North Korean troops become cannon fodder for Russia

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 12–18 January 2025

Six publications (Foreign Policy, The National Interest, The Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs, CBC, and Toronto Star) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

Moscow is doomed to defeat. Rajan Menon (Foreign Policy) insists that any territorial gains made by Russia will not change the fact that it has been defeated in the war against Ukraine. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow has pursued two key goals: “The first was to annex as much Ukrainian territory as possible: ideally, all of Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia provinces. That would have been—and nearly was—complemented by the seizure of the capital city of Kyiv and the replacement of Ukraine’s government with one beholden to Russia. The invasion’s second, larger purpose was to use these gains to absorb Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of influence and transform the European balance of power.” Neither goal has been achieved. Instead, Russia’s war against Ukraine has only encouraged Ukrainians to distance themselves more and more from everything Russian: “After years of Russian revanchism, Ukrainian identity is now defined by a determination to have as little to do with Russia as possible.” Every day, Ukraine is integrating more and more into the EU, including militarily, which contravenes Moscow’s primary goals: “European states are already supplying arms to Ukraine, training its troops, and investing in its defense industries. Their role will continue to expand, and Ukraine—which now has the most experienced, battle-tested army in Europe—will be militarily aligned with European countries for the long run, even without a formal alliance.” According to Menon, “These developments indicate that no matter the outcome of the war, Putin will have failed to achieve his foremost goal of retaining Ukraine within Russia’s sphere of influence. Nor will the conflict leave Russia better off in other respects.”

Russia has demolished its achievements of the 2000s. Luke Rodeheffer (National Interest) argues that Russia’s war against Ukraine has cancelled out Moscow’s economic achievements in recent decades. In the early 2000s, President Vladimir Putin did a lot to stabilize the Russian economy: consolidated the fiscal situation, reduced foreign debt, launched financial reform, and created favourable conditions for innovation. However, Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine has set all these achievements back. Russia’s Sovereign Welfare Fund is almost completely depleted because of the war: “On the eve of the invasion, the fund had liquid assets totaling $114 billion. The fund is now rapidly depleting, with some analysts concluding that Russia is using sleight of hand to inflate the perceived value of remaining assets in the fund and ultimately risks bankruptcy in the medium term.” Financial reforms aimed at improving the country’s demographic situation have failed: “Russia’s fertility rate was 1.2 in 2000. By 2015, it had reached 1.78. On the eve of the invasion, it was 1.4, roughly on par with the EU average. Nearly three years later, estimates by the BBC’s Russian service calculated that somewhere between 140,000 and 170,000 Russians, overwhelmingly men, had been killed in the war as of October 2024.” The innovation environment is on the verge of disappearing due to the Kremlin’s repressive policies: “In July 2024, Arkady Volozh, the founder of Yandex, Russia’s most successful internet company, fled Russia after divesting himself of all assets in the country, taking with him hundreds of specialists and a plan to build Europe’s most powerful artificial intelligence systems in the Netherlands. He had made the mistake of criticizing the war and was labeled a traitor by the Kremlin.” Moscow’s dream of expanding the influence of the Eurasian Economic Union is likely unrealizable. According to Rodeheffer, “The wheels are coming off of the economy that Vladimir Putin has staked his whole presidency on repairing and maintaining.”

North Korean troops become cannon fodder for Russia. Seth G. Jones and Benjamin Jensen (Wall Street Journal) suggest that Kyiv and Washington should take advantage of the failures of the joint North Korean–Russian troops to drive a wedge in relations between Moscow and Pyongyang. North Korea sending soldiers to the Russo-Ukrainian war was an operational disaster: “Their troops have performed poorly in combat, failed to integrate with the Russian military, and suffered significant casualties.” This failure demonstrates “the critical weaknesses of the axis of autocracies consisting of Russia, North Korea, China and Iran.” Elite North Korean troops are used by Moscow for frontal attacks that result in heavy losses: “South Korean intelligence estimates that North Korea’s forces have suffered around 3,000 casualties—a quarter of the fighting force. At least 300 have been killed. In many battles, such as one near the village of Plekhove, North Korean formations launched costly ‘meat assaults’ that consisted of human-wave attacks…For comparison, this rate puts North Korean casualties nearly on par with one of the bloodiest battles of World War I, the Battle of the Somme.” According to the author, Moscow’s dependence on North Korean forces and inability to synchronize its own actions create an opportunity for Ukraine: “By targeting these vulnerable units, Ukrainian forces can erode Russian combat effectiveness while sowing discord within the axis’s coalition.” It also creates internal problems for Russia’s President Putin: “He acquired these foreign troops to avoid another mobilization. Destroying them will strip him of that luxury.” The administration of US President-elect Trump can use these tensions to deepen the rift between Moscow and Pyongyang. According to Jones and Jensen, “If Ukraine and President Trump can continue to exploit these problems, then they can keep the axis on its heels.”

China does not mind North Korean troops in Ukraine. Jacob Stokes (Foreign Policy) opines that Beijing is happy with anything that helps Russia win its war against Ukraine and costs it nothing. The assumption that the participation of North Korean troops in the Russo-Ukrainian war is a matter of concern for China is wrong: “Beijing is unlikely to oppose, much less do anything to stop, North Korea’s military support to Russia. China has made it clear, both rhetorically and through its actions, that it wants Russia to prevail in Ukraine or at least avoid what Russian President Vladimir Putin has called a ‘strategic defeat.’” There are several reasons why China is taking this position. First, Beijing is interested in deepening its relations with Moscow. Second, China supports the principle of Russia defending its “legitimate security interests”: “What China means by legitimate security interests is the right of major powers to assert a veto over the political and security relationships of its neighbors, and to enforce them militarily if necessary.” Third, China provides Russia with huge economic aid and technical support. Fourth, Beijing is constantly testing the limits of the patience of the US and its European allies: “It is only fear of Western reprisals, such as tighter export controls, sanctions, or a complete rupture of relations, that prevents Beijing from directly providing traditional overt military assistance to Russia.” Fifth, Beijing thus ensures the stability of Kim Jong Un’s regime: “Russia’s remunerations to North Korea in the form of food, fuel, and potentially technical military assistance on space, satellites, and missiles bolster the government in Pyongyang.” Sixth and last, Pyongyang’s assistance to Moscow contributes to the continuation of Russia’s war against Ukraine, thereby “occupying scarce U.S. strategic attention and resources that might otherwise be directed toward China.” According to Stokes, “Western attempts to get Beijing to restrain its most pugnacious partners are understandable—they are just unlikely to work. For now, at least, China sees the North Korean troops fighting in Ukraine as a feature, not a bug, of closer authoritarian cooperation with and among Moscow and Pyongyang.”

Putin’s edge lies in warmongering, outlasting Western leaders. Terence McKenna and Alex Shprintsen (CBC) highlight how Vladimir Putin’s interactions with foreign leaders over his 25-year reign reveal a deliberate strategy to maintain dominance and influence. Personal relationships, both friendly and adversarial, have played a key role in shaping international dynamics. The Russian president’s private dinner invitation to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his close camaraderie with Chinese leader Xi Jinping show how he builds alliances to support his vision of a “new world order,” according to the authors. As Putin remarked at the 2024 BRICS summit, such friendships underpin this strategic shift. In contrast, he has been known to play psychological games, such as bringing a Labrador to a meeting with Angela Merkel, knowing her fear of dogs. Former Canadian foreign minister Peter MacKay described this as a “character flaw” that crosses diplomatic norms. Putin’s treatment of leaders is rooted in his long-term approach to power, viewing Western politicians as transient compared to his enduring rule, McKenna and Shprintsen write. The West’s repeated misjudgment of Putin’s intentions has had dire consequences, McKenna warns in the new CBC documentary. While leaders like US President George W. Bush initially hoped to bridge divides, hindsight reveals their widespread underestimation of his authoritarian ambitions. Dissidents like Garry Kasparov and Vladimir Kara-Murza, interviewed by CBC, point out that Western democratic nations often turned a blind eye to Putin’s early domestic crackdowns, enabling him to escalate his global aggression. As former French President François Hollande observes, this fundamental disconnect persists: for Putin, war and death are tools of statecraft, a stark contrast to Europe’s commitment to peace. “Europeans don’t want to go to war. For them, war has a terrible history, the history of the 20th century, and there is no reason to think that war is possible on the continent today. But for Putin, war is possible. That’s the disconnect. We are peaceful, democratic nations that don’t like death. Whereas for Putin, death is part of the action.”

Trump’s return pressures EU to focus on Ukraine, defence autonomy. Erik Jones and Matthias Matthijs (Foreign Affairs) argue that the return of Donald Trump to the White House and his anticipated policies—such as reducing military and financial aid to Ukraine and questioning the USA’s commitment to NATO—pose significant challenges for the European Union. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, which prioritizes shifting focus to China and imposing tariffs on European imports, puts Europe at a crossroads. While some EU leaders propose “buy American” strategies to appease Trump, others fear this will not prevent retaliatory tariffs or reduced security guarantees. Trump’s stance on Ukraine also shifts the burden of support to Europe, with the expectation that the EU will take the lead in funding and sustaining Ukraine’s defence against Russian aggression. “Continuing to rely solely on procurement from the United States is incompatible with Europe’s longer-term security autonomy,” the authors warn. To address these challenges, the EU must prioritize long-term structural reforms, particularly in defence and economic integration. However, Euroskeptic leaders like Viktor Orban and Giorgia Meloni, as well as broader economic stagnation in key member states like Germany and France, threaten to derail these plans. “Europeans will need to invest an additional 800 billion euros annually to restore the continent’s industrial prowess,” according to the authors. Lastly, Trump’s policies could either force Europe to strengthen its integration or deepen divisions among EU member states. While some leaders may opt for bilateral deals with Trump, others recognize the need for unity to maintain security and economic resilience. Failure to act risks ceding economic and political influence to the United States and China. “A more cohesive Europe is not just an economic necessity; it is an existential challenge to preserve its role as a steadfast democratic ally in a volatile world.”

Legal disputes, costs stall removal of seized Russian cargo plane. Estella Ren (Toronto Star) reminds readers that a Russian Antonov An-124 cargo jet, grounded at Toronto Pearson Airport since February 2022, remains stranded as a complex legal and logistical impasse prevents its removal. Initially seized under sanctions responding to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the aircraft has accrued over $1 million in parking fees, which the Canadian federal government is covering. Ownership disputes, maintenance challenges, and the high costs of making the plane operational again have delayed plans to surrender it to Ukraine. Aviation expert John Gradek says that the airplane “has to, in fact, be turned on and flown. It’s not happened for close to three years,” suggesting the jet may now require costly disassembly for transport. Canada must also legally clear ownership under the Special Economic Measures Act before deciding its next steps, including repairs or forfeiture. Adding to the gridlock are legal challenges from Volga-Dnepr Airlines, which claims no ties to the Russian government and has filed a $100 million suit against Canada for violating a 1989 treaty. The airline argues the plane has suffered from prolonged exposure to the elements without maintenance. McGill University aviation law professor Vincent Correia emphasized the treaty’s clause allowing expropriation for a public purpose but acknowledged the case’s complexities due to the ongoing war. Gradek suggests that Canada might negotiate costs with Ukraine: “It’s gonna cost a lot of money to basically bring this airplane into a flyable condition.” Regardless of the way Canada chooses to proceed, Ren argues that it will be a long time yet before the airplane is moved from Toronto.