doubts about whether NATO can field the necessary force. Bociurkiw questions whether Putin would tolerate NATO troops in Ukraine and whether European countries have the capability to sustain such an operation. The author warns that “even in the best-case scenario, Ukrainians may have to sacrifice significant portions of their land.” With Ukraine weakened and the West hesitant, Europe finds itself in a precarious position. The author concludes: “Europe hasn’t been this vulnerable to a leader’s expansionist ambitions since the Second World War.”
Canada’s Arctic defences lag as Russia, China expand influence. The editorial board of the Globe and Mail warns that Canada is unprepared for the escalating geopolitical tensions in the Arctic that have intensified since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Once a region of cooperation, the Arctic is now a focal point of military expansion—particularly by Russia, which has fortified its presence with new bases and the largest naval fleet in the region. Moscow is also deepening its Arctic ties with China, which aims to become a “polar great power” by 2030 and recently sent a coast guard fleet into the region for the first time. The shrinking Arctic sea ice has made the Northwest Passage, which Canada claims as sovereign waters, and the Northeast Passage, controlled by Russia, increasingly viable for shipping. While Arctic transit is still modest, the trend is accelerating, with record cargo ship and tanker activity in both passages over the past two years. The board stresses that Canada must act decisively to confirm whether the US still views NORAD as a cornerstone of North American defence and whether it remains committed to protecting the Arctic from Russian and Chinese encroachment. If not, Canada must deepen its cooperation with Nordic NATO allies. Germany and Norway have already invited Ottawa to participate in a submarine program that could bolster Arctic security by the early 2030s. Current Canadian defence plans—including a $38.6-billion NORAD upgrade and the procurement of new submarines and icebreakers—are spread over decades, failing to meet the urgency of the moment. “Canada is not on a war footing, but it is no longer living in a conventional peacetime era,” the authors warn. To protect its sovereignty and security, Canada must take swift, concrete action now, not in twenty years.
US pressure and Kremlin tactics may push Kyiv toward Moscow. Kateryna Bondar (Foreign Policy) notes that Ukraine faces growing pressure from both the United States and Russia, with early elections emerging as a potential tool to reshape its leadership in a way that could favour the Kremlin. Bondar argues that US President Donald Trump’s approach—seeking to extract economic concessions from Ukraine while sidelining it in negotiations with Russia—risks weakening Kyiv’s position. A proposed deal offering Washington control over Ukraine’s critical resources in exchange for military aid and NATO prospects was rejected, but the mere airing of the proposal sparked concerns of “economic colonization.” Meanwhile, Trump’s recent rhetoric, calling President Volodymyr Zelensky a “dictator without elections,” aligns with Russia’s claims that Zelensky is illegitimate due to postponed elections. The author underscores that Russia has long used hybrid warfare tactics to install pro-Russian leadership in former Soviet states, and an early vote in Ukraine could create an opportunity for Moscow to exploit internal divisions. “Ukraine falling back into Russia’s sphere of influence might seem unthinkable now, [but] it could, in fact, become a reality over the course of a decade.” Beyond Ukraine, she highlights the broader geopolitical risks of what is amounting to a US retreat. Trump’s recent moves to normalize relations with Russia, including high-level talks that excluded Ukraine and European allies, suggest a shift toward ending Moscow’s isolation. US officials have already signaled a reluctance to support Ukraine’s NATO aspirations or its recapture of occupied territories, further emboldening the Kremlin. The author draws parallels to Georgia, Moldova, Hungary, and Slovakia, where Russian-backed forces have successfully manipulated elections and public opinion to shift governments toward Moscow’s influence. If Ukraine is forced into early elections and fractures politically, it could pave the way for a pro-Russian candidate who promises peace at the cost of sovereignty. “If Ukraine falls, the Kremlin’s success would echo far beyond Eastern Europe, encouraging further geopolitical shifts in Russia’s and, more importantly, China’s favor,” Bondar’s piece warns, arguing that the consequences would extend beyond Ukraine, undermining Western credibility and security worldwide.
Trump’s “peace plan” pressures Ukraine to concede as US sidelines allies. Mark MacKinnon (Globe and Mail) reminds readers that US President Donald Trump’s push for a peace deal with Russia is causing alarm in Kyiv and among Western allies, as it threatens to concede to nearly all of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demands. The shift in US policy was signalled by Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, who called Ukraine’s goals of restoring its territorial integrity and securing NATO protection “unrealistic.” Trump followed by attacking President Volodymyr Zelensky, falsely calling him “a dictator without elections,” amplifying Kremlin propaganda narratives. Meanwhile, Trump’s administration is negotiating directly with Russia in Riyadh, sidelining Ukraine from discussions about its own future. The proposed deal includes a ceasefire, early elections in Ukraine, and later negotiations—raising fears that Ukraine will be forced into political instability while still under attack. The Trump administration’s stance has further isolated Ukraine, with Trump suggesting Kyiv must accept a deal or risk losing US support. “Zelensky better move fast or he is not going to have a Country left,” Trump posted on Truth Social. Ukrainian officials, however, have rejected Trump’s demands so far, particularly a proposal to grant the US access to Ukraine’s rare earth minerals as payment for military aid. Zelensky stated, “I cannot sell our country,” pointing out that the US offer lacked security guarantees. Meanwhile, Russia continues its military offensive along the 1,000-kilometre front, showing no real intent for peace. Analysts warn that Trump’s approach mirrors pre–World War II appeasement policies, where European nations were pressured into ceding territory to aggressors under the illusion of securing peace. With Trump effectively neutralizing NATO’s influence in the negotiations and declaring the war a European problem, concerns are growing over the US’s commitment to defend its allies, including the Baltic states. As European leaders scramble to reassess their security strategies, Ukraine is reaching out to Canada and the EU for increased military assistance. Despite three years of war fatigue, polling shows that Ukrainians are determined to reject an unfair settlement. MacKinnon quotes political scientist Olga Onuch: “Ukrainians, their leaders, the ordinary citizens, will keep fighting for their survival. And Ukrainians have shown us that they are capable of fighting.”
Trump should leverage Russia’s economic weakness for a fair peace deal. Eric Reguly (Globe and Mail) critiques the effectiveness of Western sanctions on Russia, pointing out that while the sanctions have inflicted significant damage, the Russian economy remains largely intact and capable of funding the war effort. Despite sanctions targeting Russian banks and energy exports, Russia’s defence spending has surged, now consuming 7% of GDP. However, the economic toll is evident, with burgeoning inflation, high interest rates, and a strained national wealth fund, which could soon be depleted. This has left the Russian economy dependent on high defense spending that offers little to the wider economy, with the country’s ability to continue funding the war in question if oil prices fall further. Reguly stresses that US President Donald Trump could leverage Russia’s deepening economic weaknesses to pressure Putin into a more favourable peace agreement for Ukraine. However, Trump’s current rhetoric and actions seem to align with Russia, including blaming Ukraine for the war and making concessions to Putin. The author concludes with a grim statement: “Unless (Trump) plays on Russia’s deepening economic weakness, Ukraine, the invaded, will pay more than Russia, the invader, and that’s not right,” and urges strategic use of sanctions in order to force a fair peace settlement.