CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 15–21 December 2024

Six publications (The New York Times, The Washington Post, Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, The Economist, and The National Interest) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

Featured topics

• The world and Ukraine: four scenarios for the end of the Russo-Ukrainian war; Ukraine’s victory will have a positive impact on the welfare of Western countries; peace talks should start without Ukraine.
• Russia at war: Moscow has passed the point of no return; Europe must balance resources between supporting Ukraine and deterring future conflict; Ukraine’s intelligence services strike again with targeted assassination in Moscow; Ukraine’s economic recovery will be a game-changer for US and beyond.

MMS summaries

Four scenarios for the end of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Rajan Menon (New York Times) argues that for the first time in the three years of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there is a chance for peace talks. Both sides need them, due to exhaustion and internal socio-economic and political factors. Peace talks are meaningless without guarantees that will protect Kyiv from possible future aggression by Moscow. According to the author, there are four key possible scenarios for ensuring Ukraine’s future security. First, albeit unlikely, is Ukraine’s membership in NATO: “At least seven NATO countries are reported to oppose Ukraine’s entry or want to defer it indefinitely, including the United States—Mr. Trump’s top advisers have said that membership is off the table.” The second scenario would grant security guarantees for Ukraine from a coalition of states. However, the US is trying to avoid any commitments: “Mr. Trump, who seeks not only to end the war without making any promise to protect Ukraine but also to reduce America’s security commitments in Europe in general, is unlikely to sign off on any such arrangement.” Third, European states could assume responsibility for security in the region, including the deployment of their troops in Ukraine. The fourth scenario would impose neutrality on Ukraine, implying staying outside of NATO. This scenario is desirable for Moscow and threatening for Kyiv, thus it is unlikely that Ukraine would agree. But if it does, Kyiv would be wise to stock up on the most advanced weapons. According to Menon, “After more than 1,000 days of a war that has killed thousands, displaced millions, and destroyed large parts of Ukraine, the end may be approaching. But for a durable peace, rather than a freeze that’s just long enough for Russia to regroup and reattack, it’s what comes afterward that counts.”

Ukraine’s victory will have a positive impact on the welfare of Western countries. Marc A. Thiessen (Washington Post) emphasizes that Ukraine’s victory is in the interests of the US for not only political but also economic reasons. Kyiv has sizable gas and mineral deposits: “Ukraine is not only the breadbasket of Europe; it is also a mineral superpower, with some of the largest reserves of 117 of the 120 most widely used minerals in the world. Of the 50 strategic minerals identified by the United States as critical to its economy and national security, many of which are quite rare yet key to certain high-value applications, Ukraine supplies 22.” According to the author, “One of the main reasons Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine (aside from his delusional historical fantasies about how Ukrainians and Russians are “one people”) was to seize these natural resources, which are valued at an estimated $26 trillion.” If Ukraine loses the war, these resources will be used to strengthen the economies of Russia and China. Conversely, a Kyiv victory would strengthen the economies of Western countries. Washington should not only stop the war but also prevent any future resumption of Russian aggression. Firstly, that will require creating defensible borders. Secondly, Ukraine should be provided with ironclad security guarantees. Thirdly, Ukraine’s armed forces should be armed and strengthened to the maximum extent possible in order to permanently deter Russia. According to Thiessen, “A stable, sovereign, and prosperous Ukraine will be an essential partner for America in extracting this natural resource wealth. An unstable Ukraine under constant threat from Russia will lead to a resumption of war when Trump leaves office and ultimately allow Putin to seize that wealth for Russia and China’s benefit.”

Moscow has passed the point of no return. Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Michael Kofman (Foreign Affairs) argue that Washington should help Kyiv significantly strengthen its position as peace talks loom, as this is in its interests. Moscow’s goal is not only to conquer Ukraine but also to destroy the world order created by the West: “Moscow’s actions underscore how, after almost three years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of its neighbor, Putin is now more committed than ever to the war with Ukraine and his broader confrontation with the West. Although the conflict is first and foremost an imperial pursuit to end Ukraine’s independence, Putin’s ultimate objectives are to relitigate the post–Cold War order in Europe, weaken the United States, and usher in a new international system that affords Russia the status and influence Putin believes it deserves.” The Kremlin’s desires are not new, and Russia’s war against Ukraine has only strengthened its resolve while narrowing its options: “Putin has already transformed Russia’s society, economy, and foreign policy to better position the Kremlin to take on the West. Having accepted the mantle of a rogue regime, Russia is now even less likely to see a need for constraint.” Moscow will try to use the ceasefire and possible easing of sanctions to improve its position for the next war. Therefore, the key question is not whether Russia will pose a threat to the US and its allies, but “how to assess the magnitude of the danger and the effort required to contain it.” China will remain a key US competitor, but Washington cannot afford to lose sight of the Russian threat in Europe, which has global implications: “Putin’s willingness to invade a neighbor, assault democratic societies, and generally violate accepted norms—and his seeming ability to get away with it—paves the way for others to do the same. The Kremlin’s provision of military equipment and know-how to current and aspiring US adversaries will amplify these threats, multiplying the challenges that Washington will face from China, Iran, North Korea, and any other country that Russia backs.” According to the authors, “By taking the steps necessary to counter Russia today, the United States and Europe can ensure that the threat they face tomorrow will be a manageable one.”

Peace talks should start without Ukraine. Anatol Lieven (Foreign Policy) argues that the first stage of peace talks should be led by the US and Russia. Ukraine should be involved in the negotiations at a later phase. There are issues that Washington must agree with Kyiv before bilateral talks with Moscow, and without which further negotiations are impossible: “These aspects include the terms of a ceasefire, the nature and extent of any demilitarized zones, and any constitutional amendments guaranteeing the linguistic and cultural rights of Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine. US negotiators will have to be fully cognizant and respectful of Kyiv’s views on Ukraine’s vital interests.” However, in the author’s opinion several issues can be resolved without Kyiv’s participation, among them: Ukraine’s membership in NATO, possible deployment of Western troops to Ukraine, Western security guarantees for Ukraine, further arms supply to Kyiv, lifting of the sanctions against Russia, etc. According to Lieven, “The United States has been the essential and irreplaceable supporter of Ukraine in this war, not only because of the aid that it has given but because European countries would not have given their aid without US encouragement and backing. American citizens have, in consequence, been faced with great costs and considerable risks, and wider US interests have been endangered. This gives US citizens the right to expect their government to take the lead in trying to negotiate an end to the Ukraine war—especially since it is the only government that can.

Europe must balance resources between supporting Ukraine and deterring future conflict. Franz-Stefan Gady (Foreign Policy) explores Europe’s critical choices as Ukraine’s military situation remains difficult and US military aid prospects are waning. The looming possibility of a cease-fire that favours Russia highlights the risks of inaction, with French President Emmanuel Macron advocating for a robust European peacekeeping force. Despite Macron’s efforts, key European powers like Germany and Poland remain hesitant, while Italy has signaled potential support. The article warns that Europe’s indecision could lead to dire consequences: “Without a significant Western military presence in Ukraine, any security guarantee to what remains of Ukraine will likely be ignored by Russia.” A cease-fire without robust enforcement risks enabling Russia to regroup and reignite hostilities, potentially escalating into a larger and more brutal conflict in the future. Gady notes that deploying a European force in Ukraine would necessitate a significant commitment, including a minimum of 25,000 to 30,000 active troops, rotating personnel, and extensive logistical support. The mission would require months of preparation, including training and coordination with Ukrainian officers, as well as an exit strategy to ensure that Ukraine can rebuild its defences. To free up resources, Europe may need to re-allocate troops from existing missions in the Balkans, Africa, and even NATO’s Baltic deployments. Gady stresses that a lighter, traditional peacekeeping force would be ineffective against Russia’s battle-hardened army, calling for “a robust force capable of fighting and holding its ground” similar to NATO’s presence in Kosovo or US forces in Korea. Even without direct troop involvement, US support is deemed crucial for planning, logistics, and additional deterrence. A combined approach, featuring Global South peacekeepers at the cease-fire line and a European rapid-reaction force further back, could offer a feasible compromise. “If the Europeans want to avoid the next war, they must be ready to engage directly in Ukraine—despite the obvious risks involved.” 

Ukraine’s intelligence services strike again with targeted assassination in Moscow. Editorial board of the Economist reports that Ukraine’s security services have intensified their targeted operations against key figures in Russia’s military infrastructure. On 16 December the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) accused General Igor Kirillov, head of Russia’s nuclear, biological, and chemical protection forces, of mass chemical weapons use in Ukraine—a charge tied to 4,800 incidents and over 2,000 hospitalizations of Ukrainian troops. The following day, Kirillov was killed by a remote-controlled explosion in Moscow, marking one of the most audacious Ukrainian operations to date in the Russo-Ukrainian war. The SBU claimed responsibility, asserting that Kirillov, who was sanctioned by the UK for war crimes and disinformation, was a legitimate target. The attack underscores Ukraine’s determination to hold perpetrators accountable, even deep within enemy territory; numerous such operations have included the killing of Russian commanders, officials, and collaborators. “Mr Kirillov’s assassination shows that Ukraine’s intelligence services remain lethal. The message Ukrainian agents have sent is that they can target the Russian armed forces’ top brass, even in Moscow.” The Economist concludes that Russia’s inability to mount a comparable campaign inside Ukraine leads to its predictable response—escalating attacks on Ukrainian civilians. 

Ukraine’s economic recovery will be a game-changer for US and beyond. David Ayer and Michael Hewitt (National Interest) envision a path to success for Ukraine and the United States, drawing on historical examples of postwar reconstruction in Japan, South Korea, and Germany. The authors argue that Ukraine has the potential to become an economic and innovation powerhouse, benefiting both nations through strong commercial ties. This becomes possible by securing Ukraine’s vast critical mineral resources, restoring its land, and ensuring energy security through civil nuclear power, all of which will drive Ukraine’s economic renaissance. The reconstruction will not only revitalize Ukraine but also foster prosperity for the US through mutual development. Additionally, Ayer and Hewitt highlight the need for innovative approaches to defence, infrastructure, and technology in Ukraine’s recovery, which will undoubtedly include redesigning the defence industrial base, leveraging new battlefield technologies, and developing world-class data systems to ensure security and economic growth. In addition, establishing a Silicon Valley-style innovation hub in Ukraine is seen as crucial to harnessing the intellectual potential of the Ukrainian people. “The story of Ukraine must be told, including why Ukraine matters and why a strong partnership with the United States matters. The values of the Ukrainian people mirror our own, and their resilience can provide hope and vision, not just for their people but for our nation as well,” the authors summarize. 

MMS takes a closer look:

Should peace talks take place without Ukraine? Anatol Lieven (Foreign Policy) suggests that Ukraine’s participation in negotiations with Russia and the US at the first stage could nullify all attempts to restore peace. After all, Kyiv may not want to compromise with the aggressor state on many issues. Therefore, in his opinion, Ukraine should be withdrawn from the negotiation process at the first stage. Only after Moscow and Washington agree on a negotiating framework would Kyiv then be invited to join the process.

The MMS notes that the suggested approach would contravene the foreign policy principle of “Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine”—which was agreed by Kyiv’s Western allies during Russia’s war against Ukraine and could lead to Ukraine’s “soft capitulation.” Ukraine, as a victim of Russia’s aggressive war and fighting to preserve its sovereignty, has the right to be an active participant in negotiations on its future. The author is correct that the “first and most fundamental goal of the talks (as in all such negotiations) will be for each side to clearly establish, on the one hand, its vital interests and absolute and nonnegotiable conditions and, on the other hand, what points it is prepared, in principle, to compromise on.” However, Lieven’s proposed approach makes it clear that a compromise would be reached at the expense of Ukraine, and conversely, it is unclear what concessions Russia is willing to make. The future of Ukraine and the security of the European continent cannot be decided “behind the scenes,” without Kyiv’s presence or input in the process. No one wants peace more than the Ukrainians, but peace solely at the expense of Ukraine is unacceptable.