Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk has destroyed Kremlin narratives

CIUS weekly report on North American media coverage of Ukrainian affairs, 18–24 August 2024

Seven publications (The National Interest, Foreign Policy, The Wall Street Journal, Globe and Mail, National Post, Washington Post, and Winnipeg Free Press) were selected to prepare this report on how Ukraine has been portrayed in the North American press during the past week. The sample was compiled based on their impact on public opinion as well as on their professional reputation, popularity among the readership, and topical relevance. These publications represent centrist viewpoints on the political spectrum.

This MMS report covers only the most-read and relevant articles about Ukraine, as ranked by the respective North American publications themselves in the past week. Its scope covers promoted articles on home pages and articles from special sections on Ukraine, with the hashtag #Ukraine, from the paper editions of the publications, and about Ukraine from opinion columns and editorials.

MMS summaries

Washington needs to support Ukraine’s offensive. Jake Auchincloss (Wall Street Journal) argues that Washington should help Ukraine take advantage of the successful offensive on Kursk. It can help in three ways. First, President Biden must clearly define what Ukraine’s victory means: “a secure eastern border, freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, and imminent Ukrainian accession to the European Union.” This would create conditions for “a strategic defeat for Vladimir Putin and a victory worthy of Ukrainians’ heroism.” Second, the White House should allow Kyiv to strike Russian oil refineries, which would weaken its military machine. In parallel, Washington should impose new maritime sanctions to reduce Russia’s oil revenues. Third, President Biden should provide long-term funding for Ukraine from frozen Russian assets: “A deal with Brussels would help MAGA-proof Ukraine’s defenses… By investing long-term capital, Ukraine could turbocharge its defense industrial base.” According to Auchincloss, “It’s the stuff victory is made of, and Mr. Biden can deliver it before he leaves office.”

Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk has destroyed Kremlin narratives. Alex Kovalev (Foreign Policy) declares that Ukraine’s offensive deep into Russia has destroyed the Kremlin’s propaganda narratives. One narrative destroyed was “about the supposed existential threat to Russia emanating from Ukraine.” It turned out that this was not the case: “Even pro-war television pundits point out that Kyiv could use occupied areas of Russia in a land-for-land trade—in other words, they correctly see the incursion as part of a strategy to evict Russia from Ukraine, not to threaten Russia itself.” A second narrative that has been destroyed is “Putin’s image as an authoritarian leader, which is built on strength, order, and the promise to make Russia great again.” President Putin’s inability to defend Russia’s borders, despite his imperialist ambitions, completely discredits him: “In the TV talk shows, prominent pundits have been tearing at the propaganda edifice. One proposed ‘sacrificing’ Russia’s border regions to Ukraine—hardly a vision of strength. Another called on the leadership to stop the lies and be more honest about military setbacks, while a third wanted strict censorship to shield the populace from embarrassments.” Next, by moving the war to Russia, “Ukraine has popped the bubble of the Kremlin threats to escalate the war, based on the idea that Russia’s existence—rather than Ukraine’s—was somehow at stake.” Fourth, the narrative about Russia’s “red lines” has been destroyed: “In 2016, Putin infamously claimed that Russia’s borders don’t end anywhere. Today, it turns out that they don’t begin at any particular point, either.” Finally, the Ukrainian offensive on Kursk shattered the narrative that “Russians collectively support the war [only] because government-sponsored polls say so.” According to Kovalev, “most [Russians] do take their cue from Putin: In case of trouble, just ignore it and hope it goes away.”

“Space troops” are fighting in Kursk. Peter Suciu (National Interest) argues that the participation of space troops in the Kursk battle is a sign of Russia’s weakness. This week’s media focus was not on the “Little Green Men,” who played a key role in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014 during the Crimea occupation, but on “Russia’s so-called ‘Space Troops,’ which were rushed to help defend the border region of Kursk, which Ukrainian forces invaded earlier this month and as of this week control 1,150 square kilometers (444 square miles) of territory.” Several sources have already reported that Moscow has sent to Kursk a motorized rifle regiment of the Aerospace Force, which is not an elite special forces unit but [rather] “engineers, mechanics, and other servicemen from a Russian spaceport.” In the author’s opinion, they have neither the combat qualifications nor the appropriate equipment to be effective on the battlefield. This step appears to be an act of desperation on the part of Moscow. According to Suciu, the move has caused confusion even among sympathizers of the Russian regime: “The deployment of the Space Troops to Kursk has caught some Russian propagandists off guard—much like the Kremlin was caught off guard when Kyiv invaded the region, marking the first invasion into Russia since World War II.”

Kamala Harris should revamp Biden’s Ukraine strategy for victory. Anders Aslund (Globe and Mail) writes that while the Biden administration’s support for Ukraine was crucial in preventing an early Russian victory, it has since failed to develop a clear strategy for achieving a decisive Ukrainian win. As Ukraine now experiences a costly war of attrition, this lack of direction is increasingly problematic. Aslund suggests that if elected, Kamala Harris should seize the opportunity to differentiate herself by adopting a more assertive policy to ensure Ukraine’s victory. Ukraine’s goals are straightforward: to fully restore its territorial integrity, ensure the return of all displaced citizens—including thousands of children abducted by Russia—and obtain full compensation for the damage inflicted by Russia. For its part, the United States currently lacks a defined strategy vis-à-vis Ukraine.

Harris’ policy could significantly increase military and financial aid to Ukraine, providing it with $150 billion per year (double the current support), and grant it the right to target Russian bases deep inside the country. Aslund also emphasizes that the U.S. policy should move beyond the fear of provoking Putin, since the likelihood of nuclear escalation is minimal. A major part of this strategy involves leveraging frozen Russian assets held in Western banks to finance Ukraine’s defence. The author highlights that the U.S. Congress has passed legislation authorizing the seizure of these assets, while the European Union has been reluctant to follow suit, an approach the author deems irrational. By seizing these assets, Harris could bolster Ukraine’s ability to defeat Russia without additional strain on the US budget. The author concludes that “for Ms. Harris, the current impasse is an opportunity,” noting that a more assertive stance could turn the Ukraine war into a major political win for her.

Ukraine’s Kursk incursion highlights strategic dilemma amid stalemate, ceasefire talks. Gwynne Dyer (Winnipeg Free Press) discusses Ukraine’s recent cross-border incursion into the Kursk region in Russia, highlighting strategic and symbolic significance rather than territorial gain. While Russia and Ukraine present conflicting claims about control over territories, Ukraine’s foreign ministry spokesperson clarified that Ukraine is not interested in holding the Kursk region indefinitely. As of 27 August, Ukraine controlled close to 1,294 square kilometres (almost 500 square miles) and 100 settlements in Kursk oblast. The primary goal of the operation seems to be to undermine Russian President Putin’s narrative and demonstrate to Western supporters that Ukraine remains resilient. However, holding on to this territory could provide Ukraine with leverage in future negotiations, potentially using captured Russian land as a bargaining chip for Ukrainian territories currently under Russian control. Dyer points out the complexities of a potential ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia, noting that both sides might be considering it but with very different terms. Putin accuses Ukraine, backed by what he calls “Western masters,” of intending to improve its negotiating position by holding Russian territory hostage. Meanwhile, Ukraine may also be wary of the upcoming US presidential election, fearing that a win by Donald Trump could force Kyiv into an unfavourable deal which leaves significant portions of its territory under Russian occupation. A Trump-free scenario might allow more time, but a prolonged war could last over a decade (history shows that most extended interstate wars do). Both sides are caught in a strategic dilemma, according to the author—whether to pursue a ceasefire now or wait for an unforeseen development that could shift the war’s balance. She emphasizes the difficulties of achieving a ceasefire, as it “just freezes everything at the precise moment when the ceasefire is signed,” without resolving core issues or compensating victims. Any agreement would likely cement the current front lines for decades, as seen in wars like the Korean and Iran-Iraq. Given these stakes, both Ukraine and Russia appear to be calculating their next moves cautiously, with neither side rushing to the negotiating table before seeing the outcome of the US election.

Kursk operation exposes Russia’s “red lines” as bluffs. Robyn Dixon and Catherine Belton (Washington Post) examine Ukraine’s recent incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, highlighting how this direct ground assault, the first of its kind since World War II, has exposed the shallowness of Russia’s so-called “red lines.” Despite previous threats of severe retaliation from Putin if Russia’s territorial integrity is threatened, Moscow’s response to Ukraine’s bold actions has been surprisingly muted. This pattern of inaction has led to growing skepticism about the effectiveness of Washington’s cautious approach to military aid, which has been designed to avoid escalating tensions with Russia. Analysts argue that this strategy has limited Ukraine’s ability to drive Russia out and has prolonged the war, leading to significant casualties. Ukraine’s persistent and largely successful defiance of these red lines—ranging from attacks on Russian territory to the use of Western-supplied weapons—has prompted a reassessment of the situation. Former Ukrainian intelligence official Oleksandr Danylyuk said that the Kursk incursion “proved the Russians are bluffing,” thereby challenging the narrative that Ukraine cannot win the war. President Zelensky used the incursion to call for lifting the US restrictions that prevent Kyiv from striking deeper into Russia, arguing that the “naive, illusory concept of so-called red lines regarding Russia” has now crumbled. However, while the incursion has shifted some perceptions, it has not yet altered the overall balance of the war, with Russia continuing its focus and push on eastern Ukraine.

Russia’s attack on the Kharkiv printing house is not just about the destruction of books. Anastasia Nikulina (National Post), a Ukrainian writer, shared her thoughts on how a Russian missile strike on the Factor-Druk printing house in Kharkiv on 27 May resulted in the tragic loss of seven lives and the destruction of countless books, symbolizing the broader assault on Ukrainian culture and history. Russia used S-300 missiles, fired from inside its territory, to target the factory, which belongs to Ukraine’s prominent Vivat publishing house. The attack, occurring just before Ukraine’s national holiday for book printers and publishers, decimated works by numerous authors. The destruction of these books highlights Russia’s ongoing efforts to erase Ukrainian identity, the author notes, emphasizing the cultural genocide Russia is attempting by systematically erasing Ukrainian stories and those who create them.